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Abstract 
Many Indonesian banks suffered problems and some even failed in the early 1990s. 
This provided evidence that risk-based capital adequacy regulation in Indonesia had 
failed to prevent banks from taking excessive risks. Such observations provide the 
motivation for this thesis which seeks to identify the nature of bank risks in Indonesia 
and also analyses the operation of risk-based capital adequacy regulation in Indonesia. 
To obtain a general view of risk in Indonesian banks, this thesis includes an empirical 
study to identify the determinants of problem banks in Indonesia using a logit fixed- 
effect model. The model also can be used as an "early warning" device in banking 
supervision. This study finds that credit risk and operational risk contributed 
significantly to banking problems. State banks, non-foreign exchange banks and 
regional development banks are shown to be also sensitive to interest rate risk. Foreign 
exchange rate risk is less significant for banks (by group) in Indonesia. If we examine 
cases individually, however, there were some bank failures which were due to 
excessive foreign exchange rate risk. 
This thesis also finds that the adoption of risk-based capital adequacy regulation in 
Indonesia contains some deficiencies, such as focusing only on credit risk (ignoring 
market risk). This study suggests that market risk should be included in capital 
adequacy assessment and a number of alternative models of risk assessment 
[exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) and generalised autoregressive 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH)] are analysed. 
The results of the empirical study show that the inclusion of foreign exchange rate risk 
in capital adequacy assessment results in a higher capital requirement than that 
resulting from the application of the BIS's standardised methodology. This study also 
finds that the decay factor of 0.94 suggested by J. P. Morgan (J. P. Morgan, 1995, 
1996) is irrelevant for [DR (Indonesian Rupiah) exchange rate returns. Additionally, 
assessment of foreign exchange rate risk using GARCH suggests a lower capital 
charge than that applicable under the BIS's standardised methodology and EWMA. 
The policy implications of these findings are also considered. 
i 
Table of Contents 
Pages 
Abstract i 
Table of Contents ............................................................... ii Acknowledgments 
............................................................... vi List of Figures ............................................................... vii List of Tables ............................................................... viii List of Acronyms ............................................................... ix List of Appendices ............................................................... xi List of Graphs ............................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1. Bank reform in Indonesia ................................................... I-1 1.2. Problem in bank regulation in Indonesia ..................................... 1-3 1.3. Basic concept of risk in finance ..................................... 1-5 1.4. Bank risk classification ....................................................... 1-9 1.5. Measuring bank risk ...................................................... 1-13 1.6. Cases of bank failure in various countries .................................... 1-17 1.6.1. Selected bank failure in the US ..................................... 1-17 1.6.2. Selected bank crises in the UK ..................................... 1-22 1.6.3. Individual bank failure cases in Indonesia ................... 1-24 1.6.4. Bank failure in other countries ..................................... 1-31 1.6.5. Summary of bank failure cases in various countries .............. 1-32 1.7. Objectives of thesis 1-34 ....................................................... 1.8. Framework for thesis .............................................. I-3 5 1.9. Structure of thesis ....................................................... I-37 
Chapter 2- Survey of Empirical Works on Bank Failure 
2.1. Introduction 
............................................................... II-1 2.2. The aims of bank failure prediction models .............................. 11-2 2.3. Modelling in the prediction of bank or company failure .................. 11-4 2.4. Sample proportion ...................................................... 11-12 2.5. Criteria for classifying banks as "failure" ................................. 11-14 2.6. Explanatory variables ...................................................... 11-16 2.7. Performance measurement and tests .................................... 11-22 2.7.1. T-test 
............................................................... 11-22 2.7.2. Log likelihood ratio test .................................... 11-22 
2.7.3. Pseudo-R....................................................... II-23 
11 
2.7.4. Classification of errors .................................... 11-24 2.8. Conclusions 
............................................................... 11-26 
Chapter 3- An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Potential Problem 
Banks in Indonesia 
3.1. Introduction III-1 
3.2. Models 
....................................................... 111-2 3.3. Data III-11 
3.4. Dependent variables ...................................................... 111-12 3.5. Independent variables ............................................. 111-13 3.5.1. Ratio relating to credit risk ...................................... 111-14 3.5.2. Ratios relating to liquidity risk .................................... 111-14 3.5.3. Ratios relating to solvency risk .................................... 111-15 3.5.4. Ratios relating to interest rate risk ............................... 111-16 3.5.5. Ratios relating to efficiency risk .................................... 111-17 3.5.6. Exchange rate risk ............................................. 111-19 3.6. Empirical results ............................................................... 111-19 3.7. Conclusions 
............................................................... 111-27 
Chapter 4- Capital Adequacy Assessment with Respect to Market risk 
4.1. Introduction 
...................................................... IV-1 4.2. The BIS's approach to capital adequacy assessment with respect to 
market risk ............................................................... IV-3 4.2.1. Framework 
...................................................... IV-4 4.2.2. Some pitfalls in the BIS's proposal ........................... IV-6 4.2.2.1. Amount of required capital ........................... IV-6 4.2.2.2. Comprehensiveness 
........................... IV-7 4.2.2.3. Regulatory constraints ........................... IV-7 4.2.2.4. Portfolio effects .................................... IV-7 4.2.2.5. Equivalent treatment of risks ........................... IV-8 4.2.2.6. Rewarding precision in risk management ......... IV-8 4.2.2.7. Durability 
............................................. IV-9 4.3. Models to assess market risk ............................................. IV-9 4.3.1. Definition of VaR ............................................. IV-10 4.3.2. Volatility assessment methodologies ........................... IV-13 4.3.3. Parametric approach (delta valuation method) .................. IV-16 4.3.4. Identification of exposures .................................... IV-19 4.3.4.1. Fixed income exposure ........................... IV-20 4.3.4.2. Exposure arising from foreign exchange positions ..... IV-23 4.3.4.3. Portfolio risk ............................................. IV-27 
iii 
4.3.5. Problems with VaR ............................................. IV-29 
4.4. The pre-comnvtment approach .................................... IV-30 
4.5. Conclusions 
............................................................... IV-34 
Chapter 5- Literature Review of Financial Instruments and Risk Evaluation 
Methodology 
5.1. Introduction ............................................................... 
V-1 
5.2. Swaps ............................................................... 
V-1 
5.2.1. Basic concept of swaps ............................................. 
V-1 
5.2.2. Risk evaluation methodology for interest rate swaps ......... 
V-2 
5.2.3. Risk evaluation methodology for currency swaps ......... 
V-5 
5.2.4. Application of VaR to swaps .................................... 
V-8 
5.3. Bonds 
............................................................... 
V-11 
5.3.1. Basic concept of bonds ............................................. 
V-11 
5.3.2. Risk evaluation methodology for bonds .................. 
V-11 
5.3.2.1. Duration method .................................... 
V-11 
5.3.2.2. Convexity method .................................... 
V-15 
5.3.3. Application of VaR to bonds .................................... 
V-17 
5.4. Forward rate agreements (FRAs) and futures ........................... 
V-19 
5.4.1. Basic concept of FRAs and futures ........................... 
V-19 
5.4.2. Risk evaluation methodology for FRAs and futures ......... 
V-20 
5.4.3. Application of VaR to FRAs and futures .................. 
V-21 
5.5. Options 
........................................................................ 
V-24 
5.5.1. Basic concept of options .................................... 
V-24 
5.5.2. Risk evaluation methodology for options .................. 
V-26 
5.5.2.1. Put-call parity relationship ........................... 
V-26 
5.5.2.2. Black-Scholes model ........................... 
V-29 
5.5.2.3. Risk neutral valuation .................................... 
V-31 
5.5.2.4. The binomial tree .................................... 
V-34 
5.5.2.5. Sensitivity of option premium ........................... 
V-38 
5.5.2.5.1. Delta (A) .................................. 
V-39 
5.5.2.5.2. Gamma (I') ........................... 
V-40 
5.5.2.5.3. Theta (O) .................................... 
V-41 
5.5.2.5.4. Vega (A) ....................................... 
V-41 
5.5.2.5.5. Rho (P) .................................... 
V-42 
5.5.2.5.6. Price sensitivity of all Greek letters ......... 
V-42 
5.5.3. Application of VaR to options .................................... 
V-43 
5.6. Equities 
............................................................... 
V-44 
5.7. Conclusions ...................................................... 
V-45 
iv 
Chapter 6- Foreign Exchange Rate Risk Assessment Using Alternative 
Models: Empirical evidence 
6.1. Introduction 
............................................................... VI-1 6.2. Models 
........................................................................ VI-3 
6.3. Data 
........................................................................ 
VI-6 
6.4. Identification of the patterns of data .................................... 
VI-12 
6.4.1. Sample autocorrelation function (ACF) ........................... 
VI-13 
6.4.2. Test of a whitenoise process .................................... 
VI-15 
6.4.3. Partial autocorrelation function (PACF) ........................... 
VI-18 
6.4.4. Unit root test ...................................................... 
VI-20 
6.4.5. Identification results ............................................. 
VI-23 
6.5. Exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) .................. 
VI-23 
6.5.1. Theory of EWMA ............................................. 
VI-24 
6.5.2. Universal optimum decay factor in EWMA .................. 
VI-27 
6.5.3. Empirical results of forecasting IDR using EWMA ......... 
VI-28 
6.6. Theory of the ARIMA and GARCH models .................. 
VI-31 
6.6.1. Models of the mean process .................................... 
VI-31 
6.6.1.1. Autoregressive (AR) models ........................... 
VI-31 
6.6.1.2. Moving average (MA) models ........................... 
VI-32 
6.6.1.3. Autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models ...... 
VI-33 
6.6.2. Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) VI-33 
6.6.3. Model selection procedures in GARCH ........................... 
VI-38 
6.7. Empirical results ...................................................... 
VI-40 
6.8. Testing of GARCH estimates ............................................. VI-46 
6.9. Foreign exchange rate risk assessment using GARCH volatility 
and correlation ...................................................... 
VI-50 
6.10. Conclusions 
...................................................... 
VI-52 
Chapter 7- Conclusions 
............................................. 
VII-1 to VII-4 
Bibliography 
............................................................... 
VIII-i to VIII-14 
Appendices 
............................................................... 
IX-1 to IX-42 
V 
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr Maximilian J. B. Hall, my supervisor, for 
his extensive support, advice, and comments. Without his exceptional help and 
understanding this thesis would never have been completed. My thanks also go to Prof 
Terence C. Mills, Postgraduate Research Director, for his guidance which enabled me to 
finish this thesis. I am also particularly grateful to Prof David T. Llewellyn for his 
comments which contributed to making this thesis more focused on the core issues. 
Special acknowledgment and thanks must also be extended to the Board of Directors of 
Bank Indonesia who have provided funds and great support for me and my family during 
my period of study in the UK. Without their support, my work would not have been 
possible. 
My thanks and gratitude must also be extended to Mr Achil Ridwan and Mr Ilham Ikhsan, 
the Deputy Directors of the Banking Supervision Department I, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta 
for their support and friendship during my attachment to the Banking Supervision 
Department I from 2 July to 15 August 1997. Without their support this thesis would not 
have been finished. I am indebted to staff in the Banking Policy, Research and 
Development Department, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta for their support in providing data for 
my empirical work. 
I also acknowledge, with thanks, the contribution from various staff at the Department of 
Economics, Loughborough University, in providing administrative facilities and support. 
I would like to express special thanks to my dear wife, Dina, and my lovely sons, Doni and 
Adisa, and Denilson for their presence, understanding, support and help in making this 
thesis possible. Finally, to my friends and the many people who made me and my family 
feel so welcome at Loughborough, I express my sincere gratitude. 
V1 
List of Figures 
Pages 
Figure 1.1 The relationship between total risk and financial risk ....... 1-7 Figure 1.2 Relationship between total risk and returns .......... 1-9 Figure 1.3 Components of financial risks ............................ 1-12 Figure 1.4 Concluding schema of bank risk ............................ 1-16 Figure 1.5 The framework of thesis ............................ 1-36 Figure 4.1 Framework for calculating the BIS minimum capital 
requirements .............................................. IV-5 Figure 4.2 Value at risk calculation procedures ................... IV-13 Figure 4.3 The rank of daily returns ..................................... IV-15 Figure 4.4. a Cash Flow Map .............................................. IV-22 Figure 4.4. b Duration Map 
.............................................. IV-22 Figure 4.4. c Principal Map .............................................. IV-23 Figure 5.1 Basic Format of Interest Rate Swaps ............................ V-2 Figure 5.2 Flow of Funds in Swaps ..................................... V-4 Figure 5.3 Cash Flows of Currency Swaps ............................ V-6 Figure 5.4. a Relationship Between Duration and Term to Maturity ......... V-13 Figure 5.4. b Relationship Between Duration and Yield ................... V-13 Figure 5.5 Relationship Between Price and Yield to Maturity ............ V-14 Figure 5.6 Type of Options ............................................... V-25 Figure 5.7 Value of a Call Option From Buyer's Point of View ........... V-26 Figure 5.8 Two Step Tree of Binomial Valuations .................... V-36 Figure 5.9 Framework of Option Valuations Using Binomial Tree ........ 
V-37 
vii 
List of Tables 
Pages 
Table 2.1 
Table 2.2 
Table 2.3 
Table 3.1 
Table 3.2 
Table 3.3 
Table 3.4 
Table 4.1 
Table 4.2 
Table 4.3 
Table 5.1 
Table 5.2 
Table 5.3 
Table 5.4 
Table 5.5 
Table 5.6 
Table 5.7 
Table 5.8 
Table 5.9 
Table 5.10 
Table 6.1 
Table 6.2 
Table 6.3 
Table 6.4 
Table 6.5 
Table 6.6 
Table 6.7 
Table 6.8 
Table 6.9 
Relationship between the number of bank failure observations and 
the number of correct classifications produced in the modelling of 
bank failures 
................................................... 11-13 Independent variables used in the prediction of bank failures .... 11-18 Errors of estimates ................................................... 11-25 Dummy Variables for Constants 
................................. 111-9 Regression Results 
................................................... 111-22 Groups of Banks in Indonesia ................................. 111-23 Error Summary 
................................................... 111-26 Risk correlation matrix .......................................... IV-25 Mapping of a forward foreign exchange position ............... IV-26 Risk of a forward foreign exchange position ..................... IV-27 Benefit of Swap Transactions .......................................... V-5 Cash Flows of Counterparty A per Currency ........................ V-7 Assumed Discount Factors and Forward Exchange Rates ...... V-7 Value at Risk for Swaps .......................................... V-10 Value at Risk for Bonds .......................................... V-18 Difference Between Futures and FRAs ........................ V-20 Value at Risk for Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) ............... V-22 Value at Risk for Forward Foreign Exchange ........................ V-23 Cash Flow of Options ................................................... V-28 Value of Options Using Binomial Approach ........................ V-34 Foreign Exchange Risk Using the BIS Standardised Method 
...... VI-12 Stationary Test of USD/IDR at Original Series Level ............ VI-18 Decay factors (a) of IDR Exchange Rate Returns ............... VI-29 DDaR estimates using EWMA ................................. VI-30 Mean and Heteroscedasticity Processes of Variance Models VI-41 
IDR Exchange Rate Returns: Estimates on 2 June 1997 ...... 
VI-42 
Error Estimates (as percentage of observations) ............... VI-49 Foreign Exchange Risk of a Sample Bank ........................ VI-51 Comparison of Risk Using GARCH and the BIS Standardised 
Method 
............................................................ VI-52 
viii 
List of Acronyms 
ACF Autocorrelation function 
AIC Akaike information criterion 
APE Absolute percentage error 
AQ Asset quality 
AR Autoregressive 
ARCH Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
ARIMA Autoregressive integrated moving average 
ARMA Autoregressive moving average 
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
BEQR Bank of England Quarterly Review 
BFS Baring Futures Singapore 
BI Bank of Indonesia 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CAMEL Capital, Assets, Management, Earning, Liquidity 
CAPM Capital assets pricing model 
CAR Capital adequacy ratio 
CD Certificate of deposit 
CMAR Call money to total assets ratio 
DAR Discount window borrowing to total assets ratio 
DEaR Daily earnings at risk 
EC European Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
EqWMA Equally weighted moving average 
ExWMA Exponentially weighted moving average 
FACR Fixed assets to capital ratio 
FB Foreign bank 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
FNB Franklin National Bank 
FRAs Forward rate agreements 
FRBNY Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
GARCH Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
ICR Interest cost to total cost ratio 
IDR Indonesian Rupiah 
IT Institute of International Finance 
IIR Interest income to total income ratio 
IOR Istituto per le opere di religione 
IRR Interest rate risk 
JIBOR Jakarta inter-bank offered rate 
JMB Johnson Matthey Bankers 
JVB Joint venture bank 
ix 
LDR Loans to deposits ratio 
LIBOR London inter-bank offered rate 
LM Lagrange Multiplier 
LPR Loan provisions to total loans ratio 
MA Moving average 
ML Maximum likelihood 
RMSE Root Maximum square erro 
OIR Operating income to total income ratio 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
OTC Over the counter 
PACF Partial autocorrelation function 
PFEB Private foreign exchange bank 
PNFEB Private non-foreign exchange bank 
RDB Regional development bank 
RLLF Restricted log likelihood function 
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
ROI Return on Investments 
SBC Scharwz bayesian criterion 
SML Security market line 
TOWRA Total of weighted risk assets 
TUFF Time until first failure 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
ULLF Unrestricted log likelihood function 
VaR Value at risk 
VU Volatility of underlying 
X 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Appendix 4.1 
Appendix 4.2 
Appendix 4.3 
Appendix 4.4 
Appendix 4.5 
Appendix 4.6 
Appendix 4.7 
Appendix 4.8 
Appendix 6.1 
Appendix 6.2 
Appendix 6.3 
Appendix 6.4 
Appendix 6.5 
Appendix 6.6 
Appendix 6.7 
Appendix 6.8 
Appendix 6.9 
Appendix 6.10 
Appendix 6.11 
Appendix 6.12 
Appendix 6.13 
Appendix 6.14 
Appendix 6.15 
Appendix 6.16 
Appendix 6.17 
Appendix 6.18 
Appendix 6.19 
Pages 
Pseudo-R2 
................................................. IX-1 Derivation of the capital base under the BIS proposal ...... IX-2 Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet assets under 
the BIS proposals ............................................. IX-3 Credit conversion factors for off-balance-sheet items under 
the BIS proposals ............................................ IX-4 Specific risk-weights for debt securities under the BIS 
proposals ...................................................... IX-5 Debt securities' risk weights under the BIS proposals using 
maturity method .................................... IX-6 Debt securities' risk weights under the BIS proposals using 
duration method .............................................. IX-7 Treatment of debt and equity options 
(under the BIS proposals) ................................... IX-8 Qualitative and quantitative standards 
(under the BIS proposals) .................................. IX-9 Identification guidelines and model selection criteria .......... 
IX-11 
Mathematical background of Dickey-Fuller test ............. 
IX- 12 
Dickey-Fuller Test at Level of the Series .................... 
IX-13 
Stationary Test Using Ljung-Box and Box-Pierce ........... 
IX-16 
Distribution of IDR Exchange Rate Returns .................... 
IX-20 
Solving Parameters of Autoregressive (AR) Processes ....... 
IX-22 
Mathematical Explanation of Moving Average (MA) 
Processes 
............................................... IX-23 Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) Models 
.......... 
IX-25 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
............................ 
IX-27 
Plot on IDR estimates using EWMA with original decay 
factor 
....................................................... 
IX-28 
Plot on IDR estimates using EWMA with a decay factor 
of 0.94 ....................................................... IX-30 
Error Estimates of GARCH (one tail at 5% confidence level) IX-32 
Test of GARCH Residuals ..................................... 
IX-33 
Correlation Matrix of GARCH Variances ................... 
IX-34 
TUTF test on EWMA estimates based on a 0.94 decay factor IX-35 
TUTF test on EWMA estimates based on original decay factor IX-36 
TUTF test on GARCH estimates ............................ 
IX-37 
Proportion of failure test on EWMA estimates based on 
a 0.94 decay factor 
Proportion of failure test on EWMA estimates based on 
original decay factor 
IX-38 
IX-39 
xi 
Appendix 6.20 Proportion of failure test on GARCH estimates .......... IX-40 Appendix 6.21 Kupiec's table .............................................. IX-41 Appendix 6.22 List of Currencies .............................................. IX-42 
xii 
List of Graphs 
Pages 
Graph 2.1 Probability distribution of a logistic function ................. 11-8 Graph 6.1 Graphs of IDR Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Returns VI-8 
Graph 6.2 Plot of GARCH Estimates Using a 5% Confidence Level ... 
VI-43 
Xlll 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
I. I. Bank reform in Indonesia 
The central bank of Indonesia, Bank Indonesia (BI), has had experience with bank failures 
since 1967. At that time, there were seven state banks, 11 foreign banks and more than 
100 private banks. Many of the private banks had suffered difficulties in the previous three 
years because of defaults by their borrowers as a result of high inflation and the 
introduction of a stabilization program by the government (devaluation of the currency). In 
August 1967, a banking crisis occurred when 20 private banks were suspended and placed 
under temporary central bank supervision (Wardhana, 1981, pp. 339-57). 
Between 1967 and 1983, the central bank imposed tight regulation, especially for private 
banks. The main purpose was to improve the stability of the banking system with by 
minimising private bank failures. One of the policies adopted by the central bank was 
encouraging the private banks to merge with others, to enhance their ability to compete 
with the state banks which were major players in the banking industry. Finally, the 
authorities succeeded in reducing private bank number from more than 100 in 1967 to 
around 70 by 1983 (BI, 1994). 
The first deregulation of the banking industry occurred in 1983 and was followed by 
further bank reform in October 1988. Between 1983 and 1988, almost no bank fell into 
serious financial difficulty, although fraud affected some small banks. However, after 1988, 
a large number of banks failed for various reasons. The main content of this section covers 
the wider issue of bank failure after the banking reform. 
Since bank reform took place in 1988, the Indonesian banking industry has experienced 
problems. We can see that every year since then there have been banks in financial 
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difficulties. The question that needs to be addressed is: what went wrong with the reform ? 
Is it that banks in Indonesia are not capable of coping with free market competition 
(traditionally, they just concentrated on internal group loans)?. 
BI itself did not know what to do. Some minor adjustments were implemented for both 
more relaxed and tighter regulation. Responses from the banks were unpredictable and 
sometimes were at variance with BI's expectation. That is why, according to some critics, 
BI - the only authority responsible for bank supervision - was not in a strong position to 
execute its function as a bank supervisor. 
Evidence suggests that some banks were exceeding the legal lending limit without 
receiving any warning from BI to follow the rules (see the failure of Bapindo in Section 
1.6.3) Finally, some banks suffered illiquidity. There may have been some constraints on 
BI in its efforts to bring the banks into compliance with the rules, because of a lack of 
qualified personnel, political issues, lack of independence, and inappropriate regulation. 
Finally, the most significant disturbance in the Indonesian banking sector occurred after 
July 1997 when the USD/IDR exchange rate dropped gradually from IDR 2,500 to IDR 
10,000 in March and to 15,000 in June 1998 (the IDRIUSD exchange rate sometimes 
depreciated above IDR 15,000 at the beginning of 1998). Depositors converted their 
money from IDR to foreign currencies because they lacked confidence in the IDR and the 
banking system in Indonesia. As a result, many banks were unable to carry on their 
operations without fresh funds from the government. However, the government only 
bailed out "sound" banks; 16 banks were closed in November 1997; 7 banks were 
suspended from operation in March 1998; and around 40 banks were classified as being "in 
emergency" in April 1998 and put under the control of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA). Finally, 38 banks were closed in March 1999. The economic turmoil since 
the middle of 1997 provides strong evidence that banking supervision and regulation in 
Indonesia needs to be restructured. The above cases also support the suggestion that there 
must be something wrong with banking regulation in Indonesia. 
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1.2. Problems in bank regulation in Indonesia 
Under the existing regulations, the authorities have experienced difficulties in detecting 
problem banks at an early stage. My view is that banking regulation in Indonesia still 
contains a number of deficiencies. 
First, risk-based capital requirements which rely solely on credit risk fail to assess the true 
risk in banks. Theoretically, bank risks comprise not only credit risk, but also interest rate 
risk, foreign exchange risk and other risks. This situation encourages banks to ignore risks 
which are not covered in the CAR. There are many internal reasons for banks doing so, 
such as lack of knowledge of risk management and it is being too expensive to add more 
capital. This study finds that current capital requirements ignore interest rate risk and 
foreign exchange rate risk, with the result that banks would probably break the trigger of 
the minimum capital requirement if these were included in the assessment. 
Second, under the BIS risk-based capital regulation', all loans to non-banks have the same 
risk weight. Good-quality loans attract the same risk weight as bad in the assessment. In 
an extreme case, a bank may not get any revenue from doubtful loans, yet the authorities 
require the same capital for both good and doubtful loans. This example also shows that 
the expected cash flows for the doubtful loans may be zero, unless the bank sells any 
collateral taken, but the current minimum capital adequacy regulation does not cover this 
issue. In addition, bank managers still find loopholes to escape the regulation. For 
example, bank managers may accrue interest revenues in their accounting system. 
Although, under this treatment, the payment of interest looks plausible on the borrowers' 
account balances, there is, in fact, no fresh money coming into the bank. This situation is 
not accounted for by the minimum capital adequacy regulation. Finally, some banks 
apparently have negative economic values of capital without the awareness of the 
regulatory authorities. 
The Indonesian government has adopted the BIS minimum capital adequacy requirements since October 
1988. 
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Third, under the BIS risk-based capital regulation, capital is measured on a book value 
basis. Actually, the economic values of capital change continuously in line with changes in 
the values of assets and liabilities. The economic values of assets and liabilities change as a 
result of changes in asset quality, volatility in interest and foreign exchange rates, and the 
change in values of intangible assets. The real value of capital can be expressed by market 
share prices. 
Fourth, the risk assessment methodology used fails to capture the actual performance of 
the management. There are two issues here. First, the methodology lacks the ability to 
capture management behaviour. Second, there are insufficient guidelines for bank 
supervisors to assess management performance. In too many cases, immediately before 
being declared a "problem" bank, the management had been given a good score in 
management appraisal. Later on, the authorities became aware that the information 
delivered to them was biased. This shows that bank supervisors failed to carry out their 
tasks properly. 
Fifth, earnings ratio assessment is just based on the accounting record and the link between 
the ratio and capital is not considered. The accounting ratio method is incapable of 
assessing the capability of banks to produce earnings in the near future. As we have 
already discussed, some banks can accumulate unrealised interest revenues in their 
accounting system. In this case, earnings ratios fail to capture the true performance of 
banks. 
While other criticisms may be levelled against the BIS proposal (BIS, 1988) we have 
enough evidence to say that current capital adequacy regulation is imperfect. Therefore, 
banking regulation in Indonesia needs to be re-evaluated and adjusted in the direction of 
further enhancing prudence. 
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1.3. Basic concept of risk in finance 
In general, risk is defined as the probability of success or failure, where success is making a 
profit and failure is losing money on an investment. In finance, risk is associated with the 
degree of fluctuation in generating return whether measured by return on investment 
(ROI) or by the rate of return on securities. 
According to Lee and Finnerty (1990, p. 157) and MacNew (1996), risks can be classified 
based on their sources, namely: business risk and financial risk. 
First, business risk (or operating risk) is the risk which refers to the degree of fluctuation 
of net income and cash flow associated with different types of business and operating 
strategies. It is assumed that ROI is a variable measurement for making profit and its 
variance reflects its fluctuation. By transforming to an equation we get a formula to 
measure expected ROI associated with a particular risk: 
n 
expected ROI =x=X; P, and (1.1) 
i=1 
variance of ROI =62 (x; - x)2 P 
ý=i 
(1.2) 
where P,. = probability of occurrence of the ith level of the economy and X, = ROI at the 
ith level of the economy and n= the various sources of incomes (i = 1,2,3...... n). 
This type of risk is more applicable in investment analysis to a non-financial firm, but less 
relevant for the analysis of overall risks at banks. 
Second, financial risk refers to magnification of profit or loss because of the use of debt 
financing. Therefore, financial risk is related to financial leverage. The financial risk 
emerges when a bank cannot pay claims to lenders as a result of a shortage in cash inflow. 
In the early stages this condition is called illiquidity. One of the common measurements of 
financial risk is a debt-equity ratio. The larger the debt of a bank, the larger the probability 
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of encountering a financial problem is, because of fixed cash payment to lenders. The 
measure of a bank's ability to fulfill its long-term claims is called solvency. 
If we relate this to bank risk in practice, financial risk may cover earnings risk, liquidity 
risk, solvency risk, and efficiency risk depending on the purpose of the analysis. We 
identify earnings risk when the focus of analysis is on the shrinking of revenues because of 
high interest payments on debts compared to total assets or equities. Efficiency risk is 
important when the financial analyst is interested in making a comparison between 
revenues and expenses. Liquidity risk analysis is intended to show the ability of a bank to 
cover its short-term claims, and solvency risk analysis focuses on the ability of a bank to 
cover the claims when the bank is liquidated. 
It is clear that the degree of financial risk mainly depends on the ability of a bank to cover 
claims from depositors, lenders and other counterparties. We can apply this risk theory in 
the banking industry. Generally, a bank's cash flows are from its investments, credits, 
profits in trading activities, new deposit funds, borrowed funds and various fees and 
expenses, including interest payments and operating expenses. These cash flows are not 
always easy for a bank's management to control. 
The difference between business risk and financial risk depends on the sources of the risk. 
Business risk refers to the ability of a bank to generate revenue from investments or 
credits. Financial risk refers to unexpected events which affect the values of payments and 
revenues associated with commitments in the banking or trading books. The relationship 
between financial risk and business risk is shown in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 
The Relationship Between Total Risk and Financial Risk 
Risk (variability of 
Total ris 
Debt/equity (leverage) 
C 
B 
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The figure shows the relationship between business risk and financial risk. The sum of 
business risk and financial risk is called the total risk. There is no relationship between the 
business risk and leverage. The business risk is constant whatever the size of leverage 
shown by line AB. The financial risk increases along the line OD. 
Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1966) developed an asset pricing model which not only 
determines the value of an efficient portfolio, but also the value of an individual security. 
They focus on the pricing implications of that area of risk which can be eliminated through 
diversification as well as that which cannot. In their analysis, they distinguish between 
systematic risk, or market risk, and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is one of the 
components of risk in portfolio investment and results from the tendency of stock prices to 
move together with the general market. The prices of some stocks and portfolios are 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
sensitive to the prices of other stocks in the market, while others show more independence 
and stability. A measure of the sensitivity of a portfolio to the market, based on its past 
record, has been designated by the Greek letter beta (Q). Unsystematic risk is the 
fluctuation which may occur as a result of variation in an industry or a firm because of 
internal factors, such as a labour strike or a resource shortage. A bank with excessive 
trading activities normally uses this theory to analyse its portfolio investment. 
Sharpe (1964) also suggests that we can derive a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by 
employing beta risk in the model given certain assumptions, such as that there is an 
efficient and perfect market, investors being risk-averse, and that there are no transaction 
costs2. Sharpe concludes that there is a linear relationship between returns and risks except 
in the region of extra high risk. 
CAPM is defined by the following equation: 
(1.3) E(RA) = Rf +A[E(Rm) - Rf] 
where, E(R, ) = the expected rate of return for asset i; Rf = the risk-free rate; Q= the 
measure of systematic risk (beta) for asset i; and E(R,,, ) = the expected return on the 
market portfolio. The trade-off between risk and return is called the Security Market Line 
(SML) as shown in figure 1.2. 
2 See F. Cheng Lee and Joseph E. Finnerty, Corporate finance: Theory, Method and Application, 1990, p. 191 
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Figure 1.2 
The Relationship Between Risk and Return 
The capital asset pricing model 
Return (R) 
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1.4. Bank risk classification 
In practice, there are many risks at banks. Different researchers apply different risk 
headings depending on the purpose of the studies. Wall and Eisenbeis (1984) and Rose 
(1989) employed profitability and cash flow variables to examine bank risks. Other 
authors, such as Saunders and Yourougou (1990), adopt Stone's model (1974) which 
employed two factors: a market and an interest rate model in order to compare the market 
and interest rate risks of portfolios in banking firms and commercial firms. 
To assess bank risks, Isimbabi (1994) and Dietrich and Weinstein (1989) compared the 
sensitivities of the stock returns of banks, other financial firms and non-financial groups to 
inflation, industrial production, the term structure, and default risk by adapting the multi- 
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factor model of Chen, Roll and Ross (CRR), (1986). Their results indicate that default risk 
is significant in addition to the term structure variable for banks and some of the other 
groups. Isimbabi (1994) conducted an empirical study with regard to a comparative 
analysis of the market perception of the risk of the banking sector and non-financial 
(commercial) sectors. The study not only focused on market and interest rate risk but also 
covered default risk. All these studies assess the risk of banks from different points of 
view. 
From the various studies mentioned above, we can conclude that there are many types of 
risks at banks. Market risk, interest rate risk and default risk are the components of a 
bank's risk which may be measured by profitability and cash flow. If we relate to risk 
theory, which has already been mentioned in the previous section, security prices, foreign 
exchange rates and interest rate risk reflect systematic risk. This conclusion is based on the 
argument that market price volatilities and interest rate volatilities will affect any firm 
which is involved in investment in securities markets as well as debt financing. The market 
risk for each firm may differ from others as a result of the different exposure of their 
portfolios. The sources of default risk normally emerge from a specific condition of 
borrowers or counterparties, and this only affects the lenders. Therefore, we cannot regard 
default risk as a systematic risk. 
Some economists have pointed out that there are some risks which arise from banks' 
activities such as market risk, economic environment changes (Flannery and Guttentag, 
1979, Guttentag and Herring, 1988) and management and operations risks (Mullin, 1977; 
Graham and Horner, 1988). Other kinds of risks may cause significant damage before their 
dimensions are well understood, including interest rate risk and sovereign risk (Stanton, 
1994). The following outline shows various bank risks in practice. 
According to Gardener, a bank's risk consists of general risk, international risk and 
solvency risk (Gardener, 1986). General risk is a fundamental risk faced by all banks 
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namely, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and credit risk. Liquidity risk is the risk of having 
to cover claims from liabilities on their maturity dates. 
Vojta (1973) has yet another view of bank risk. Based on his observation, risk could be 
defined according to banks' operations or activities: (1) credit risk (losses on loan 
portfolios); (2) investment risk (losses in the value of marketable securities and fixed 
assets); (3) liquidity risk; (4) operating risk (losses arising from operating errors and 
inefficiency; (5) fraud risks; and (6) fiduciary risk (losses arising from improper discharge 
of fiduciary responsibility). 
Revell (1975) argues that Vojta focuses on only some of the possible sources of risk, so 
that the adoption of his risk classification could be very dangerous for regulators or 
depositors. Revell mentions that Vojta's list does not identify foreign exchange rate risk as 
an important source of bank losses, nor interest rate risk as a source of risk, apart from 
their effect on asset prices. Inflation could also be considered an important cause of losses. 
Finally, according to Revell, the most important risk is the loss of confidence by 
depositors. Compared to Vojta, Revell describes risks more comprehensively and 
includes the source of each risk. He omits fraud and fiduciary risks because these risks can 
be insured against in most countries due to the development of insurance markets. 
Moreover, Revell gives a more detailed description of certain risks. 
Maisel classifies the risk of banks to be interest rate risk, operating risk and fraud (Maisel, 
1981, pp. 1-40). Interest rate risk contributes significantly to insolvency. When interest 
rates rise, banks must pay more for interest costs on liabilities. The degree of danger 
depends on the schedule of cash flows from assets and liabilities and on the probable 
magnitude of shifts in the interest rate structure. 
Risk in a modern bank comprises more types of risk than in traditional banks. McNew 
(1997) suggests a more comprehensive risk classification in the case of modern banks. 
According to him, financial risk in a modern bank comprises credit risk, market risk, 
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liquidity risk, operational risk, regulatory risk and human factor risk. The detail of each 
risk is shown in the following figure: 
Figure 1.3 
Components of Financial Risk 
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From the discussion above, we can derive a number of conclusions. 
First, the risk components defined by the authors above are fairly closely related to each 
other, but since they classify the risks under different headings they can seem to overlap 
with each other. 
Second, solvency risk covers the major components of risk. It means we could 
hypothesize that solvency plays the most significant role in bank failure and that other 
risks, such as credit risk, market risk (including exchange rate risk), interest rate risk and 
operating risk, are components of solvency risk. Solvency risk can be defined as the risk 
I-12 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
which is associated with the market value of equity in order to satisfy stakeholders that the 
bank is still solvent. If the value of equity is low, the regulator will require the bank to add 
more capital or to reduce risk by restructuring its risky assets to the level which increases 
the economic value of the equity. 
Third, there are also some risks which are not related directly to solvency risk. Banks may 
find difficulties in controlling these risks because the sources of the risks are mostly 
beyond the management boundary. The risks are normally associated with prudential 
operations with which the regulator needs to be concerned before a bank becomes 
insolvent, such as political risk and fraud. 
1.5. Measuring bank risk 
The determinants of bank risk can be defined as the factors responsible for variation in the 
value of the bank itself. Depositors, creditors, insurers and owners will refer to the value of 
the bank when they assess its risk. The general opinion is that the value of a firm at any 
time is equal to the present value of expected net cash flows from assets, liabilities and 
other activities. The risk of banks arises because the expected values of assets change, and 
alterations in cash flows may either require raising funds at a higher cost than returns on 
the existing portfolio, or the value of liquidated assets falling below their book values. 
Bank management, normally, reduces the risk by managing assets and liabilities in such a 
way that the expected returns of the bank will be unaffected by various changes in the 
economy, interest rates, exchange rates and customers' behaviour. 
Maisel (1981, pp. 1-40) describes insolvency as a function of the current economic value of 
the bank's capital - that is, the present value of the expected cash flows from the firm's 
portfolio - and the probability that either the expected cash flows or the discount rates at 
which the flows are valued will alter. Maisel's description implies that the present value of 
the cash flows, credit risk, interest rate risk, market and exchange rate risk are all brought 
into consideration. The bank will become insolvent if its accumulation of negative income 
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is more than its initial capital plus any reserve. Moreover, Maisel mentions that the 
insolvency of banks, expressed by capital adequacy, may be arise either when the supply of 
liquidity is very low, when banks cannot pay claims to depositors and debts, or when the 
market value of the assets reduced by the cost of bankruptcy is less than the value of the 
liabilities to customers, computed under the assumption that all such claims will be met 
fully. 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that solvency risk has covered liquidity 
risk, interest rate risk, and exchange rate risk. Moreover, solvency risk contributes 
significantly to the probability of bank failure. The risk of the banks becoming insolvent 
depends on the level of the expected incomes and payments and the variation of the net 
profit/loss and the initial capital. Therefore, risk measurement should consider the balance 
sheet income and economic income. 
The value of a bank should change over time because the income and future expected cash 
flows have changed, mainly as a result of the movement of interest rates, exchange rates, 
market value of assets or liabilities and other activities. Bank records and balance sheets 
often fail to show such actual changes in the value of assets and liabilities. 
There are some components of bank risk suggested by authors which may be very difficult 
to define. We will focus on solvency risk which is derived from various components of 
bank risk. Based on the theory of finance, the solvency of a bank will be determined by the 
value of a bank at any point in time which equals the present value of expected cash flows 
from its activities. If the instrument is traded in a liquid market, the expected cash flow is 
just the same as the market value of the instrument (mark-to-market). 
An accounting book value which relies on historical values is not real economic value. 
Therefore, this method cannot be used in capital adequacy assessment for banks. Proper 
assessment of the economic value of capital requires complicated quantitative calculations 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
because the value of assets-liabilities changes over a period of time as a result of wealth 
effects and income affects. 
Whatever risk headings are suggested by the authors above, the impact on banks' value 
will be reflected in solvency which is measured by net present values of cash flows. Finally, 
we may conclude that solvency is an appropriate measure to represent all risks which are 
derived from the present value of expected cash flows. This research also suggests that 
credit risk, market risk (i. e. interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk, and price risk) 
and operational risk are the main factors determining discrepancies between estimated and 
actual cash flows. Figure 1.4 shows the schema of these conclusions. 
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Figure 1.4 
Concluding Schema of Bank Risk 
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1.6. Cases of bank failure in various countries 
1.6.1. Selected bank failures in the US 
The first US bank failure was Farmers Exchange Bank, Gloucester, Rhode Island (Sinkey, 
1979, p. 3). The Providence Gazette reported on 25 March 1809 that the directors and 
managers of the bank: 
practised a system of fraud beyond which the ingenuity and 
dishonesty of man cannot go". 
The causes of the failures which happened during the period 1865-1933 vary. The 
following paragraph will discuss some of the causes of individual bank failures in the US. 
On 14 April 1865 the First National Bank of Attica (New York) failed. The bank, which as 
a small one with total assets of $208,106 and capital of $50,000, was the first nationally 
chartered bank to close. According to Kane (1923, p. 36) the failure was caused by 
"... injudicious banking and insolvency of large debtors". 
The next bank failures were the Venango National Bank of Franklin, Pennsylvania, and the 
Merchants National Bank of Washington, D. C. (Kane, op. cit. 1923. p. 37-45). Venango, 
with capital stock of $300,000, was closed on 1 May 1866, while Merchants, with capital 
of $ 200,000, failed on 8 May 1866. The report of the House Banking Committee 
indicated that each bank had a heavy business loan concentration on one particular 
borrower, although not the same one. Consequently, when these two business enterprises 
failed and defaulted on their loans, which were unsecured, the banks also failed. The 
managers of the Merchants Bank were characterized as being 
in the highest degree illegal, improvident, reckless and dishonest" 
(Kane, op. cit. 1923, p. 38). 
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The Venango bank was said to have operated in the same manner as the Merchants Bank. 
Some research has been conducted with regard to the cause of bank failure. A Federal 
Report (National Industrial Conference Board - 1932, pp. 44-5) listed a number of causes 
as being important in banks closing from 1921-7. Among the internal causes that reflect 
incompetent or dishonest management the following were listed: (1) a large volume of 
doubtful, slow, or past-due loans; (2) large loans to officers or directors; (3) defalcation or 
embezzlement; (4) excessive loans to businesses with which officers or directors were 
affiliated; and (5) in general, overall poor management. External causes cited were: (1) 
heavy deposit withdrawals; (2) unexpectedly large depreciation of security investments; (3) 
the failure of a banking correspondent; and (4) the failure of a large debtor. 
Another author (Bremer, 1935, p. 99) reported that the failure of national banks in 1925 
was because of the following problems: (1) inexperience and mismanagement (50%); (2) 
unfavourable local conditions (40%) ; and (3) defalcation (10%). 
The most traumatic experience was the "bank holiday" of 1933, when all banks were 
forced by government to close their operations until they could prove that they had enough 
capital resources. The banking crisis began in November 1930, initiated by 256 banks 
failing. In December in the same year, 352 more banks failed. Measured by deposits, the 
largest bank failure was that of The Bank of the United States. The bank was a Federal 
Reserve Member, and therefore the Federal Reserve of New York organized a "lifeboat" 
rescue with the support of clearing house banks. Other countries suffered bank failure as 
well because the depression in the US had wide-reaching global effects. 
Another relapse was followed temporarily by recovery but in January 1932 failure spread 
to other areas in the US. By 3 March 1933, half of the states were required to declare a 
bank holiday and banks were closed until 13-15 March, depending on their location 
(Sinkey, 1979, p. 14). On 15 March 1933, about 14 banks were back in business, but about 
4,500 banks were not permitted to reopen because they were insolvent or in a condition 
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requiring restrictions on deposit withdrawals. The number of bank failures for the 1930-3 
period amounted to 6,704 banks (Upham and Lamke, 1934, p. 5). 
When the immediate crisis abated, Congress turned its attention to more permanent 
banking legislation. The result was the Banking Act of 1933. The purpose of the Act was 
to provide for safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to encourage banks to 
adopt prudent internal controls, to prevent undue diversion of funds into speculative 
operations, and for other purposes. Among other things, the Act of 1933 provided for the 
establishment of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, separation between commercial 
and investment banking, restriction on the use of bank credit for speculative purposes, 
more stringent chartering requirements for national banks, prohibition of interest payment 
on demand deposits, removal of bank directors, and branching by nationwide chartered 
banks to be subject to the same state law imposed upon state-chartered institutions. 
From 1 January 1934 until 5 September 1978,689 banks failed. Four hundred and ninety 
(490) banks (71.1 %) were closed over the nine-year period 1934-42 or approximately 54 
banks per year. From 1943 up to 1977, only 193 (28.9%) banks failed, or about 5.5 per 
year. 
As of 31 December 1974, there were 251 uninsured banks or non-deposit trust companies 
in the US. These uninsured institutions accounted for only 1.7 percent of the population of 
14,481 commercial banks and for only 0,95 percent of $754 billion in total deposits at 
commercial banks. From 1943 until 1974, only 121 insured banks failed, on average less 
than four banks per year. On the other hand, 37 non insured banks closed during the same 
period. In contrast, in 1975, thirteen insured banks failed and in 1976 sixteen banks closed. 
A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) study conducted by Hill (1975, pp. 1-2) 
based upon 67 insured banks that failed between 1960 and 1974, indicated that there were 
three major causes for the banks' failure. First, 38 of the failures were due to improper 
loans to officers, directors, or owners and in 20 of these 38 cases misuse of brokered funds 
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was involved. Second, defalcation, embezzlement, or manipulation were important in 21 of 
the failures. And third, eight of the failures were blamed on managerial weaknesses in loan 
portfolio supervision. 
In 1979, First Pennsylvania, then the twenty-third largest bank in the US, reported a loss in 
net earnings, after a provision for loan losses and taxes, of $5 million. The bank was 
founded in 1782 and recognized as the first private bank established in the US. In 1967, 
the bank's equity was equal to 8.7 percent of net earning assets. In 1979, the ratio dropped 
to 4.2 percent. The share of earning assets financed by interest-bearing short-term funding 
liabilities was 26 percent in 1967 and rose steadily to 74 percent in 1979. Earning assets 
increased by 400 percent while demand and saving deposits rose only 40 percent. Risks 
were augmented by active trading in securities and mortgages. As interest rates rose 
during the decade, net operating earnings before loan losses of the bank declined. At the 
same time, earnings become more variable (Maisel, 1981, pp. 8-10). The condition implies 
that the greatest danger to financial institutions arises from interest rate risk when the 
funding management relies on short-term sources and long-term lending. Interest rate risk 
depends on the net difference in the maturities of a bank's assets and liabilities. If the 
average maturity of the liabilities is shorter than the average maturity of assets, the value of 
capital will deteriorate when interest rates rise. 
Spero (1980) outlines further detail concerning the failure of Franklin National Bank 
(FNB). The bank, which was considered as the 20`x' largest bank in the US, suffered a 
crisis in May 1974. The authorities had known that the bank had a problem from the 
beginning as shown when the Federal Reserve Bank refused the proposal of FNB to take 
over another institution at the beginning of May with the reason that the bank had 
expanded too quickly. Two days later the bank announced that it had suffered very large 
foreign exchange losses and had no money to pay quarterly dividends. Moreover, the bank 
also made a large volume of low-quality loans as a result of growing too rapidly. The 
depositors withdrew their funds and the money market was reluctant to lend money to the 
bank. The Federal Reserve Bank lent Franklin up to $1.75 billion. Because it was insured 
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by the FDIC, small depositors who had less than US$100,000 on deposit did not 
withdraw their money. As we know, the FDIC Act 1933 mentions that: 
"The maximum amount of the insured deposit of any depositor shall be 
$100,000" (Symons, 1991, p. 81). 
Finally, in October 1974, the bank was taken over by a consortium of seven European 
banks and European-American banks. Actually, the sources of the problem were not only 
foreign exchange losses, but also domestic problems such as rapid growth and poor 
management. 
From the experience of the Franklin bank, we can conclude that loan losses were the initial 
problem of the bank as a result of weak loans and funding management. The speculation in 
foreign exchange trading was expected to generate profits to settle the loan losses. But the 
market moved in an adverse direction and the heavy losses from foreign exchange trading 
pushed the bank into deeper problems. Weak internal control also allowed speculation to 
occur because the Franklin traders could engage in high risk transactions without any 
monitoring by their internal auditors/managers. 
US bank failures still continued up to late 1990, as reported by Sarah B. Kendall (1994). 
Between 1934 and 1981, the FDIC had made a profit, but later on, by closing 
approximately 15 banks per year, it incurred a deficit for the first time in 1991. Moreover, 
the FDIC estimated that 200 banks would have been closed in 1992 without their 
intervention, which increased the insurance fund deficit to $14 billion (Kendall, 1994, 
p. 542). Savings and Loan institutions also had very high failure rates. According to Barth, 
from 1980 to 1990,1,730 saving and loans institutions suffered failure (Barth, 1994). 
Finally, in 1984, the eighth largest bank in the United States, Continental Illinois, declared 
the need for an additional injection of funds from the Federal Reserve of up to $6 billion 
in order to cover claims fro 1 creditors. The source of the bank's problem was high 
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leverage combined with a risky portfolio in its reckless pursuit of market share (Kapstain, 
1994). 
1.6.2. Selected bank crises in the UK 
The failure of banks has occurred since the 15th century when the Medici bank failed after 
the English sovereign defaulted on his debts. In the UK, Gurney and Company Ltd failed 
in 1866 (Batchelor, 1983, pp. 4-12). At first, Gurney was a prosperous financial firm 
involved in banking and bill brokerage. In 1856 and 1857 the bank changed its 
management. Unfortunately, the new management adopted an unsound strategy by taking 
bills of dubious quality and allocating loans with poor collateral. In 1865, the firm reported 
losses of £3-4 million. Moreover, in 1866, some speculative firms and associated 
contracting firms linked to Gurney through finance bills, also failed. Some depositors 
suspected that Gurney was suffering financial problems and they withdrew their money. 
On 10 May 1866, the bank was short of liquidity and the Bank of England refused to inject 
fresh funding. Gurney was reported as bankrupt on the same day. The source of the 
problem in the Gurney case was the poor quality of finance bills. 
Baring Brothers & Co, the large international merchant bank, nearly failed in 1890 
(Batchelor, op. cit. pp. 12-18). The bank was founded in 1763 by John and Francis Baring 
to finance their customers in textile trading in Europe and Latin America, but in 1821-2, 
the loan portfolio was expanded to include Mexico and Latin America. Baring, together 
with other London-based merchant banks, specialized in long-term sterling lending to 
foreign governments and public bodies. Most of their loans were concentrated in Europe 
and Latin America. In the late 1890s, the loans concentrated in Argentina and Uruguay 
accounted for over 75 percent of the bank's total portfolio for government projects. 
European loans were less than 10 percent by 1890. The Argentinian government found 
difficulty in paying interest and negotiations to find new investors were unsuccessful. 
However, the bank and the UK government feared a massive drain of foreign capital from 
the UK if they let the bank go bankrupt without any solution, and persuaded other banks 
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to inject funds into the bank. Finally, Baring's liquidity problem was solved by obtaining 
£17 million from other banks and discount houses and the impact on the financial market 
was small. From the Baring experience, we can deduce that the source of the problem was 
counterparty risk. Normally, banks would reduce the risk by diversifying loans 
geographically and across more business activities. 
Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB), one of the Johnson Matthey Group members, had been 
rescued in October 1984 when it was believed that the loan problems would spread to the 
whole group. As we know, Johnson Matthey is a prominent dealer in gold bullion and 
precious metals and it was feared its failure would damage London's reputation in 
commodities trading. JMB got into trouble because it managed to acquire loan losses of 
£245 million on a loan portfolio of only £450 million, so it had to write off more than its 
equity base which was less than £120 million (Hall, 1987). 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) case exploded in 1991 because of 
a variety of criminal activities, such as money laundering for drug dealers. BCCI was 
declared insolvent in the summer of 1991, and the Bank of England closed it in July 1991. 
Because of this case, UK banking supervisors encountered some criticism for not closing 
the bank at an earlier stage, (Hall, 1992). The BCCI, founded by Agha Hasan Abedi on 21 
September 1972 in Luxembourg, had been recognized as indulging in fraud and illegal 
dealing since 1975 when the US authorities refuse to allow the bank to take over two New 
York banks for the main reason that the owner, Abedi, was failing to disclose details about 
his company. 
A subsidiary was opened in Panama on 22 April 1980. When General Manuel Noriega 
came to power in 1981, Marcela Tason, Noriega's secretary, was one of its early 
customers in Panama. Other names who have been recognized as smuggling drugs had 
opened accounts in this bank such as Pablo Escobar (Kochan, 1991, pp. 93-4). In the BCCI 
scandal, we can raise questions about the role of both the home-country as well as the 
host-country authorities in supervising the bank. BCCI was based in Luxembourg, but the 
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home country authorities lacked the resources to control its operation. Host-country 
authorities attempted to monitor the foreign bank's branches, but they were unable to 
access all the information on the bank. Criticism of the Bank of England also came from 
the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee (in this discussion, we will 
use the term "Committee"). In the Committee's report for the parliamentary session 1991- 
1992, the Committee criticised the Bank of England for not closing BCCI down earlier, 
forcing the banking group to change its structure to facilitate consolidated supervision by a 
single lead supervisor, or sponsoring "single auditor" audits, and for pressing Price 
Waterhouse, the sole auditor to BCCI after 1987, not to qualify BCCI's 1980 accounts. 
The Baring Group plc, a British merchant bank, suffered massive losses from unauthorized 
derivative transactions conducted in its subsidiary, Baring Futures Singapore (BFS), at the 
beginning of 1995. The bank was subsequently taken over by the Dutch Bank ING. The 
UK Board of Bank Supervision subsequently produced a report highlighting the lessons to 
be learnt from the collapse. Nick Leeson, a Singapore-based office trader, built massive 
positions in futures contracts by betting that Japanese stock prices would rise, with 
minimal supervision from headquarters. As the market fell, Leeson apparently kept 
doubling and re-doubling his positions. Losses were estimated at more than US$1.2 billion 
or about triple the bank's capital (Clifford, 1995). 
1.6.3. Individual bank failure cases in Indonesia 
As we have already mentioned, the rapid growth in the number of banks, offices, and their 
exposures, a shortage of professional managers and deficiencies in bank supervision are 
potential sources of banking crises. In fact, several banks have suffered financial problems, 
for example Bank Umum Majapahit, Bank Pertiwi, Maranu Bank, Bank Bukopin, Bank 
Sampurna, Bank Duta, Bank Summa and Bapindo. The central bank officially announced 
that these banks had financial problems although the public did not know the exact number 
of banks which suffered similar financial problems because of asymmetry of information in 
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the banking industry. Bapindo's failure was the latest in a series of crises in 1994 that have 
heightened fears of a financial breakdown. 
Bank Umum Majapahit suffered problems in 1987 because the owners engaged in insider 
transactions using illegal CDs. The dishonesty was exposed when they failed to meet their 
liabilities. Certain unauthorized borrowers were also involved. Depositors claimed their 
refunds, and the case was eventually reported to the central bank. In this situation, the 
bank is officially responsible for all liabilities whether the deposit certificate is original or 
counterfeit. All insider transactions were undertaken by dishonest managers because all 
transactions were labelled with the name of the bank. Bank Indonesia restricted the bank 
to participating in clearing activities, and some depositors took the bank managers to 
court. Finally, a consortium of other banks took over the bank with the aim of 
maintaining public confidence in the banking system in Indonesia. However, its re-opening 
was put on hold until the government revoked its licence in November 1997. 
The Pertiwi case exploded in 1986 because of two major reasons that were interrelated, 
namely, loan concentration and mismatch of funding. The case began with loan 
concentration. The majority of its loans were concentrated on properties when there was a 
price boom in the late 1970s when, as we know, the Indonesian economy was booming 
because of high oil prices in the 1970s. When the oil price dropped in the early 1980s, 
demand for housing automatically went down because the government maintained tight 
liquidity in order to ensure that the government kept enough foreign reserves to back up 
its balance of payments. As the mortgage demand dropped in a period of tight liquidity, the 
revenues of housing construction firms fell far below estimates and repayments to the 
banks were delayed. Banks with long funding positions suffered from lack of liquidity as a 
result of the shorter term of deposits. Banks with strong group companies did not 
encounter any problems because other group members provided funds instantly. But, for 
the weak group companies, the group members did not have the capability to support the 
banks. Finally, the management of the bank declared the bank illiquid when the rush 
occurred. Bank Indonesia closed the bank's operation until the bank settled the claims from 
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the clearing system. Finally, other banks took over all assets and liabilities under guidelines 
from the central bank with the aim of preventing instability in the banking system. 
The Pertiwi's case caused the Maranu Bank to suffer a lack of liquidity as a result of a 
large amount of inter-bank loans to Pertiwi. When Pertiwi suffered a lack of liquidity, 
Maranu had the same problem; moreover, the deposit customers knew about the case and 
panic could not be avoided. As a general rule, the banks which failed to cover the claims 
from the clearing system were restricted to continuing their participation in the clearing 
system. Therefore, Bank Indonesia removed Maranu from the clearing system before the 
bank was taken over by other banks. 
The three bank failures that we have discussed above occurred before the banking reform 
of 1988. Even after the reform, the Indonesian authority had experience of bank failure. 
Even banks which were amongst the 10 largest banks in Indonesia failed. 
The first large bank to fail was BUKOPIN. This bank suffered from significant doubtful 
credits without any secure collateral. The case was not exposed openly by the authority to 
the media because the bank is a cooperative bank, working on behalf of the government to 
elevate the performance of small scale business cooperative firms in Indonesia. The bank 
was rescued by Bank Indonesia to prevent it from collapse. 
The second large bank to fail was Bank Duta, a private bank, which had 73.39 percent of 
its shares held by three charities chaired by President Suharto (Schwarz, 20 September 
1990). At first, nobody believed that Bank Duta had suffered a crisis. Financial reports 
showed a conservative performance with credits accounting for Rp. 1,700 billion 
(approximately US$0.85 billion) of Rp. 2,300 billion (approximately US$1.15 billion) of 
total assets, but the capital base was only US$164 million (Vatikiotis, 13 September 
1990). Further, to Bank Duta, it appeared that reserves for loan-losses were below those 
of other private banks. Nobody suspected, not even the authority, that the idle funds were 
invested in trading activities. Regulation restricts national private banks to running a net 
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foreign exchange position of not more than 25 percent of capital. Indonesian bankers said 
that Bank Duta must have run an open foreign exchange position of around US$1-2 billion 
-equals to between 610% and 1220% of the capital base- before the collapse and the 
bank also speculated in the US$/IDR exchange rate both its own account and on behalf of 
individual clients. That trading was not recorded properly and thus not reflected in the 
financial reports. The bank thus maintained large exposures in foreign currency positions; 
therefore, when exchange rates moved in an adverse direction, the bank was illiquid and 
unable to settle claims from creditors. Finally, the bank announced on 4 October 1992 that 
losses resulting from foreign exchange trading had reached US$ 419.6 million (Schwarz, 
18 October 1990). Ronald Stride, a Booz Allen & Hamilton Vice President who advised 
several Indonesian banks, said: 
"Indonesian banks, unsophisticated in foreign-exchange markets, have 
been on the losing side of a zero-sum game and they are getting out" 
(Tempo, 18 Oct. 1990). 
The statement above reveals that banks in Indonesia did not have enough experience in 
foreign exchange trading compared to other traders in the markets. Finally, charities 
chaired by the President of Indonesia, Suharto, rescued the bank with fresh-money and 
replaced the management. Dicky, who was a managing director in charge in trading, was 
sent to jail on a corruption charge for running dishonest foreign exchange transactions. 
The third large bank to fail was Bank Summa in November 1992. The bank was formed in 
1988 from an existing bank - Bank Agung Asia - in the same year when deregulation 
triggered an explosion in the number of new bank licences approved. The slowdown in 
property demand in 1990 was the main source of the crisis. The bank was faced with a 
financial crisis because of large loan exposures to shareholders' group companies which 
were involved mostly in properties. The bulk of this debt was the result of loans to finance 
Sumnia Group's involvement in the Indonesian property market from 1989-90, when real- 
estate prices were at their peak. The Summa Group, which was set up in the late 1970s, 
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was interested in insurance, leasing, office development, hotels and plantations. Most of 
Summa's non-performing loans were made to Summa Group, headed by the eldest son of 
Soeryadjaja (the owner of Bank Summa). According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
more than half of Summa's non-performing loans were made to companies within the 
Summa Group, (Azman, 1992). 
The problem banks also include some medium or small banks such as Bank Sampurna. The 
bank was established after the banking reform of 1988. The source of problems also came 
from doubtful credit to shareholders' group companies. Bank Danamon, a top 10 private 
bank, took over the bank in early November 1992. There may have been some other 
problem banks in Indonesia, but the information has not been revealed to the media. 
The last case exposed to the public before the banking crisis in 1997 was Bapindo, a state 
bank, in 1993. The case was officially disclosed at the parliamentary hearing by the 
financial authorities, namely, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the central bank. 
One of the parliamentary members had been asking about the performance of a Bapindo 
borrower, Golden Key, which was suspected of having financial problems. The borrower 
had outstanding credit of Rp. 1,300 billion (US$ 650 million) from Rp. 9,600 billion 
(US$4,300 million) of total credit or 13.5%. The bank's capital was Rp. 700 billion 
(US$350 million). Therefore, the credit of the borrower was 140% of total bank capital. 
Actually the ROA of the bank had shrunk from 2.1% in 1987 to 1.8% in 1988,1.1% in 
1990,0,31% in 1990 and 0.26% in 1993. 
The banking crisis since 1997 has occurred as a result of the gradual fall in the Indonesian 
rupiah (IDR) exchange rate since July 1997. The USD/IDR exchange rate dropped from 
IDR2,450 per US dollar in July 1997 to IDR11,000 per US dollar in March 1998. The 
IDR depreciated significantly in March 1998 when the IMF released a negative report on 
the Indonesian budget deficit. The depreciation of the IDR caused people to have less 
confidence in it and to convert their deposits from 1DR to US dollars or to other strong 
currencies. The more people wanted to buy US dollars, the more US dollars disappeared. 
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The crisis began in July 1997 when the IDR/USD exchange rate was IDR2,450. The first 
attack caused the IDR to sink to the level of IDR 2,511. In response to the speculation, 
Bank Indonesia (BI) increased the spread for US dollars (ie. the difference between buying 
and selling rates) from 8% to 12%. The widening of the spread had been used by BI 
several times to curb speculation in IDR. The spread was only 2% in April 1995, but rose 
to 3% in February 1996, to 5% in July 1996, and to 8% in September 1996. The widening 
of the spread in April 1995 was to prevent a rush into dollars because of the death of Mrs. 
Suharto, while other widened spreads were intended to counter rushes into dollars because 
of the rumours concerning devaluation of the IDR. However, this strategy was no longer 
valid in the period after July 1997. The demand for US dollars was very strong and the 
intervention band of BI (le. the market spread at which BI has to intervene) was not 
effective in slowing down the demand. The exchange rate of the IDR was still unstable, 
strengthening for a few days by a few points and then depreciating again. To avoid a 
further wasting of reserve funds, BI cancelled the intervention band and let the IDR float 
on the market when the exchange rate stood at IDR2,800 to the dollar. 
The exchange rate turmoil affected significantly the weak banks which had already suffered 
financial problems before the crisis. Finally, the government revoked the permit of 16 
private national banks on 1 November 1997, closed 7 banks in April 1998 and 38 banks in 
March 1999. The sources of problems for those banks were mainly illiquidity and 
insolvency as a result of credit defaults, fraud and liquidity mismatches. With their 
liquidity mismatched, these banks were sensitive to the rush to dollars. None of those 
banks' financial problems occurred because of losses in foreign exchange trading (Gatra, 8 
November 1997). Bad loans occurred in internal group companies where the amounts had 
already breached the lending limits. The exchange rate turmoil affected indirectly the 
liquidity of banks through the rush to draw money to be placed in other banks or overseas 
banks. 
In another initiative, the government formed the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) at the end of January 1998 to restore the solvency of sick banks. In April 1998, 
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there were 54 banks under the control of this agency which comprised four state banks, 11 
regional development banks and 39 national private banks. The criterion of a sick bank is 
either when emergency funds from the central bank amount to more than 200% of the 
capital base or the risk-based capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is less than 5%. To restore 
public confidence in the banking system, the government announced its intention to fully 
protect depositors' money. Most of the sick banks suffered illiquidity and insolvency as 
they posted huge credit defaults and suffered large withdrawals. The only bank which 
suffered significantly from foreign exchange trading losses was Bank Exim, a state bank. 
From the banking crisis in Indonesia, we can conclude that the depreciation of the IDR did 
not directly cause bank failure in Indonesia except in the case of Bank Exim. However, the 
exchange rate turmoil made depositors less confident in the banking system in Indonesia 
and encouraged depositors to put their money in foreign currencies in overseas banks. 
Finally, the small and medium sized banks suffered the most. For large banks, problems 
normally arose because of defaults by borrowers which made the banks illiquid or 
insolvent. Bank Exim, a state bank, is the only bank which got into trouble because of 
losses in foreign exchange trading 
From these experiences, it can be seen that the Indonesian banking industry suffered 
problems mostly because of default by credit borrowers. Most cases cited above indicate 
that the sources of the problems were credit default mixed with significantly unmatched 
funding positions; some of them because of fraud mixed with large credit default (such as 
Bapindo); and some of them because of foreign exchange losses (such as Bank Duta and 
Bank Exim). This qualitative evidence of problems at banks will be used to suggest the 
main variables to be employed in the analysis of problem banks in Indonesia by 
transforming the sources of problems into financial ratios. 
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1.6.4. Bank failures in other countries 
In July 1982, the Italian authorities seized the country's largest bank, Banco Ambrosiano, 
SpA because of massive problem loans, worth up to $1.4 billion, to 15 front companies in 
Panama. These loans were under guarantee by letters of comfort from the Istituto per le 
Opere di Religione (IOR), the Vatican Bank, in some cases or were at least under 
guarantee by direct subsidiaries of the IOR. Banco Ambrosiano posted $700 million of 
borrowed funds from the Euromarkets. Among the bank's assets were more than $1 billion 
in overdue foreign loans, and the bank was on the verge of a collapse that would have 
wiped out the savings of thousands of depositors. The Bank of Italy refused to bail out 
Banco Ambrosiano Holdings Luxembourg, a subsidiary in Luxembourg, because it should 
have been subject to supervision by the Luxembourg authorities (Dale, 1992, pp. 198-201). 
As we know, it was only in April 1981 that the Regulator in Italy amended the legislation 
to comply with the philosophy of the Basle Concordat that the parent bank could pass 
through financial information of overseas subsidiaries to the parent authority. A series of 
meetings of seven banks that made efforts to rescue the bank revealed a preference for 
Banco Ambrosiano SpA to be placed in liquidation and a new entity, Nuovo Banco 
Ambrosiano, was established. 3 
Looking beyond Europe, Australia, Scandinavia, New Zealand and Japan, all have 
experienced banking crises as well as the US. David Hale (1991) in his paper for the G-7 
Council in Tokyo, Japan, November 1991, summarises that the major foreign banks in 
Australia, for example, lost several billion dollars on loans to property developers and 
corporate asset traders. The non-performing loans ratio increased to 4-5 percent in 1991 
compared with 1 percent in the mid- 1980s. This can be contrasted with the situation in 
Britain, where the ratio of non-performing loans in the country's leading clearing banks had 
risen to almost 2 percent in 1991 from 0.6 percent in 1987 as a result of credit quality 
problems with real estate and corporate "entrepreneurs". 
3 The information on the Banco Ambrosiano case was derived from various editions of The Banker in 1992. 
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Information about banking crises was summarized by David Hale (1991) in his paper for 
the G-7 Council in Tokyo, Japan, November 1991. In his summary, he concluded that the 
major sources of banking crises were credit problems. 
1.6.5. Summary of bank failure cases in various countries 
From these bank failure cases, we can conclude that the typical sources of failure mainly 
came from: first, a maturity mismatch of assets-liabilities associated with changes in 
interest rates; second, large exposures in foreign exchange and securities lending which 
turned to losses when adverse changes in market prices and exchange rates occurred; 
third, doubtful loans to large borrowers or default by borrowers; fourth, management 
dishonesty or fraud, as happened at BCCI. The qualitative analysis of bank failure in 
Indonesia will be discussed in the following section. 
As for Indonesia, it can be seen that the banking industry suffered problems mostly 
because of default by credit borrowers. Out of the seven cases cited above, five of them 
indicate that the sources of the problems were credit default mixed with significantly 
unmatched funding positions; one of them because of fraud mixed with large credit default 
(Bapindo); and one of them because of fraud mixed with foreign exchange losses (Bank 
Duta). This qualitative evidence of problems at banks will be used to suggest the main 
variables to be employed in the analysis of problem banks in Indonesia by transforming the 
sources of problems into financial ratios. 
From our discussion above, we will now try to draw general conclusions about the causes 
of unsound banks before we begin to analyse, in greater detail, the determinants of 
potential problems at commercial banks in Indonesia. 
Default by borrowers is the major contribution to the problems experienced by banks, 
associated with excessive credit exposure and weak asset-liabilities management. The 
credit default itself need not be a threat to the banks if the amount is not significant or the 
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banks have sound funding management so that they can manage their liquidity properly 
when the actual cash inflow fails to reach the amount projected. This condition normally 
emerges when liquidity in the economy is reduced, initiated by increasing interest rates. In 
these circumstances, those banks which have vulnerable liquidity will reduce the spread as 
a result of a lack of funding. Therefore, they offer high interest rates on deposits to attract 
investors, or ask for help from other group members to improve their liquidity. In 
Indonesia, some banks were coping with that problem by covering their liabilities from the 
clearing system by asking for lifeboat support from the central bank or other banks. 
Individual cases discussed above show that some banks were having financial problems 
because of loan losses or credit default, examples being Johnson Matthey Bankers in the 
UK, Banco Ambrosiano in Italy, Continental Illinois and Pennsylvania in the US, and 
Pertiwi, Maranu, Sampurna, Bapindo and Summa in Indonesia. The David Hale report for 
the G-7 council in Japan, 1991, outlined the loan problems faced by the G-7 member 
countries. 
Losses on derivative and foreign exchange transactions were also major causes of failure. 
Such problems normally result from inexperience in these kinds of services and from weak 
internal controls. Sometimes a bank's exposures break the limits that have been 
established for normal operations. Franklin National Bank (FNB) suffered large losses 
from foreign exchange operations. Bank Duta, one of the top 10 private banks in 
Indonesia, declared losses of $417 million from foreign exchange operations. The foreign 
exchange director was sent to jail because the court considered that he was dishonest in 
running the operation. 
Fraud is also often a source of problems for the banks. BCCI is an example of a 
spectacular collapse because of fraud. Bank Duta in Indonesia gave a lesson to the 
supervisory authorities as well as to the public accountants in how to hide the true 
information by providing false accounting records. The supervisory authorities failed to 
detect the true condition of the bank because of illegal activities which were not recorded 
and internal controls in the bank which did not work properly. 
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Weakness in management was also one of the causes of these bank problems. As we 
know, there must be internal rules to govern operations and each level of management 
should understand and follow the rules. Weak management normally breaks its own rules 
for different reasons. Loan concentration limits were ignored by some banks; Bukopin and 
Bapindo are good examples of such cases in Indonesia. Bapindo suffered loan losses from 
a customer that accounted for 13.5 percent of the total credit portfolio and 140 percent of 
the bank's capital. This case was also one example where regulators could not prevent the 
losses from the beginning even though they knew that such practice was a potential 
problem for the bank. 
Regulators are normally reluctant just to let the bank die without an attempt to save it. 
Bank Indonesia, as a central bank, is responsible for the stability of the banking system; 
therefore its policy of closing a bank is the last alternative and, because of this view, only 
Summa Bank was liquidated in the period of 1975-96. However, 16 banks were liquidated 
on 1 November 1997. The rest were taken over by other banks or investors. Sometimes, 
regulators use the term "too big to fail" as the main justification for rescuing the failed 
banks. Even in the US, there is a tendency to rescue banks through mergers. This 
sometimes creates additional problems because even if, in total, the banking system looks 
good, the basic problem still exists and the new management does not always succeed in 
cleaning up the problems. 
Chapter 3 contains an empirical study concerning the determinants of problem banks in 
Indonesia by employing financial ratios which represent bank risks as discussed in this 
section. 
1.7. Objectives of thesis 
As noted above, after a series of deregulation measures for the banking industry was put 
into effect, many banks suffered illiquidity at the beginning of the 1990s. As a result, the 
authorities (i. e. Bank Indonesia and the Finance Ministry) need to address the following 
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issues: first, the authorities are apparently unable to detect financial problems in banks at 
an early stage; second, the authorities adopt imprudent capital adequacy regulation; third, 
the absence of a deposit insurance scheme creates costs for society when there is a bank 
failure because depositors will loss their money. Additionally, the absence of deposit 
insurance will reduce public confidence to banking systems, increasing the possibility of 
bank runs. 
More recently, some efforts have been made to improve the situation, such as the adoption 
of new approaches in supervising banks and the establishment of a team to study the 
adoption of deposit insurance and the improvement of capital regulation. This study will 
try to examine the issues related to capital regulation using finance theory. The main 
objective of this research is to develop a methodology for assessing market risk. The 
following section sets out the framework of this research (see Figure 1.5) 
1.8. Framework of thesis 
To achieve the objectives of this research, I adopt the following framework: 
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Figure 1.5. 
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Based on the framework above, this research involves the following: 
" Reviewing the theories of bank risks 
" Identifying the determinants of bank risk in Indonesia by conducting an empirical study 
" Reviewing the theories of capital adequacy regulation 
" Outlining the capital adequacy proposals from the BIS (including the pros and cons) 
" Designing alternative models for risk-based capital adequacy assessment using theories 
of finance and econometrics 
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" Comparing capital requirements calculated using the BIS standardised methodology 
with alternative models. 
" Explaining how an early warning system can be designed to assist bank supervisors in 
Indonesia 
1.9. Structure of thesis 
Chapter 1 (Introduction) outlines the background to banking problems in Indonesia, bank 
risk in theory and practice, bank failure in various countries, the aims and framework of 
this thesis, as well as providing a summary of each chapter (see below). 
Chapter 2 discusses various empirical studies involving probability estimation of bank 
failure carried out by other authors. 
Chapter 3 comprises an empirical study of the determinants of potential problem banks in 
Indonesia. This empirical study adopts limited dependent variables in regression analysis by 
employing "problem" and "non-problem" banks as dependent variables and financial ratios, 
which represent various bank risks, as independent variables. Using panel data of 240 
banks from the fourth quarter of 1989 to the third quarter of 1995, this study finds that 
solvency risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and interest rate risk were 
significant for most problem banks. However, foreign exchange rate risk was found to be 
insignificant, since few banks encountered financial problems because of foreign exchange 
rate exposure. However, some individual banks suffered illiquidity because of trading 
losses, such as Bank Duta and Bank Exim. As a result, further investigation of foreign 
exchange risk was conducted using one bank -the major player in Indonesia- as a case 
study. The empirical study in Chapter 5 provides evidence that the sample bank is sensitive 
to foreign exchange rate risk. 
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Chapter 4 provides an overview of capital adequacy assessment methodologies. This 
section consists of a discussion of the BIS's standardised methodology, internal models 
and the pre-commitment approach, including analysis of their the pros and cons. 
Chapter 5 reviews the methodologies available for valuing positions in financial 
instruments. The aim of this chapter is to understand the basic concept of positions in 
financial instruments and to analyse valuation methods which can be used in the 
assessment of market risk. 
Chapter 6 represents empirical work concerning the assessment of foreign exchange rate 
risk using alternative models. This empirical work involves forecasting the volatility of 
IDR exchange rates (Indonesian Rupiah) against 18 currencies using GARCH models and 
simulates these volatility estimates for foreign exchange positions of the largest banks in 
Indonesia. Using daily data from January 1996 to May 1997, the results show that the 
volatility estimates of IDR exchange rates are lower than suggested by risk weights in the 
BIS proposals (i. e. BIS suggests an 8% risk weight). However, the GARCH does not 
guarantee to provide volatility estimates of less than 8%, the results depend heavily on the 
time series data used in the models. Based on the back testing method, the maximum 
percentage error in GARCH (GARCH error occurs when the estimates are lower than 
actual) is 3.71% (see Table 6.6). 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the evidence presented in the previous chapters. In 
particular, the empirical study in Chapter 3 shows that modelling of bank failure using a 
fixed effect logit model (Model 2) provides better results than the standard logit model 
(Model 1). This finding is significant contribution to the existing literature on the 
estimation of the probability of bank failure. Moreover, the results in this empirical study 
are reliable for two reasons: (1) the proportion of problem banks in the sample is around 
40% (nearly in balance with the proportion of non-problem banks); (2) this study employs 
supervisory data (call reports). Furthermore, the empirical study in Chapter 6 finds that the 
decay factor of IDR exchange rate returns varies depending on the characteristics of the 
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data. This finding questions the assumption of J. P. Morgan that the decay factor is 0.94 for 
all currencies. Additionally, J. P. Morgan also suggests that the decay factor of 0.94 is 
similar to GARCH (1,1). This study finds that the characteristics of IDR exchange rate 
returns are not always GARCH (1,1). This finding further supports the evidence that the 
decay factor is not always 0.94. Finally, the empirical study in Chapter 6 also finds that 
the BIS's approach suggests a higher volatility for IDR foreign exchange rates than that 
suggested by EWMA and GARCH, calling into question the validity of the former 
assumed risk weights. 
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Chapter 2 
Survey of Empirical Works on Bank Failure 
2.1. Introduction 
Banks from around the world have failed due to a variety of causes. The signs of failure in 
traditional banks can often be detected at an early stage. Credit default is the major cause 
of failure in traditional banks. Symptoms of failure in modern banks may only appear 
shortly before the banks fail because trading in financial instruments and foreign exchange 
are the main activities of modern banks. This leaves bank supervisors with little time to 
take action to prevent bank failure. Therefore, identification of banks' condition prior to 
failure is crucial. 
Assessment of bank failure is necessary for two reasons. First, an understanding of the 
determinants of bank failure will enable supervisors to supervise banks more efficiently, 
taking account of their risk profiles. Bank failure prediction models which employ 
independent variables that are significantly related to the risks causing failure can be used 
as a basis for calculating the risk of failure. Additionally, the results can be used to set 
variable rate deposit insurance premia. Second, the ability to differentiate between sound 
banks and troubled ones may allow bank supervisors to implement action to prevent 
problem banks from failing. In other words, the model can be used as early warning system 
in banking supervision. 
Prediction of bank and corporate failures using limited dependent variables has been a 
popular area of research (see Altman, 1968,1977; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Deakin, 1972; 
Sinkey, 1975; Martin, 1977; Bovenzi, Marino and McFadden, 1983; Avery and Hanweck, 
1984; Thomson, 1991; Espahbodi, 1991; Thomson, 1992; Heffernan, 1995). 
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Some researchers have adopted a linear form of multiple discriminant analysis (LMDA). 
However, this approach assumes that variance and co-variance matrices of independent 
variables are equal across groups, and that independent variables are multivariate normally 
distributed. The normal distribution assumption for independent variables is necessary to 
allow for significance tests on individual coefficients. An alternative model for assessing 
the probability of bank failure is a binary choice regression model. Many derivations of 
such binary choice models have been developed to estimate the probability of bank failure. 
This chapter discuss how to select the appropriate failure prediction model. However, 
the choice of model is not the only problem involved in predicting bank failure. Sometimes 
we may face data limitation problems. This is likely to be because the proportion of failed 
to sound banks is relatively small. Finally, these constraints may lead to prediction bias. 
This chapter will review the literature on failure prediction (for both banks and 
companies), focusing on the models, data sets, variables, and testing methods used and the 
results derived. The chapter is organised in the following way: Section 2.2 outlines the 
aims of bank failure prediction models; Section 2.3 discusses modelling in the prediction of 
bank or company failure; Section 2.4 assesses the needs of sampling; Section 2.5 discusses 
the criteria of bank failure; 2.6 outlines the explanatory variables used in previous studies; 
Section 2.7 discusses the performance measurement and tests used; and Section 2.8 
comprises the conclusions. 
2.2. The aims of bank failure prediction models 
The introductory section in this chapter mentions that the purposes of the probability 
estimations of bank failure are two-fold: (1) providing an early warning system in banking 
supervision; and (2) identifying the determinants of bank failure. This section will discuss 
these purposes in more detail. 
Early identification of potential failure is necessary for regulatory agencies to ensure that 
corrective actions can be carried out promptly before the condition of banks deteriorates 
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towards failure. The failure of banks may affect the economy as a whole through the 
deterioration of public confidence in the banking system and, furthermore, through 
reduction in the nation's money supply. 
Bank failure estimation models can provide a tool for supervisory agencies to estimate the 
probability of failure for each bank on a regular basis, such as monthly or quarterly. 
Financial ratios, which may be updated every month or quarter, can be employed in the 
model to obtain the probability of failure for each bank. If the probability figure breaks the 
trigger (the cut-off point - see below), supervisory agencies will pay special attention to 
the banks and suggest corrective action, if necessary, to reduce the probability of failure. 
However, the selection of the cut off point is arbitrary. Some studies adopt 0.5 as the 
basis on which to decide whether a bank is classiffied as failed or sound. If the probability 
estimate is >0.5, the bank will be classified as a failed bank and if the probability is <0.5, 
the bank will be classified as a sound bank. However, many researchers argue that 0.5 is 
not an appropriate cut-off point since the number of failed banks is not 50% of the total 
sample. Adoption of the cut-off point of 0.5 for an extreme difference between the 
number of failed banks and sound banks (e. g. 10% failed banks and 90% sound banks) will 
create significance bias in the classification (Mandala, 1994). Many researchers adopt 
different proportion of failed and non-failed banks (Martin, 1977; Thomson, 1991,1992). 
Section 2.4 discusses in more detail the needs of sampling. 
The ultimate purpose of predicting the probability of failure is to provide information for 
bank supervisors concerning the causes of failure. The model employs several explanatory 
variables which represent the various causes of failures. The determinants of failure can be 
derived from significant variables in the model. However, the relationship between the 
financial variables and bank failure must be statistically valid, otherwise the accuracy of the 
estimates can be enhanced by employing as many independent variables as possible without 
considering the statistical validity of the parameters. This type of regression is recognised 
as a spurious regression in Granger and Newbold (1974). Heffernan (1995) focuses on the 
determinants of failure rather than early warning systems in her study. 
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2.3. Modelling in the prediction of bank or company failure 
In the introductory section to this chapter, it was mentioned that there are two approaches 
which have been used in the prediction of bank or company failure; discriminant analysis 
and limited dependent variable regression models using maximum likelihood functions. 
This section discusses in more detail the pros and cons of these models. 
This study ignores the linear probability model which has been used by Davis (1992) for 
two reasons. First, the model assumes that a company is considered a failed company if the 
profit maximisation yields a negative number. This assumption can be expressed in the 
following equation: 
pF(L)-WL-qD+S<0 
where, 
pF(L) = output function 
WL = input function 
qD = debt with q interest rate 
S= the value of share after the deduction of D 
The model is less applicable in the prediction of bank failure because banks may not fail in 
the real business world even though the result of profit maximisation is less than zero, as 
assumed in Davis's model. Because of asymmetric information in the banking industry, 
banks may still exist by raising new deposits or interbank call money when the profit 
maximisation given by the model above is negative. In some cases, banks can survive and 
be considered as sound banks after certain periods of time. 
Second, in estimating the probability of bankruptcy, ji(. ) , 
Davis (1992) adopts the 
following equation: 
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, u(. 
) =, u(W, PM, q, r, D, MV, p, 6, AD) 
where, 
W= the price of labor 
PM = the price of raw material 
q= the real interest rate 
r= the nominal interest rate 
D= the debt 
p= the output price 
a- = the variance of the output price 
AD = the aggregate demand 
This approach can be identified as a linear probability model (LPM) which is not 
applicable to this study. The ensuing discussion in this section contains the reasons for not 
using the LPM. 
Discriminant analysis is an approach used to classify banks or companies in a certain 
manner such as "failed" and "sound". This approach has been widely used in the prediction 
of bank failure (see Altman, 1968,1977; Sinkey, 1975; and Martin, 1977). However, this 
approach employs some assumptions which violate real-world conditions. By simplifying 
reality, application of this approach in the economics, finance and business literature can 
only have limited usefulness. The key assumptions in discriminant analysis include the 
following (Hubert, 1994): (1) The standard discriminant analysis procedures assume that 
variables used to describe or characterise the members of the groups being investigated are 
multivariate normally distributed. In fact, this is very rare in practice. Violations of the 
normality assumption may affect the validity of the significance parameters and estimated 
error rate tests. Employing the normality assumption and applying the standard procedures 
of discriminant analysis can, at best, produce only reasonable approximations to the truth. 
(2) The standard discriminant analysis also assumes that the group dispersion (variance- 
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covariance) matrices are equal across groups. Violation of this assumption will affect the 
significance test for the differences in group means and classification rules. (3) 
Discriminant analysis procedures assume that the groups being investigated are discrete 
and identifiable. In fact, the definition of bank failure is based on arbitrary judgements. 
Haslem and Longbrake (1971) grouped banks based upon the distribution of their 
profitability. Sinkey (1975) distinguished between "problem" and "non-problem" banks 
using guidelines which were used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
Based on these guidelines, the FDIC keeps a list of problem banks and updates this 
constantly to keep its eyes on the banks which are most likely to need special attention 
from supervisors. Inconsistency in the application of the criteria used to identify "problem" 
and "non-problem" (or "failed" and "non-failed") banks will lead to biased probability 
estimates. Additionally, discriminating factors in discriminant analysis are calculated just 
for the purposes of classifying groups, not for determining the causes of failure. Therefore, 
this approach is not suitable for determining the probability of bank failure. 
Realising the limitation of discriminant analysis, Mayer and Pifer (1970) adopted a limited 
dependent variable regression model in their study. This approach employs a binary choice 
of dependent variables which gives the symbol "1" for failed banks and "0" for non-failed 
(ie. sound) banks. Econometricians identify this model as a linear probability model 
(LPM). However, this approach does not guarantee that the estimates will fall in the range 
between 1 and 0 (Gujarati, 1995, p. 554). To ensure that the estimates fall between 1 and 0 
we have to impose a restriction on the regression estimates. 
The logistic approach can be applied to LPM (Aldric and Nelson, 1984, p. 48 and Mandala, 
1994, pp. 23-6) as an alternative way to ensure that the estimates fall between 0 and 1. In 
mathematical terms, this can be explained in the following equation: 
T1 
Yi -A+/jkI x; k+e, (2.1) 
i=1 
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where, 
y; = independent variable of observation i (symbol "1" for failed and "0" for non-failed) 
N1= intercept 
/Jk =coefficient of the kh independent variable 
Xk = independent variable k (k = 1,2,3............ k) 
e; = error term for observation i 
The errors in the equation above are identically identified as following a normal 
distribution or i. i. d. N(0,62 ). 
From equation 2.1, we can get the list of un-constrained probability estimates (z; ). 
Assuming P,. is the probability that a bank is classified as "failed" and P(=1- P, ) is the 
probability that a bank is classified as "non-failed", the logistic function can be shown as 
follows: 
Liz ,=Z; 
0- P) 
With algebraic manipulation, we can solve for P, using the following equation: 
eZ P 
(1+eZ) 
(2.2) 
The coefficients of independent variables can be derived using the maximum likelihood 
approach. 
With the logistic treatment, the probability will be bounded by 0 and 1. The graph below 
shows the probability distribution using a logistic function. 
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Graph 2.1. 
Probability Distribution of a Logistic Function 
1 
istribution range 
Observations 0 
source: Aldrich and Nelson (1984) 
Logit models have been widely used in the prediction of bank failure (Martin, 1977; 
Thomson, 1991, Espahdobi, 1991). They are preferable to discriminant analysis because 
of superior statistical properties which affect the t-test for significance parameters, the log 
likelihood ratio test for insignificant parameters and the Pseudo-R square for the goodness 
of fit, and because the discriminant analysis relies upon assumptions which do not exist in 
reality. This has lead a growing number of researchers to employ logit models in the 
prediction of bank or company failure. 
The standard logit model is normally applied to cross sectional data. If we apply a 
standard logit model to cross sectional and time series data (i. e. panel data), we must 
implicitly assume that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same over time 
and between cross sectional units. In mathematical form, this can be shown in the 
following equation: 
KT 
. 
Yit -i+Aý 
ý'xkit + ett (2.3) 
k=1t=1 
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where, 
y; t = dependent variable of cross section i and time t 
/3 = intercept for all cross section i and time t 
xktt = kth independent variable for cross section i and time t 
, ßk = coefficient of independent variable k for all cross section i and time t 
eit = disturbance of cross section i and time t 
Similarly to equation 2.1, equation 2.3 also assumes that e; t is i. i. d. N( 0, a2 ). 
Equation 2.3 assumes that the coefficients of parameters are the same for all cross 
sectional units and over time. However, this assumption is not always valid. To 
accommodate the individual and time series effects, we can employ the following equation: 
K 7' 
. 
yit - Y6it + )6ki7 
IT xkit + eit 
k=1t=1 
(2.4) 
Since we have only a small number of cross sectional units and a short time series, 
applying this model will be very simple. It is similar to running regressions simultaneously 
on cross sectional units and time series. However, this model becomes more complicated 
for a large number of cross sectional units and long time series. 
To simplify this problem, Chamberlain (1980) proposed the use of the following 
alternatives: a fixed-effect model that maximises the joint likelihood function; or a fixed- 
effect model with a conditional likelihood function. The joint likelihood function fixed- 
effect model assumes that: (1) observations across groups are independent; (2) 
observations within a group are independent as well, but conditional on the group effects. 
The dependence of different observations within a group is assumed to be due to their 
common dependence on the group specific effect, A. In fact, a more general form of 
independence is possible, such as serial correlation. Therefore, the regression in this model 
is simply a multiple regression of y on x and a set of a group indicators which is 
represented by a dummy variable. Then, the likelihood function can be processed using the 
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normal procedure. Chapter 3 shows in detail how to solve the regression using the 
maximum likelihood function. 
Chamberlain also suggests adopting a conditional likelihood function fixed-effect model. 
The key idea is to base the likelihood function on the conditional distribution of the data. 
Then, we can say that the statistic of the fixed-effect (A) is E vff . Chamberlain looks at 
the case of T=2. If yi1 +yi2 =0 or 2, then yil and yi2 can be determined using their 
sum. However, if y, 1 + yi2 = 1, two possibilities may occur for the order of y, 1 and yi2. 
The first event (wi = 0) arises if (yi 1, Y; 2 )=(0,1), and the second event (wi = 1) arises if 
(Y1, Yi2)=(1,0). The conditional density is given by the following: 
prob (w; = 1Iy;, __ 
prob (w; = 1) 
Y, a 1) [prob (w; = 0) + prob (w1 = 1)ý 
eß'0xi2-xi1) 
1+eß(x; z-xil) - FLQ(xi2 -xi1) (2.5) 
Then, the conditional log-likelihood function is: 
L=E;,,,, 
1 
{w; 1nF[ß'(x12 -xj]+(1-w; )lnF[-, ß'(x; 2 - xnI}, 
where, 
Il-Lll. yil+. yi2=1} 
Heffernan (1995) adopts the conditional logit fixed-effect model to run panel data of bank 
failures from an international pool and a Scandinavian pool. However, the conditional logit 
fixed-effect model suffers from computational problems. According to Green (1995), the 
maximum of the series (T) is 10. Computation in conditional logit fixed-effect models 
will become prohibitive when T>10 in the log likelihood function. The reason is that the 
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larger the value of T in the log likelihood function the larger the space required, and 
computation is required at a geometric rate. 
Many variations on the standard logit model have been used in the prediction of bank 
failure. Thomson (1992) extends the standard logit model into a two-step logit model. 
Although, the model is similar to the standard logit model, the two step logit model 
employs an ordinary least square (OLS) regression to estimate one or more independent 
variables before running the logit regression. The drawback of this approach is that it 
requires the separation of the equation into at least two equations. This produces errors in 
each equation. Classification error analysis only appears in logit models (ignoring errors in 
other OLS equations). Error estimates do not represent the overall errors in the models, 
and the result will be misleading. For this reason, I believe a single equation model is 
preferable. 
Some researchers have employed probit models to predict bank or company failure 
(Bovenzi, et al, 1983; Casey, et at, 1986; Pastena and Ruland, 1986; and Dopuch, et al, 
1987). The difference between probit and logit models lies in the treatment adopted to 
ensure that the probability estimates will fall in the range between 0 and 1. Unbounded 
results (i. e. unlimited range of probability) are useless in determining the probability 
estimates. Logit models adopt a logistic probability distribution function while probit 
models adopt a normal probability distribution function. In mathematical terms, we can 
show the general form of a normal distribution for observations with mean ,u and 62 
in the 
following equation (Green, 1993, p. 58): 
12,,,. 2, 
f (xI u. 6) = 
i(ta ) 
-N/-2 zu 
(2.6) 
Probit and logit models are alike because the normal and logistic distributions are similarly 
shaped. The difference lies just in the tails. Many studies have been done to compare these 
models (see, Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, Martin, 1977). The results show that probit and 
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logit models yield similar probability estimates. However, the logit model is 
computationally simpler and more tractable than the probit model. 
2.4. Sample proportion 
Models to predict bank failure may be constrainded by a limited number of observations on 
bank failure. A relatively small number of bank failures in the observations will yield 
unreliable results. Previous studies show that the lower the percentage of failure 
observations in a given sample, the higher the percentage of "correct" classifications 
produced. A good model will give stable results whatever the number of failure 
observations in the sample. The following table shows the link between the proportion of 
failed bank observations and the number of correct classifications produced in estimation. 
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Table 2.1. 
Relationship between the number of bank failure observations and the 
number of correct classifications produced in the modelling of bank 
failures 
Models and number of parameters Number of % from total % of 
failed banks sample observations 
correctly 
classified 
1. Bovenzi et al (1983) -7 parameters 
-call report 2 year lead time 3,000 21 79 
-call report 2 year lead time 1,000 7 93 
-call report 2 year lead time 600 4 96 
-call report 1 year lead time 3,000 21 79 
-call report 1 year lead time 2,000 14 86 
-call report 1 year lead time 1,000 7 93 
-examination report 2 year lead time 3,000 21 79 
-examination report 2 year lead time 1,000 7 93 
-examination report 2 year lead time 600 4 96 
-examination report 1 year lead time 3,000 21 79 
-examination report 1 year lead time 2,000 14 86 
-examination report 1 year lead time 1,000 7 93 
2. Korobow-Stuhr (1983) -6 parameters 
2 year lead time 31 20 84 
16 10 94 
8 5 98 
3. Martin (1977 -9 parameters 
2 year lead time 517 9 91 
4.. Sinkey (1975) - 11 parameters 
classification model 94 46 82 
5. Espahbodi (1991) - 13 parameters 
-2 year lead time 29 76 75.71 
-1 year lead time 33 89 87.62 
6. Thomson (1992) - 19 parameters 
-1984 data 78 4.49 86.17 
-1986 data 33 7.66 88.212 
-1988 data 174 10.02 93.988 
The studies cited above use the percentage of correct classifications as a measure of the 
performance of the models. A perfect model will estimate 100 percent of observations 
correctly. However, the proportion of failed and sound banks in the sample affect the 
classification results. The table above shows that a lower percentage of failed bank 
observations is associated with a higher percentage of banks being classified correctly. 
Since the models employ failed and non-failed banks as dependent variables, the number of 
failed banks will be very low as a result of governments' efforts to prevent banks from 
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failing. Therefore, the finding that a high percentage of banks are classified correctly by a 
model which employs a low percentage of failed banks in samples does not reflect the true 
reliability of the model. In an extreme case, we cannot say that the model is reliable when 
there are only 1 observation of bank failure and 100 observations of sound banks in a 
sample. The more observations of bank failure included in a sample, the more we can 
reliably assess the performance of the model. The model is perfect when the correct 
classification remains constant whatever the number of bank failure in the sample. The 
percentage of failed and non-failed banks in a sample plays a critical role in determiningthe 
usefulness of the model. 
2.5. Criteria for classifying banks as "failures" 
The definition of "failure" will play an important role in determining the number of banks 
put into this group. In general, a bank is categorised as a "failure" if the bank cannot carry 
on its operations without incurring losses which will immediately result in negative net 
worth. This definition has been used by several authors to predict bank failure, such as 
Meyer (1970) and Thomson (1991,1992). However, some banks do not fail, as a result of 
governments' intervention to prevent them from failing. Therefore, the number of bank 
failures in reality is very low. A large gap in sample proportions between "failed" and 
"non-failed" banks will thus bias the "performance" of the model. To obtain a reasonable 
number of bank failures, several researchers have thus defined bank failure using wider 
definition of failure. Martin (1977), for example, classifies a bank as a failure if one of the 
following holds: the occurrence of failure, supervisory merger, and/or emergency measures 
to resolve an imminent failure situation. Other authors adopt different definitions of 
"failure". In Heffernan's study (1995), a bank is considered as a "failure" if at least one of 
the following conditions holds: the bank is liquidated, taken over under government 
supervision, and/or rescued with a package which includes state financial support. 
Thomson (1991; 1992), meanwhile, includes mergers with FDIC assistance as an additional 
criteria of bank failure, extending the definition used by Heffernan . 
Chapter 2- Survey of Empirical Works on Bank Failure 
Another approach to determining bank failure is to use the supervisory agency's judgement 
of bank condition, rather than actual failure. Each agency maintains a "problem list" of 
banks which are considered substantially riskier than other banks and which will require 
corrective action by management. Sinkey (1975) adopts definitions for "problem" and 
"non-problem" banks based on the FDIC's approach. The FDIC used three classifications 
for problem banks: (1) the "Serious problem-potential payoff' (PPO) label is designed to 
identify in advance a bank facing serious problems and which has at least a fifty percent 
chance of requiring FDIC financial assistance in the near future; (2) the "Serious problem" 
(SP) label is designed to indicate a banking situation that threatens ultimately to involve 
the FDIC in financial outlay unless drastic changes occur; (3) and the "Other problem" 
(OP) label is designed to define a banking situation involving a significant weakness, but 
with a lesser degree of vulnerability than cases (1) or (2) above, but still calling for 
aggressive supervision or attention by the FDIC. The FDIC is concerned with the 
evaluation of risk exposure, and believes that problem banks face greater risks than non- 
problem banks. 
Classification of "problem" and "non-problem" banks in this ways depends very much on 
the subjective judgement of bank supervisors. Different agencies often differ in their 
opinions on whether a bank is a "problem". However, if such a problem bank 
classification is followed by actual failure, a model using "problem" and "non-problem" 
banks defined in this way may provide a longer lead time for corrective action than would 
a model based on actual failure because "problem" in this case is the condition before 
banks failed. 
The adoption of bank condition prior to failure will be useful in the operation of an early 
warning system in banking supervision. This approach can be designed in such a way as to 
be an additional tool in bank examination and supervision. The advantages of using 
"problem" and "non-problem" banks defined in this way as dependent variables are as 
follows; (1) More efficient allocation of resources in banking supervision. Early 
identification of problem banks will help bank supervision agencies to allocate resources 
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based on need. Less time and fewer resources will be spent on non-problem banks rather 
than on problem banks. Examination frequency may also be reduced for non-problem 
banks. (2) The results of this approach can be used as a basis for evaluation of the 
examination and supervisory performance of banking supervision (i. e. the supervisory 
performance is not good if many banks are classified as problems). (3) This approach can 
be used to provide a basis for assessing deposit-insurance premiums based on the 
probability of suffering problems. (4) It provides an objective methodology for assessing 
bank condition prior to failure. Although bank regulatory agencies may employ composite 
ratings to reflect the condition of banks, the components of the composite rating reflect, in 
turn, the subjective judgements of bank supervisors. (5) It may provide sufficient time to 
allow for corrective action to prevent banks from failing. 
For the above reasons, Sinkey (1975) adopts "problem" and "non-problem" banks as 
classified according to FDIC guidelines in his studies. However, the adoption of this 
approach to classifying "problem" and "non-problem" banks suffers from the following 
drawbacks: (1) the definition of "problem" and "non-problem" may vary between 
supervisory agencies; (2) the criteria used to define problem banks may change due to 
changes in regulations and/or the judgement of supervisors. Inconsistency in defining 
problem banks leads to the provision of unreliable estimates by the model. 
2.6. Explanatory variables 
Financial ratios are the main explanatory variables used to estimate the probability of 
failure. The ratios normally represent liquidity, solvency, size, asset quality, and earnings. 
Most of the previous authors surveyed above believe that such variables can be used to 
represent the causes of bank failure. However, due to the development of risk analysis, the 
causes of bank failure can now be more closely identified as arising from such risk as credit 
risk, operational risk, foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, and fraud risk. 
These risks will affect the liquidity and solvency of banks. Some previous researchers did 
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not include the ratios which represent foreign exchange and interest rate risk. Table 2.2 
shows in detail the variables which have been used in previous studies. 
Previous researchers also employed different numbers of variables. Some of them 
employed a small number of independent variables while others employed a large number. 
The number of explanatory variables affects the goodness-of-fit in prediction. The more 
explanatory variables that are included in the regression, the better the goodness-of-fit of 
the regression. However, goodness-of-fit in regressions which employ too many 
explanatory variables may be because of multicollinearity between independent variables - 
these regressions are called spurious regressions (Granger and Newbold, 1974). 
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2.7. Performance measurement and tests 
2.7.1. T-test 
There are many approaches available to test the results of the logit models with maximum 
likelihood estimation. This study uses the t-test to examine the coefficients of parameters 
individually by employing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of an individual 
parameter is zero. According to Pindyck (1991, p. 281), the t-test may be applied in 
maximum likelihood estimation since all parameter estimators are known to be 
(asymptotically) normal. The t-value is derived from: 
(ß - B) 
se, ß 
(2.7) 
where se stands for standard error of estimates. By using t-tables, we can reject or accept 
the hypothesis with a certain degree of confidence. If the results show that some variables 
have zero coefficients, the test will continue by employing a log likelihood ratio test to test 
whether the coefficients of parameters remain zero when they interact simultaneously in 
the equation. 
2.7.2. Log likelihood ratio test 
To measure the goodness of fit, this study employs the likelihood ratio test by 
transforming the restricted log likelihood function (RLLF) and the unrestricted log 
likelihood function (ULLF) into the following formula, (Gujarati, 1995, p. 281, Aldrich 
and Nelson, 1984, p. 54, Green, 1993, p. 647): 
A= 2(ULLF - RLLF) (2. g) 
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ULLF is the log likelihood of the original regression (i. e. without any restriction) while 
RLLF is the result of the log likelihood of regression with the priori that one or some of 
the parameter coefficients are zero. The value of A will follow the chi-square (x2 ) 
distribution with a degree of freedom equal to the number of parameters restricted to zero. 
The test accepts the hypothesis if there is no difference between ULLF and RLLF 
(i. e. A =0) and rejects otherwise. Alternatively, for A 0, the test can be performed by 
comparing the value of A and the value of the chi-square distribution. Based on the chi- 
square distribution table, we can identify whether the hypothesis is accepted using a 
certain level of confidence and degree of freedom. 
2.7.3. Pseudo-R2 
To measure the performance of model predictions, previous studies have used pseudo-R2 
and classification errors. Traditional R2 is not appropriate for models with a limited 
dependent variable (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, p. 56) as the value of the dependent variable 
is 0 or 1. The criteria of success in the traditional R2 estimation is the degree to which the 
error of variance is minimised, while the logit model uses the criterion of maximum 
likelihood. 
Previous researchers have used several methods to measure pseudo R2. Several surveys, 
such as those by McFadden (1973, p. 121), Aldrich and Nelson (1984) and McKelvey and 
Zavoina, (1975) indicate that different pseudo R2's yield different values for the same 
model and data. To identify which one is the best is arbitrary. Zimmermann (1996, 
pp. 241-59) suggests that the McKelvey and Zavoina R2's model (R2MZ) yields the best 
score. However, the R2, w produces a score which is more sensitive to misspecification in 
the error term than the McFadden approach, especially in binary probit and logit models. 
For the purpose of this study, we will use McFadden's pseudo R2. The detail of the 
mathematical expression of the pseudo R2 is shown in Appendix 2.1. 
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2.7.4. Classification of errors 
Previous studies also examined the power of the regressions to predict the probability of 
problem banks emerging by using all observations. The result of these prediction models is 
an array of probability numbers between 0 and 1. By employing a given cut-off point, this 
model produces estimates in three categories: "correct" estimates, "error I type" estimates 
and "error II type" estimates. A cut-off point is the point used to determine whether a 
bank is classified as a problem or a non-problem bank. This approach has been widely used 
by authors in estimating the probability of bank or company failure (Martin, 1977; Sinkey, 
1975; Bovenzi, Marino and McFadden, 1983; Korobow and Stuhr, 1983; Espahbodi, 
1991). For instance, a cut-off point of 0.4 means that the models identify estimated values 
of > 0.4 as problem banks and estimated values of < 0.4 as non-problem banks. The 
models produce correct estimates when the observations of problem banks are estimated 
as problems or, with a cut-off point of 0.4, the estimate value is >0.4. Error I types 
occur when the models predict non-problem banks as problems or, in this example, the 
models produce a probability >0.4 for a non-problem bank. Error II types occur when the 
models produce a probability of < 0.4 for a problem bank. 
Details of this error scenario are shown in Table 2.3. The lower the cut-off point, the 
greater is the number of banks predicted as problems and the smaller the number of banks 
predicted as non-problems. The choice of a cut-off-point plays an important role in the 
calculation of errors. Therefore, a "fair" cut-off-point is important in error analysis. The 
sample proportion of failed and non-failed banks is believed to be the best criterion to 
determine the cut-off-point (Thomson, 1992). For instance, samples with 50% of failed 
banks and 50% of non-failed banks will use a cut-off point of 0.5, and samples with 60% 
of failed banks and 40% of non-failed banks will use a cut-off-point of 0.4. 
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There is an argument that good results in error classification tests using within sample 
observations are not reliable because the observations which are employed to test the 
models were also used to generate the coefficient of parameters in regression. Therefore, 
out of sample tests are carried out in this study. 
2.8. Conclusions 
This study concludes that the logit model is to be preferred to the alternatives available 
because of its superior statistical properties. Although the probit model would give 
similar results, the logit model is mathematically more simple and tractable. LPM may 
produce estimated probabilities outside of the meaningful 0 and 1 range. LMDA may 
yield unreliable results since the multivariate normality assumption of discriminating 
factors and equal dispersion (variance-covariance) of each group do not exist. Although 
Martin (1977) maintains that discriminant analysis will provide similar results to that of 
the logit model, since the basic assumptions in discriminant analysis are satisfied, the 
probit and logit models are preferable because the significance of the independent 
variables can be tested more easily using the t statistic, and because many other statistical 
properties are readily available for analysis in this model, such as the log likelihood ratio 
test for insignificant parameters and the Pseudo- R2 for the goodness-of-fit. 
The prediction of the probability of banks becoming problems is more useful in banking 
supervision than the prediction of the probability of bank failure as it may provide 
sufficient time for the supervisory authorities to prevent banks from failing. Sinkey 
(1975), therefore, uses "problem" and "non-problem" banks as dependent variables in his 
study. 
This study thus employs a logit probability model to contribute to the literature on the 
prediction of problem banks (based on the condition prior to failure) by focusing on the 
following points: (1) lowering the gap between the proportion of "problem" and "non- 
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problem" banks in observations to ensure that the results are reliable; (2) determining 
bank risks in Indonesia by employing independent variables which represent the various 
risks run by banks; and (3) employing a logit fixed-effect model using panel data of call 
reports to obtain group-effect (i. e. call report is financial data of banks in Indonesia 
which are intended just for bank supervisors in Bank Indonesia and are not available for 
public). 
Therefore, the results of this study will be reliable for determining of bank risk in 
Indonesia and early warning system in banking supervision. 
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Chapter 3 
An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Potential 
Problem Banks in Indonesia 
3.1. Introduction 
The various sources of problems causing bank failures in selected countries have been 
discussed in detail in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1). This chapter will address the 
sources of the problems which can lead to bank failure in Indonesia using quantitative 
analysis. The aim of this empirical work is to identify bank risks, which are represented by 
explanatory variables within the regressions, in Indonesia. Moreover, the results of this 
study can be used as an additional early warning signal in banking supervision. [Detailed 
discussion concerning the needs of an early warning system is included in Chapter 1]. 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, this study finds that: (1) a standard logit model is not 
applicable for panel data; (2) a relatively small number of bank failures in samples will 
produce unreliable results; (3) independent variables used in the previous studies were not 
related directly to risks in banks; (4) prediction of bank condition prior to failure may 
provide a longer lead time for corrective action than prediction of bank failure. 
The empirical study in this chapter contributes to the literature on failure prediction models 
by focusing on the following points: (1) employing a logit fixed-effect model to estimate the 
probability of banks becoming problem in Indonesia using panel data; (2) employing a 
relatively large number of problem banks in samples (i. e. 41.32%); (3) employing the 
condition of banks prior to failure (problem); (4) employing financial ratios which represent 
risks in banks; (5) employing supervisory data and information. 
Chapter 3 is organised as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the models; Section 3.3 describes 
the data, Section 3.4 describes the dependent variables; Section 3.5 describes the 
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explanatory variables; Section 3.6 discusses the results of the empirical study; Section 3.7 
summarises the conclusions drawn. 
3.2. Models 
There are some quantitative models (e. g. Discriminant analysis, LPM, Logit and Probit) 
which have been widely used to determine the causes of company failure by taking the fact 
whether or not a firm goes bankrupt as the dependent variable and financial ratios as the 
independent variables. After reviewing those models, Chapter 2 concludes that a logit 
model is the most appropriate one for this study. The main reason for choosing the logit 
model is the superior statistical properties of the model. However, a modified model is 
necessary to ensure that the coefficients of parameters are valid due to the existence of 
group effects in the panel data. The following part of this section develops the quantitative 
expression of the standard logit model for panel data. 
The logit models involve the calculation of the probability distributions for dependent 
variables based on the cumulative logistic distribution function, as shown below. Intercept 
and constant coefficients are calculated by using the maximum likelihood method (ML). This 
approach estimates intercept and constant coefficients in such a way that the probability of 
observing the value of the y's (dependent variables) is as high as possible up to the true 
values. 
This study employs a binary dependent variable (y) where y=1 for problem banks and 
y=0 for non-problem banks. The value of y is assumed to depend on the constant /31 
and the explanatory variables x; = (i =1,2,........ 1), and the coefficients of parameters are 
assumed to be the same for cross sectional units and over time. In mathematical terms, we 
can show this in the following equation: 
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Yit - 
A+ 1A xkit + eit 
where 
i=1,2.......... N, 
e, r = pi ei,, -, 
+ v,, 
E[v, ]=O, E[v,, v, t]=o , andE[v; vj, 
]=Ofort s 
y= the independent variable of an individual i at time t 
181 = the intercept 
(3.1) 
ßk = the slope coefficient of parameter xk t 
xk;, = the k th independent variable of an individual i at time t 
e;, = disturbance term of an individual i at time t 
Assume P is the probability that a bank is classified as a problem and P(=1- P, ) is the 
probability that a bank is classified as a non-problem bank. 
Logit models adopt the following approach (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984, p. 48, Mandala, 
1994, pp. 23-6): 
= Z,. Ln 
P 
ýl Pi) 
With algebraic manipulation, we can solve for i using the following equation: 
eZ 
(1+eý 
Assuming we adopt the probability of P. for Y =1 given X; then the probability of 
P= {(Y = 0) given The probability of N values of sample Y given all N sets of 
values X, is calculated by multiplying the N probabilities: 
n 
P(Yl X) =HP, (1- P) 
i=1 
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ML estimation chooses the estimates of the intercept and the coefficients of parameters from 
a set of "K" independent variables (b) which would make the ML estimation produce 
estimates for Y as large as possible. The likelihood function is: 
L(Y /X, b) - P(Y /X) 
Each trial value b provides a value of L(Y / X; , 
b). ML estimation takes the value of 
(b) which yields the largest value of L(Y / X; , 
b) or Max L(Y / X, b) . b 
Finally, we can derive the intercept and coefficients of the b' s by differentiating the 
probability equation with respect to a and b, setting the results to zero and solving for the 
intended coefficients. 
Recall the following equation: 
n 
P(YlX)=fl Pi (1-P) 
i=1 
The likelihood function is: 
n 
LP(YlX)=fl Pi (1-P) 
i=l 
To simplify the calculation, we transform the equation into logarithmic form and obtain the 
following equation: 
n 
LogL [1og P+ log(1- P, )] 
1=1 
a(1og L) 
-ý[ 
cP, l c3)61 d3, ' c/31 ] 
aQ, -; =1 P 1-P. 
cý(1 og L) cP, l c, 8k CP,. l 4,8k 
aQk P 1- P] [ 
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Finally, we can solve for/31 and, ßk using the TSP software package to get efficient 
estimators. 
This study will employ cross-sectional and quarterly time-series data of financial ratios of 
banks from March 1989 to June 1995. In this estimation, there may be a problem with 
behaviour over time for a given cross-sectional unit and among the cross-sectional units 
themselves to get efficient parameters in the estimation (Judge et al, 1985, pp. 515-60). 
According to Judge, we can classify the variation in behaviour over time and within cross- 
section units into five alternatives, as given in the following outline. 
The equation of a linear model can be expressed in the following form: 
ýýK`` 
yit - Nlit + L, 
8kit xkit + eit (3.2) 
k=2 
The first alternative assumes that all constants and slope coefficients are the same for cross- 
sectional units and over time. (ßl; t = ßl and ßk; t =, 8k). Then, we can transform this model 
into the following equation: 
K 
Ylt -A+1: /-'k xktt + ett 
k=2 
(3.3) 
This treatment also assumes-that the different behaviour over cross-sectional units and time 
variations will be captured in the disturbance term (e7 ). Therefore, e1 will be 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated. 
The second alternative assumes that the constant varies between cross-sectional units only 
(i. e. the same over time) and the slopes are the same both for cross-sectional units and over 
time ( ý;, _, _A+ /r; i and 
Qk,, = /3ý- ). We can express this model in the following 
equation: 
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/ý_ Yit N-+A+ý Nk xkit + et 
k=2 
where, 
A= the mean of A and 
cy = the difference of ßl; (i"' individual) from ß 
(3.4) 
The third alternative assumes that the constant varies between cross-sectional units and 
through time but the slope coefficients are the same (ß1it = /3ý +, c4 +. ) and Bak ). The 
equation for this model is as follows: 
a ýK At -ý+A1+ "C + L.. ý /'' 
/ý 
k xkit 
+ ea 
k=2 
where, 
= the time series effects on all individuals 
(3.5) 
The fourth alternative assumes that the slope coefficients and constants vary between 
individuals (A,, = /jit =/+Al and t= 
Qki =A+ ph ). Therefore, we can express this 
model in the following equation: 
/ý Yit -Y+ Ni 1+1 (ý'k + Pki )xkit + eit 
k=2 
where, 
ßk = the mean of bk and 
(3.6) 
, uk = the 
individual specific component which is the difference of individual i from ßk 
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The fifth alternative assumes that the slope coefficients and constants vary between 
individuals and over time (ß; t =ß+A+A and ýk; t = A37, + , uk, + 
Au ). In mathematical 
terms, this model is as follows: 
k 
. 
yit -ý+Ni+"t+1(8k+ýC/i+'kýxkit+eit 
k=2 
(3.7) 
However, it is still unclear whether the effects on the coefficients of variables of each cross- 
sectional unit (, u) and over time (/, ) are fixed or random. If these effects are assumed as 
fixed, we can use dummy variable models for the constant and the seemingly unrelated 
regression models for the slope coefficients. Alternatively, if the effects are assumed to be 
random, we can use Error Component Models for the intercept (Mundlak, 1978a) and 
Swamy Random Coefficient Models for the slope coefficients (Swamy, 1970). Another 
approach is recognised within the Hsio Random Coefficient Models, which assume that 
effects on the intercept and slope coefficients are random (Hsio, 1974,1975). 
The choice of fixed or random effects for the model depends on whether the u; and X; are 
correlated. The random assumption results in a more efficient estimator when correlation 
between 
,c and 
X, exists by assuming a certain distribution of the A. However, Judge 
(1985, p. 527) suggests that the random assumption may produce inefficient estimators 
when the true distribution of A is different from the assumption. Therefore, dummy variable 
estimators may be better since we are not sure of the distribution of A. 
This study will employ two models. Model I assumes that the intercept and slope 
coefficients are the same between individuals and over time. Model 2 assumes that the 
intercept and slope coefficients vary between groups using a fixed effects model, but that 
they are the same between individuals within groups and over time. In other words, the 
coefficients of parameters in model 1 are assumed to be valid for all groups and the 
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coeeficients of parameters in model 2 are different for each group. The aim of model 2 is to 
test whether each group of banks has different significant coefficients of parameters. The 
results of model 2 may show different significant parameters for each group compared to 
that in Model 1. This information is useful for regulatory authorities as it enables then to 
focus on the particular risks to which the groups are sensitive in supervising banks. 
In mathematical terms, model 1 can be expressed in the folowing equation: 
k 
. 
yit =A + 1ßk xkit + eit 
k=1 
(3.8) 
where i= individual bank, t= time, k= the "k `h " independent variable. The distribution 
of e; t 
is assumed to be normal [ i. i. d. N(0,62) ]. 
In mathematical terms, model 2 can be shown in the following equation: 
k 
Ygit - 
ßg + I)t3gk xkgit + egit 
k=1 
(3.9) 
where, 
g= groups of banks (g =1................. G); 
i= individual banks (i =1 .............. 
N); 
t= time series (t =1.................... T) 
k= the "k" independent variables (k =1.................. K). 
The disturbance term, e1 , 
is also assumed to be normally distributed [ i. i. d. N(0, U2 ) 
This study adopts dummy variables of fixed effect models for the intercept and seemingly 
unrelated regression of fixed effect models for the slopes. According to Baltagi (1995, 
p. 179), Mandala (1994), and McFadden (1984), the cross-section treatment applies for 
panel data of limited dependent variables since we assume there is no random effect for 
individuals. 
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The treatment for the use of dummy variables for the intercepts is outlined in the following 
table: 
Table 3.1. 
Dummy Variables for Constants 
Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 
Group 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Group 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Group 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Group 4 0 0 0 1 0 
Group 5 0 0 0 0 1 
To illustrate the treatment of fixed effects for slope coefficients using a seemingly unrelated 
regression model, we employ the following equation: 
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. 
ygi 
t*- 
Aglkl xglklit + )692k xg2klit -f. ". " )6gnkl xgnklit 
+ Aglk2 Xglk2it + 
)6g2k2 xg2k2it +... .... ' 
Agnk2 xgnk2it +. .... .. ". 
8GKxGKit + egit 
Ygtr = Yglit --> if g =1 and i =1, ...... . ...... .. nl 
Yg2ir -* 
fg=2 and i =n1 +1, ........... n2 
YgGit -*if g=G and i= ng-1 +1 ............... ng 
xglklit-->if g=landi=l . .......................................... nl Xglklit - 0-aOtherwise 
,{0 ýOthenvise 
XS2klit - Sl xS2klit->ifg=2andi=nl+1,................................. 
*_ 0-->Othenvise 
-ýi Gandi-n gGkKit . rgGkKit . 
fS= - g-1+ ............................. ng 
egit = elft --ý if g =1 and i =1 ..... .... ....... . n1 
e2it if g=2 andnl +1,........... n2 
egtr --> if g=G and i= ng-1 +1.... . ......... ng 
where, 
g= the groups of banks (g = 1,2................. G) 
k= the "k" independent variables (k = 1,2 .............. 
K) 
i= the individual bank (i = 1,2 ....................... 
N) 
, ß= the coefficient of 
independent variables 
x the independent variable 
y =the dependent variable 
I= the time series (t = 1,2 . .......................... 
T) 
(3.10) 
111-10 
Chapter 3- An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Potential Problem Banks in Indonesia 
ng = the number of observations in group g and nl +n2........... ng =N 
If y belongs to g=1, this model will give a zero value to independent variables and 
a constant for g#1. 
3.3. Data 
This study employs quarterly data of banks' financial ratios from March 1989 to September 
1995. Because the data was collected in 1996, the last observation is at the end of 
September 1995. The last observations (September 1995), which relate to 230 banks, are 
excluded from the model generation. This data is, instead, used for out of sample test 
purposes. An out of sample test is conducted in this study to examine the model's ability to 
estimate out of sample observations. The year of 1989 was the starting point of a new era 
for the banking industry in Indonesia. The central bank restructured banking regulation in 
October 1988 (hereafter, called simply "the reform"). The reform allowed for the 
establishment of new banks in Indonesia, including joint venture banks. Many other bank 
regulations were revised (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the banking industry after the reform 
was totally different from that before 1988. Because of this, this study employs quarterly 
data from March 1989. 
The following outline is a general overview of the development and structure of the banking 
industry in Indonesia. The number of banks and their offices increased significantly after the 
reforms. In September 1995, there were 241 commercial banks, excluding rural banks which 
accounted for around 9072 banks (Bank Indonesia, 1995). Although the number of rural 
banks is very high, their share of banking business is very low. In November 1994, their 
share of total assets only amounted to 0.61% (Bank Indonesia, 1995). The rural banks will 
thus be excluded from this study as their contribution to the industry is insignificant. 
Commercial banks consist of 7 state banks; 71 private foreign exchange banks (PFEB); 95 
private non-foreign exchange banks (PNFEB); 31 joint venture banks (JVB); 10 foreign 
banks (FB); and 27 regional development banks (RDB). The differences between each 
group of banks depend on ownership and authorisation in foreign exchange operations. 
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Based on their ownership, banks may be distinguished as state banks, private banks, foreign 
banks, joint venture banks and regional development banks. Based on authorisation, banks 
may be categorised as foreign exchange banks and non-foreign exchange banks. The study 
excludes 10 foreign exchange bank branches in Indonesia from this study because the risk of 
these banks cannot be assessed separately from their parents. Consolidated positions are 
required to assess these banks. 
3.4. Dependent variables 
Logit models have been widely used in social science to determine the probability that a 
particular event occurs (see Chapter 2) by using a range of independent variables. Some 
researchers use logit models to estimate the probability of bank failure. However, certain 
problems can cause inaccurate estimates. These problems include small sample size (related 
to bank failure) and lack of reliable published information. Additionally, the results would be 
biased if there were a substantial number of bank failures as a result of fraud. The argument 
is that the balance sheets and income statements cannot reflect the integrity of staff. 
Prediction of the probability of bank failure is not appropriate for this study because only a 
few banks failed in Indonesia from 1970 to 1996 as a result of a "too big to fail" policy. 
However, there were some banks which were recognised as being in trouble. To determine 
which banks might prove problematic, this study adopts criteria which have been used by 
the Bank of Indonesia itself 
This study thus employs information on "problem" and "non-problem" banks as dependent 
variables. A bank can be defined as a "problem" if it satisfies one or both of the following 
criteria: first, the bank needs financial and/or management support from government to 
continue its operations; and second, its composite rating is either "poor" or "unsound" 
(Bank Indonesia, CL 23/21/BPPP, 28 February 1991)`. The composite ratings are calculated 
The rating is defined based on the following credit points: 81-100 is "sound"; 66-80 is "fairly sound"; 51-65 is "poor" 
; 0-50 is "unsound". 
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monthly, based on financial reports and the judgment of supervisors. The central bank 
maintains a list of problem banks and updates it regularly. To insert the data into models, 
this study assigns symbols to dependent variables of "I" for problem banks and "0" for non- 
problem banks. By employing problem and non-problem banks as dependent variables, the 
supervisory authorities have more lead time to introduce corrective action for banks 
estimated as problems than for banks estimated as failures. If a bank has been categorised as 
a failure, the condition of the bank must be very serious and the authorities will have only 
limited time to provide appropriate remedial treatment. However, the consistency of 
parameters used to determine problem banks over time contributes significantly to the 
goodness of fit of the estimates in this study. 
3.5. Independent variables 
Independent variables consist of 14 financial ratios. These independent variables represent 
proxies for determinants of bank risks and, as discussed in Chapter 1, the probabilities of 
banks suffering losses are measured by their risks. 
In general, bank risk consists of credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidity 
risk, solvency risk and efficiency risk (see chapter 1 for details). There are other risks which 
are not covered in this study such as settlement risk, legal risk, fraud risk and exposure risk. 
The main reason is that there is little data to support analysis of these risks. The rationale for 
the relationship between risks and independent variables is discussed in the following 
section. 
Sometimes, it is difficult to say precisely what the relationship is (i. e. sign) between 
dependent and independent variables. For example, a short position of call money (negative 
gap in maturity) creates a benefit for banks when interest rates drop and causes a loss when 
interest rates increase. This study will suggest the signs of independent variables under 
certain circumstances. The differences between the results and the suggestions will be 
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discussed in the analysis of results. The following sub-sections discuss the financial ratios 
which are used as independent variables in this study. 
3.5.1. Ratio relating to credit risk 
Credit risk is defined as the probability (i. e. risk) of default by borrowers. Bank Indonesia 
assesses asset quality to form a proxy for losses arising from default by borrowers by using 
the following procedure (Bank Indonesia, CL 23/12/BPPP, February 1991). First, bank 
supervisors classify the accounts of the borrowers into one of four categories -"good", 
"substandard", "doubtful" and "bad-debts" (loss)- by employing an agreed rule between the 
banking industry and the central banks. Second, bank supervisors calculate a proxy for the 
losses on each loan category based on an agreed rule6. Third, bank supervisors estimate 
asset quality by summing the amount of proxied losses for all borrowers, and the result is 
then divided by total loans. Asset quality (AQ) represents credit risk in this regression. 
Theory suggests that the higher the AQ, the higher the probability of banks suffering 
problems. 
3.5.2. Ratios relating to liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk is the probability or risk of a bank being unable to meet its short-term 
obligations, such as current account and time deposit withdrawals and short-term money 
market liabilities, as they fall due. This study includes only the "banking book" items because 
only a few banks operate trading books (i. e. derivatives). The following financial ratios serve 
as proxies for liquidity risks: 
a. Call money to total assets ratio (CMAR) 
5 The rule relies on variables such as the delay in repayment, including interest and instalments, expiration, and lack of 
security taken as collateral. 
6A proxy for losses is calculated according to the following Hiles: a good loan is defined as zero loss; substandard is 
defined as a 50% loss; doubtful is defined as a 75% loss, and bad-debt is defined as a 100% loss. 
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Call money is funds borrowed from the money markets with a maximum term of 90 
days. Banks normally use these sources of funds to satisfy a minimum liquidity 
requirement imposed by the central bank at the end of the day after the clearing house 
has closed. The hypothesis is that the higher a bank's funding on this basis, the higher 
the probability of its suffering problems (+ sign). This ratio also reflects the sensitivity 
of banks to interest rate risk as a result of the volatility of interest rates in money 
markets. 
b. Discount window borrowing to total assets ratio (DAR) 
The discount window is a facility for banks which suffer illiquidity to borrow a certain 
amount of money from the central bank at market interest rates using money market 
certificates as collateral. Normally, banks use this facility when they are unable to 
borrow money from the markets or other banks. In this case, the central bank acts as 
the lender of the last resort. However, the use of this facility is subject to tight 
requirements. Theory suggests that the higher this ratio, the higher the probability that 
a bank is suffering from liquidity problems (+ sign). 
c. Loans to deposits ratio (LDR) 
The loans to deposits ratio assesses the role of deposits in financing loans. A higher 
ratio means a lower proportion of loans is financed by deposits. Other funds are 
available to finance loans such as call money, discount window borrowing and other 
market borrowings (this study assumes that there is no paid-up capital to finance loans). 
The interest rates on these other funds, however, are higher than for deposits and, 
especially for call money, the interest rates are volatile. Theory suggests that the higher 
this ratio, the higher the probability of a bank suffering liquidity problems (+ sign). 
3.5.3. Ratios relating to solvency risk 
The solvency ratio represents the ability of banks to meet losses without being liquidated. 
This ratio normally measures net worth compared with total assets or borrowed funds. 
However, this study adopts the capital to total assets ratio (CAR) to proxy solvency risk. 
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The components of capital in this ratio consist of paid up capital, including capital stock, 
general reserves, retained earnings, and unpublished retained earnings. This study includes a 
delta earning of each quarter in the components of capital. The capital at problem banks 
must be higher than that of non-problem banks as a result of the adoption of a risk-based 
capital adequacy (Basle Accord of 1988) assessment regime since 1988. The rationale is that 
the problem banks have to maintain higher capital as reserves for settling the recognised 
losses. Thus, the higher this ratio, the lower the probability of a bank suffering solvency 
problems' (- sign). 
3.5.4. Ratios relating to interest rate risk 
Interest rate risk is the risk or probability of a bank suffering losses because of the volatility 
of interest rates (the detail of this discussion is presented in Chapter 1). Banks with long 
funding positions (i. e. positive maturity gaps) will benefit when interest rates decrease and 
the banks will lose money when interest rates increase. Banks with short positions (i. e. 
negative maturity gaps) will lose money when interest rates decrease and benefit when 
interest rates increase. 
To detect the sensitivity of banks to interest rates, this study uses three independent 
variables: CMAR, LDR and IRR (interest rate risk). CMAR and LDR have been discussed 
in the liquidity risk section. Additionally, this model also uses IRR as an independent 
variable to detect the sensitivity of banks in general to interest rate movements. The interest 
rate data used in this model are daily money market rates -Jakarta inter-bank offered rates 
(JIBOR)- and these are transformed into interest rates on a quarterly basis using delta 
weighted averages. To proxy for the interest rate risk, we multiply this delta interest rate by 
net call money positions. Finally, IRR is derived from the following equation: 
IRR=(Rt-Rr_1)CMP (3.12) 
7 The information on risk adjusted capital ratios (BIS approach) cannot be used in this study for secrecy reasons. 
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where, 
R, = the real interest rate in a given quarter 
Rt_i = the real interest rate in the previous quarter 
CMP = the net call money positions 
We expect a positive sign for IRR as theory suggests that many banks suffer problems 
because of the volatility in interest rates. 
3.5.5. Ratios relating to efficiency risk 
The ROA and ROE ratios are the main ratios used to measure efficiency risk. The 
numerators of these ratios (i. e. returns) are derived from the retained earnings figures of 
income statements. However, these ratios are unable to show which components of profit 
and loss contribute significantly to the ratio. For this reason, this study examines efficiency 
risk using components or items in the profit and loss statements such as income, costs and 
expenses. Additionally, this section also examines the efficiency of funds allocated for fixed 
assets using a fixed assets capital ratio. 
a. Return on Assets (ROA) ratio 
The ROA ratio measures the ability of banks to generate incomes from each unit of 
asset. Theory suggests that the higher the ROA, the lower the probability of banks 
suffering problems (- sign). 
b. Return on Equities (ROE) ratio 
The ROE ratio measures the ability of banks to generate incomes from each unit of 
equity. Theory also suggests that the higher the ROE, the lower the probability of banks 
suffering problems (- sign). 
c. Operating income ratio (OIR) 
The OIR is the ratio of non-interest operating incomes to total income. The OIR 
consists of incomes from trading activities and incomes from other services including 
fees. This ratio measures the ability of banks to generate incomes from non-loans or 
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investments. A lower ratio indicates that a bank has problems earning revenues from 
non-loans and investment activities. This condition implies that banks' operations are 
not efficient. Therefore, theory suggests that the lower this ratio, the higher the 
probability of a bank suffering problems (- sign). 
d. Interest income ratio (IIR) 
The IIR is the ratio of interest income to total incomes. This ratio measures the ability 
of banks to generate interest revenues from their investments. The objective of 
including this variable in the regression is to examine whether interest incomes 
contribute significantly to the problems faced by banks. Since the banks concentrate on 
investment activities, theory suggests that the higher this ratio, the lower the probability 
of a bank suffering problems (- sign). However, this causation is not appropriate for 
banks which generate income mainly from foreign exchange trading, which will lower 
the resultant IIR. 
e. Interest cost ratio (ICR) 
The ICR is the ratio of interest costs to total costs. The objective of employing this 
ratio is to examine whether banks can manage interest costs effectively. A higher ratio 
implies that banks have incurred higher interest costs (i. e. inefficient). A measure of the 
ability of banks to control interest costs is the interest rate margin. However, because of 
limited information, this study will not employ interest rate margins in the regressions. 
Theory suggests that the higher the ICR, the higher the probability of a bank suffering 
problems (+ sign). 
f. Fixed assets capital ratio (FACR) 
The FACR is the ratio of fixed assets to capital. The FACR measures the effectiveness 
of banks' operations in allocating funds to investments which generate incomes. 
Because fixed assets are not earning assets, a high ratio is an indication of inefficiency in 
a bank's operations. Theory thus suggests that the higher this ratio, the higher the 
probability of a bank suffering problems (+ sign). 
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g" Loan provisions ratio (LPR) 
LPR is the ratio of loan provisions to total loans. The objective of employing this ratio 
is to examine the ability of banks to build reserves for both expected and unexpected 
losses. A high ratio shows that banks have enough funds to cover loan losses. Theory 
suggests that the higher this ratio, the lower the probability of a bank suffering 
problems because the bank will have enough funds to back up its losses (- sign). 
3.5.6. Exchange rate risk 
To detect the sensitivity of banks to the volatility of exchange rates, this study employs the 
exchange rate of the US dollar against the domestic currency, the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). 
This variable is represented by FXDER. The US$ dominates the positions of Indonesian 
banks because most foreign exchange transactions are denominated in the US dollar'. 
Additionally, reports of foreign exchange positions made to Bank Indonesia are 
denominated in US$. Therefore, this study only employs data for the US$/IDR exchange 
rate. To calculate the FXDER, this study adopts continuous compounds (i. e. log returns) of 
the quarterly average of exchange rate returns and multiplies the results by the foreign 
exchange positions. In mathematical terms, the FXDER can be expressed by the following 
equation: 
FXDER = Ln 
lE, 
Er-i 
FX (3.13) 
Theory suggests that the higher the foreign exchange volatility, the higher the probability of 
a bank suffering problems. This study assumes that the exchange rate US$/IDR is highly 
volatile and we therefore expect a positive sign for this variable. 
3.6. Empirical results 
8 This condition may reflect the fact that the IDR was pegged to the USD. 
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The discussion in this section begins with the signs of parameters and continues with testings 
of the coefficients. We discuss only the signs which are different from a priori expectation 
and attempt to explain why they occur. The discussion begins with the analysis of results in 
model 1 and is followed by discussion of the results in model 2. 
Model 1 produces 3 signs (i. e. + for IIR, CAR and - for LDR) which differ from 
expectations (see Table 3.2). Logically, one expects a negative sign for IIR whereas the 
result shows a positive sign. There are many possible explanations for this situation. The 
best possible explanation is that most of the problem banks try to make more money by 
charging higher interest rates on lending but they have to pay higher interest rates on 
borrowed funds. Therefore the IIR must be relatively high but the interest rate margin is 
relatively low. This policy is common for problem banks where operational costs and 
expenses are relatively high. Alternative explanations are also possible, such as incurring 
losses on foreign exchange trading and fraud. 
The sign for CAR also differs from expectations. This condition shows that most problem 
banks post high CARs to comply with risk-adjusted capital regulation. Another variable 
which gives a different sign from that expected is LDR. While a positive sign for LDR is 
expected, the model produces a negative sign. The negative sign means that the higher the 
LDR, the lower the probability of banks suffering problems. The higher LDR (LDR>1) 
means that banks finance loans from other sources of funds instead of using deposits. Other 
sources of funds may consist of borrowed funds from the money market or other banks. The 
negative sign shows that the banks which used borrowed funds gained a reduced probability 
of suffering problems. However, the coefficients of IIR and LDR are not significant using a 
t-critical value of 1.96 (a confidence interval of 95%). To examine whether the signs of 
those coefficients remain consistent across the groups, we will discuss the results of model 2 
later in this section. 
Based on the t-distribution table, the results show that six variables (CMAR, FXDER, ICR, 
IRR, IIR, LDR) are insignificant even with a 0.10 confidence level. These variables 
represent interest rate risk (IRR, LDR and CMAR), foreign exchange risk (FXDER) and 
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efficiency risk (IIR, ICR). To test whether these coefficients are still zero when they interact 
simultaneously, we use the log likelihood ratio test by excluding the insignificant variables 
from the model. The results show that the log likelihood ratio is 3.99 (Lo = -2012.69 and Ll 
= -2104.68)9. Based on the chi-square distribution table with a degree of freedom (df) of 6, 
we accept the hypothesis that the coefficients of the omitted variables are zero at the 5% 
confidence level. Finally, we can conclude that only eight variables (i. e. AQ, CAR, FACR, 
DAR, LPR, OIR, ROA, and ROE) are significant. Based on the results in model 1, we can 
thus derive the conclusion that banks, individually, in Indonesia are not very sensitive to 
foreign exchange risk or interest rate risk, but that they are sensitive to credit risk, efficiency 
risk, solvency risk and liquidity risk. 
To compare the results in model 1 and model 2, this study employs the pseudo-R2 proposed 
by McFadden (1973, p. 121). The R2 is derived from the following calculation (see 
Appendix 2.1 for detail): 
-2,012.69_ R2=1- 
- 3,253.75 
-0.38 
where, 
Im -2,012.69 and 1, =-3,253.75 
This R2 is lower than the R2 in model 2 considered later in this discussion. 
9 Log likelihood ratio test=-2(2103.36-2104.1)=-1.48. 
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The results of model 1 are based on the assumption that the constant and slope coefficients 
are the same between individuals and over time. There is an argument that the results may be 
different if we employ more restrictive models such as model 2. Therefore, this study also 
employs model 2, which assumes that the constant and slopes vary among groups but are the 
same between individuals and over time, in order to examine whether each group of banks 
faces different risks as represented by the financial ratios. The following table shows the 
groups of banks in Indonesia: 
Table 3.3 
Groups of Banks in Indonesia 
Banks Group Number of 
individuals 
State Banks I 7 
Private Foreign Exchange 
Banks 
II 71 
Private Non-foreign Exchange 
Banks 
III 95 
Joint Venture Banks IV 31 
Regional Development Banks V 27 
Total 231 
The results of model 2 show that the intercept and constant coefficients for each group differ 
from that in model 1 (see Table 3.2). This shows that group effects are significant in this 
model. Based on a confidence level of 0.05, most of the groups are sensitive to credit risk 
(AQ), but none is sensitive to foreign exchange risk (FXDER) . 
All groups are also sensitive 
to efficiency risk but only group 3 is sensitive to solvency risk (CAR). 
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The results for group 1 show that banks are sensitive to AQ, ICR, LPR, ROA at a 5% 
confidence level and to LDR at a 6% confidence level. Therefore, banks belonging to group 1 
are very sensitive to credit risk (AQ), efficiency risk (ICR, LPR, ROA), and interest rate risk 
(LDR). 
The results for group 2 show that banks are sensitive to AQ, OIR, ROA at a 5% confidence 
level. Therefore, banks belonging to this group are very sensitive to credit risk (AQ) and 
efficiency risk (OIR and ROA). 
The results for group 3 show that the signs of AQ, CAR, DAR, IIR, and ROA are significant 
at a 5% confidence level and LDR is very significant at a 6% confidence level. In other 
words, banks belonging to this group are sensitive to credit risk (AQ), solvency risk (CAR), 
liquidity risk (DAR and LDR), efficiency risk (ROA), and interest rate risk ( LDR). 
The results for group 4 show that the signs of AQ, ICR, ROA and ROE are significant at a 
5% confidence level. These findings imply that banks belonging to this group are very 
sensitive to credit risk (AQ) and efficiency risk (ICR, ROA and ROE). 
The results for group 5 show that only AQ is significant at a 5% confidence level while IRR is 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and LDR is significant at a 8% confidence level. 
Therefore, banks belonging to this group are sensitive to credit risk (AQ), interest rate risk 
(IRR), and liquidity risk (LDR). 
To measure the goodness-of-fit, we employ the same method as that in model 1. The R2 is 
derived from the following (see Appendix 2.1 for details): 
-1,700.74 R2 = 1- 
- 3,142.04 
0.46 
where, 
111-24 
Chapter 3- An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Potential Problem Banks in Indonesia 
lm= -1,700.74 and 10= -3,142.04 
Based on these results, model 2 is more efficient than model 1 in estimating the probability of 
banks being problems. 
This study employs an out of sample test using the last observations (September 1995) which 
consist of 230 data points. The aim of this test is to examine the ability of the models to 
estimate the probability of banks being problems using data which are not employed to 
generate the models. The results of out of sample tests are shown in Table 3.4. The error 
classification in this study adopts cut-off points of 0.5 and 0.6. In general, model 2 produces 
fewer errors than model 1. Then, we conclude that model 2 is better than model 1. 
Model 1 classifies 28 observations of non-problem banks as problem (i. e. error I type), or 
12.17% of total observations (230), using a cut-off-point of 0.5. Error I type occurs if the 
model produces P>0.5 for Y=0 (see Appendix 2.1). Model 1 classifies 16 observations of 
problem banks as non-problem (i. e. error II type), or 6.96%. Error II type occurs if the 
model produces P<0.5for Y=1. The total errors of estimates in model 1 is 19.13%, or 44 
observations out of 230 observations, so that correct estimates account for 80.87%, or 196 
observations. However, when we use a cut-off-point of 0.6, the total errors decrease to 
16.96% and the correct estimates increase to 83.04%. 
Model 2 produces more correct estimates than model 1. Using a 0.5 cut-off-point, model 2 
predicts total errors of 13.91% and estimates 86.09% of observations correctly. The total 
errors decrease to 12.18% when we use a cut-off-point of 0.6, which we believe is the fair 
cut-off point because this study employs 1984 observations of problem banks (or 41.32%) 
and 2,817 observations of non-problem banks (or 58.68%). The errors mostly occur in the 
transition period from banks being classified as problem to non-problem or the other way 
round. Finally, we can conclude that model 2 produces better coefficients of estimates than 
those in model 1. 
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3.7. Conclusions 
3.7.1. Based on the coefficients of the regressions, model 1 produces significant coefficients 
for AQ, CAR, DAR, FACR, LPR, OIR ROA, and ROE at a 5% confidence level. These 
parameters represent credit risk (i. e. AQ), solvency risk (i. e. CAR), liquidity risk (i. e. 
DAR) and efficiency risk (i. e. FACR, LPR, O[R, ROA and ROE). However, the 
coefficients of parameters which represent exchange rate risk (FXDER) and interest rate 
risk (i. e. CMAR, IRR and LDR) are insignificant at the 5% confidence level. 
Considering the findings in model 1, we can conclude that banks in Indonesia are not 
sensitive to exchange rate or interest rate risks, but they are sensitive to credit risk, 
liquidity risk, efficiency risk and solvency risk. 
3.7.2. Each group in model 2 produces different and significant coefficients of parameters 
from those in model 1. This finding provides evidence that the group effects are 
significant. The coefficients of parameters which represent credit risk (AQ) for all 
groups are significant at a 5% confidence level. The parameter which represents 
solvency risk (CAR) is significant at a 5% confidence level only in group 3. The 
coefficient of the parameter which represents interest rate risk (IRR ) is significant at a 
10% confidence level in group 5; and LDR is significant at a 6% confidence level in 
group 1 and group 3, and at an 8% confidence level in group 5. Therefore, only group 
3, group 1 and group 5 are sensitive to interest rate risk. The coefficients of parameters 
which represent foreign exchange risk (FXDER) are insignificant for all groups. 
Therefore, no group of banks in Indonesia is sensitive to foreign exchange risk. The 
coefficients of parameters which represent liquidity risk are identical with the parameters 
which represent interest rate risk. The additional parameter for liquidity risk is DAR 
which is significant only for group 3. Therefore, group 1, group 3 and group 5 are the 
only groups sensitive to liquidity risk. The coefficients of parameters which represent 
efficiency risk are mostly significant at a5% confidence level, which is the case for 
group 1, group 2, group 3 and group 4. Only group 5 is not very sensitive to operational 
risk. Finally we can conclude that banks belonging to group I are sensitive to credit 
risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and efficiency risk; banks belonging to group 2 are 
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sensitive to credit risk and efficiency risk; banks belonging to group 3 are sensitive to 
credit risk, solvency risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, efficiency risk; banks belonging 
to group 4 are sensitive to credit risk and efficiency risk; and banks belonging to group 5 
are sensitive to credit risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Based on the results in 
model 1, banks in Indonesia are not very sensitive to interest rate risk. However, the 
results in Model 2 suggest that group 3 and group 5 are very sensitive to interest rate 
risk. This information is obviously useful for bank supervisors as indicate which risk 
banks are likely to be sensitive to. 
3.7.3. Based on the Pseudo- R2 , the results of the estimates in model 2 are more efficient 
than those in model 1. To test the accuracy of estimating the probability of problem 
banks, this study employ an out-of sample test which comprises 230 observations. Using 
a fair cut-off point (0.6), model 2 produces 12.18% of total errors and 87.82 % of 
correct estimates while model 1 produces 13.91% of total errors and 86.09% of correct 
estimates. This shows that model 2 is more efficient that model 1. 
3.7.4. To provide a fair comparison of the "performance" of these models with others, we 
have to consider the following criteria: (1) the proportion of problem and non-problem 
(e. g. failed and non-failed) banks in the sample; (2) the observations employed in the 
error classification (i. e. within sample or out-of sample); (3) the data employed to 
generate the model. This thesis can be characterised as follows: it employs 41.3 % of 
problem banks and 58.67% of non problem banks; it uses an out-of sample test for error 
classification; and it employs supervisory data to generate the models. Based on the 
literature survey, there is no other study which matches my models' comprehensive 
characteristics. The best result on the error classification front in the determination of the 
probability of bank failure which employed a similar proportion of problem (46%) and 
non-problem banks was achieved by Sinkey (1975). Sinkey's model estimates 82% of 
observations correctly while model 2 in this study estimates 87.82% correctly. 
Therefore, model 2 provides better estimates than Sinkey's. Based on these results, this 
study suggests that model 2 can be used as an additional early warning system (tool) for 
bank supervisors in Bank Indonesia to help identify emergent problem banks. 
111-28 
Chapter 3- An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Potential Problem Banks in Indonesia 
3.7.5. In general, the insignificance of the ratio for foreign exchange risk (FXDER) may 
indicate that traditional operations still dominate within banks in Indonesia. However, 
this condition may not be valid for selected individual banks which engage actively in 
foreign exchange trading. This condition occurs because, within the sample, the number 
of problem banks which are authorised in foreign exchange transactions is smaller than 
the number of non-foreign exchange banks. However, many banks suffered problem 
because of foreign exchange trading. Bank Duta suffered illiquidity because of huge 
losses in foreign exchange trading in 1990 (see Chapter 1) and the Indonesian 
government rescued Bank Exim in 1997 due to foreign exchange losses. Many banks 
have failed since the IDR exchange rate has gradually dropped since 1997. These cases 
support the suggestion that there are some individual banks which are heavily exposed to 
foreign exchange rate risk. 
3.7.6. There is no doubt that banks by group in Indonesia are sensitive to interest rate risk. 
Risk assessment modelling in the next chapter can be applied either in interest rate risk 
or exchange rate risk assessment. Models in this chapter find that banks by group in 
Indonesia are not very sensitive to foreign exchange rate risk. However, it is still unclear 
whether individual banks in Indonesia are sensitive to foreign exchange rate risk. To 
provide more information concerning the foreign exchange rate risk of individual banks, 
the next step in this thesis involves developing models for foreign exchange rate risk 
assessment using, as a sample, the commercial bank which represents the most active 
bank in foreign exchange trading in Indonesia. 
3.7.7. It would be useful to analyse whether banks which required bail-out generate different 
results to problem banks. However, this was not be possible within this research because 
of a lack of data concerning which banks were bailed-out and which banks were not. 
Confidentiality, largely due to political reasons, currently precludes such analysis. 
111-29 
Chapter 4- Capital Adequacy Assessment with Respect to Market Risk 
Chapter 4 
Capital Adequacy Assessment with Respect to Market 
Risk 
4.1. Introduction 
There are many different definitions of capital. For the purposes of this thesis, I focus my 
attention on the definition of capital used in the theory of banking and finance. It is difficult 
to define capital since there are a range of different perceptions concerning its functions. 
Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) differentiate between capital market requirements and 
regulatory requirements. The market capital requirement is defined as the capital ratio that 
maximizes the value of banks. Regulators focus on the possible negative externalities that 
may result from bank default but these are not taken into account in market capital 
requirements. Modigliani and Miller (M&M, 1958) 10 suggest that this regulatory capital 
requirement is different from that of the market requirement. They suggest that in a 
frictionless world of full information and perfect markets, a firm's capital structure cannot 
affect its value. On the other hand, the regulatory objective is to maintain the value of the 
bank in such a way that the probability of failure is low. Therefore, capital regulation is a 
matter of tradeoff between the marginal social benefit of reducing the risk of the negative 
externalities from bank failure and the marginal social cost of diminishing intermediation 
(Santomero and Watson, 1977). 
Banks' capital can be defined as the sum of equity and debt that is not insured by any 
deposit insurance institution and which can absorb losses. In this case, capital functions as 
an internal insurance fund (Benston, 1994; Hempel, 1990; Wesson, 1985; and Llewellyn, 
1989). However, Vojta (1973) suggests that management capabilities, the institution's 
liquidity, and maintaining access to markets also protect depositors and creditors from 
10 The M&: M proposition is the term used to express the suggestion introduced by Modigliani and Miller that die 
regulatory capital requirement cannot influence the way the banks are managed. The market may thus play a 
significant role in affecting profit and loss. 
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bank insolvency. The adequacy of capital must be accompanied by proper management to 
ensure that the economic value of capital does not deteriorate. 
Changes in the economic value of assets and liabilities automatically change the value of 
capital. When a bank shifts its assets to riskier assets and the nominal value of assets 
remains unchanged, the economic value of the deposits and borrowed funds goes down 
under the assumption that the bank has reduced its willingness to pay off its liabilities. The 
economic value of capital provides a better measure of the value of banks than historical 
value. However, there are many problems in calculating the economic value of capital due 
to uncertainties over the rate of return and the variance and covariance of the returns 
among activities. 
This chapter discusses mainly the assessment methodologies of the economic value of 
capital, especially for banks. Regulatory authorities benefit from information related to 
economic value of capital for supervisory purposes. When the economic value of capital is 
below the minimum requirement, regulatory authorities will require bank management to 
add more capital. The main purpose of the minimum capital requirement is to prevent 
banks from failing. Therefore, a method is required to assess capital adequacy. This 
method must acknowledge and make provision for the factors that affect capital adequacy. 
These factors comprise several risks such as credit risk, market risk, operational risk, 
interest rate risk and legal risk. However, there are some factors which may create losses, 
but which are difficult to incorporate into the risk formulation, such as the quality of 
management, which is an important factor when determining efficiency, the competitive 
position of banks, and capital market capabilities. The focus of this thesis is the assessment 
of capital adequacy with respect to market risk. 
This chapter is organised in the following way: Section 4.2 reviews the BIS's approach to 
capital adequacy assessment with respect to market risk; Section 4.3 discusses internal 
models for market risk; Section 4.4 discusses the pre-commitment approach; and Section 
4.5 comprises the conclusions. 
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4.2. The BIS's approach to capital adequacy assessment with 
respect to market risk 
The discussion below begins by reviewing the risk calculation approach which was 
introduced by the BIS in 1988. To calculate credit risk, the Committee on Banking 
Supervision, operating under the auspices of the BIS, (from now on this study will use the 
phrase "the Committee") set out its approach in the Basle Capital Accord of 1988 ("the 
Accord"). One of the purposes of the Accord was to reduce the inequality of treatment via 
capital adequacy regulation to help provide the same competitive opportunities for 
international banks. This approach has been adopted by most countries in the world 
including Indonesia. However, this approach has attracted many criticisms. According to 
Hall (1994), the Accord contains many weaknesses. Golding (1994) suggests that the 
ratios stipulated in the Accord are unrelated to true risks. 
The framework can be expressed in mathematical form as shown by the following equation 
(Hall, 1994): 
ACB 
RAR(%) = TO ff, RA 
Fst 
TOWR4 = 
ý 
i=ý 
I (A? iWj ) 
j=1 
+ 
GW 
11: Y, (Bvk `Yk wj ) 
i=1 j=1 k=1 
+ 
s y'+ zf 
(cox, 
ýJ 
LJ 
1: 
l(cJXk 
+m)WA 
i=1 j=l k=1 
(4.1) 
RAR = risk-asset ratio 
ACB = adjusted capital base 
TOWRA = total of weighted risk assets 
Ay = value of the i th asset with risk weight Wj 
Buk = notional principal amount of off-balance sheet activity i with risk weight 
w, and conversion factor Xk 
Cfk = notional principal amount of the interest-rate or exchange-rate-related activity 
i with risk weight w. and conversion factor xk 
S= number of distinct asset components 
U= number of distinct off-balance-sheet activities (excluding interest-rate- and 
exchange-rate-related activities) 
x= number of distinct interest-rate and exchange-rate-related off-balance-sheet 
instruments 
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NI = mark-to-market value of underlying contract 
The Committee was aware of some of the deficiencies in the Accord's attempt to address 
practical and universal needs. The Committee also recognised that many risks apart from 
credit risk may occur in banks. Therefore, the Committee agreed from the beginning to 
eventually capture market risk. 
In April 1993, the Committee introduced a capital adequacy proposal to accommodate 
market risk in addition to credit risk. The proposal was revised several times and the final 
revision was released in January 1996. This revision actually represents an attempt to 
accommodate the industry's requests and comments concerning the adoption of internal 
models. The discussion below contains the framework, risk components and risk valuation 
methodologies of the BIS proposal for capital regulation with respect to market risk. 
4.2.1. Framework 
The proposal contains methodologies on how to measure market risk, define capital and 
calculate minimum capital requirements for banks. The proposal adopts the following 
framework": (1) separating the "trading" from the "banking" books; (2) breaking the 
market risk into interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity risk and commodities risk, 
and the treatments of derivatives; (3) calculating foreign exchange risk arising from both 
the "trading" and "banking" books; (4) adopting the "building block" approach where each 
market risk is calculated as the sum of specific risk and general market risk; (5) 
aggregating the risk in each component in order to get the total risk; (6) suggesting a 
treatment for option derivatives. 
According to the Committee, the trading book is defined as: 
11 Information in this section is mainly derived from BIS' proposals with respect to market risk (April 1993 
and January 1996). See also Hall, 1995 and 1996. 
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"the positions in financial instruments which are intentionally held for 
short-term resale and/or which are taken on by the bank with the intention 
of benefiting in the short-term from actual and/or expected differences 
between their buying and selling prices, or from other price or interest- 
rate variations, and positions in financial instruments arising from 
matched principal brokering and market making, or positions taken in 
order to hedge other elements of the trading book". (BIS 1996, p. 1) 
There are some circumstances where non-trading instruments or off-balance sheet 
positions which are used to hedge trading activities and trading positions are used to hedge 
the banking book. The proposal excludes these transactions from the market risk capital 
charge and subjects them, instead, to the credit risk charge as proposed in the original 
Accord. The framework for calculating minimum capital requirements using the 
standardised methodology is shown in figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. 
Framework for Calculating the BIS Minimum Capital Requirements 
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Note: 1. The derivative instruments are classified according to the underlying assets (interest rate. Forex. 
commodity or equity) 
2. The standardised rules on capital charges in this case are just for market risk. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the standardised methodology adopts the "building- 
block" approach in which specific risk and general market risk are calculated separately. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, market risk is the accumulation of market risks which occur in the 
banking book (i. e. foreign exchange risk and commodity risk) and the trading book 
(foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity risk and equity risk). Finally, we can 
identify that the overall minimum capital charge under the BIS's standardised methodology 
comprises the following items: (1) The minimum capital charge calculated by using the 
original Accord of 1988 (this calculation excludes debt securities in the trading book and 
all positions in commodities; however it includes counterparty risk deriving from all over- 
the-counter derivatives, regardless of whether they are in the trading or the banking book). 
(2) The arithmetical summation of the minimum capital charges for market risk. Detail of 
technical guidelines are shown by appendices 4.4- 4.8. 
4.2.2. Some pitfalls in the BIS's proposal 
To examine whether the proposal contains deficiencies, this study will adopt the ideal 
capital adequacy standard suggested by Taylor (1993). According to Taylor, an ideal 
capital standard should satisfy the following criteria: (1) ensure that there is sufficient 
equity capital to cover most losses in order to reduce the probability of failure, (2) impose 
a minimum regulatory burden on banks and minimise the regulatory barriers to entry; (3) 
cover all the financial risks which banks may encounter; (4) consider portfolio effects (i. e. 
require more capital for concentrated risk); (5) treat risk consistently in relation to capital; 
(6) provide reward for accurate risk measurement (i. e. lower risk and good management 
deserve to have less capital); (7) it must be durable and flexible, in the sense of not 
requiring frequent update and flexible enough to accommodate financial developments. 
The discussion below adopts these criteria in order to evaluate the BIS proposal. 
4.2.2.1. Amount of required capital 
By introducing a minimum capital adequacy requirement with respect to market risk under 
the amendment to the Basle Accord, total required capital will increase. However, there 
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is no assurance that those banks which meet the minimum capital requirement will not 
encounter financial problems in the future. Failure may still occur for one or more of the 
following reasons: (1) the BIS proposal ignores the risk relationship among risk factors; 
(2) there are many possible risks which are not covered, such as operational risk and 
fraud risk. 
4.2.2.2. Comprehensiveness 
The proposal includes only market risk in the trading book. Levonian (1994) suggests that 
the proposal should also cover interest rate risk arising from the banking book, such as 
loans and deposits. Additionally, the uncertain distinction between the banking and trading 
book in certain circumstances may provide an incentive for banks to shift positions from 
the trading to the banking book or the other way round depending on what benefit the 
bank is looking for. This criticism was raised by the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF) which represented 177 banks in the US (Shirreff, 1994) 
4.2.2.3. Regulatory constraints 
Many banks have been implementing more accurate risk management models for internal 
purposes for some time. The proposal still requires banks to generate additional capital (a 
multiplication factor) to cover unanticipated shocks. This may result in banks running two 
models (standardised and internal models) for the same purpose (White, 1995). This 
condition limits banks' efficiency. 
4.2.2.4. Portfolio effects 
The BIS proposal calculates total portfolio risk by summing the individual risk factors. The 
proposal thus implicitly assumes that risk factors in the portfolio positions are perfectly 
positive correlated (+1). The following equation is the expression in mathematical form of 
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this assumption (Section 4.3.4.2 shows the detailed mathematical explanation of this 
theory): 
RAB = A'6, '4 + B26B + 2PAB6AA6BB 
where, 
RAB = the risk of investment in asset A and asset B 
SA = the risk of investment in asset A 
SB = the risk of investment in asset B 
A= the current exposure of investment in asset A 
B= the current exposure of investment in asset B 
rAB = the correlation of risk between investment in asset A and asset B 
If YAa = +1, then 
RAB 
= 
jA2a'A 
+ B26B + 2(1) 6AAa'BB 
_ (A6A +B6B)` 
= A6A+ B6B 
(4.2) 
In fact, the correlation among risk factors is not always +1. There may even be negative 
correlations. 
4.2.2.5. Equivalent treatment of risks 
The BIS proposal adopts universal capital charges for foreign exchange risk (8%), equity 
risk (8%) and commodity risk (15%). In fact, the volatility of one currency differs from 
another, and similarly for equities and commodities (Economic Bulletin, 1994, pp. 63-8). 
4.2.2.6. Rewarding precision in risk management 
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Some multinational banks normally adopt risk calculation models that contain an 
embedded solution to the deficiencies in the BIS proposal as discussed in point 4.2.2. In 
other words, these banks have implemented more prudent risk management models than 
ordinary banks which have not adopted any risk management models. However, these 
banks are treated similarly (i. e. no reward) to ordinary banks which, apparently, simply 
adopt the BIS proposal in their risk management. This treatment discourages banks from 
developing and adopting better and more accurate risk calculation models. 
4.2.2.7. Durability 
In general, the BIS proposal is unable to accommodate the risk valuations arising from 
derivative instruments, especially options (i. e. non-linear relationship between the price 
and risk factors). On the other hand, the development of derivative instruments in terms of 
the percentage of banks' operations has increased rapidly. The BIS proposal fails to 
accurately measure risk for options. Finally, the approach adopted by the BIS would seem 
to be out of date and fails to accommodate the needs of advanced financial risk 
management. However, the proposal can be applied widely in other countries as a result of 
its simplicity and practicality. This reflects a belief that universal and practical 
considerations are the most important characteristics of international capital regulation, 
especially for traditional banks. 
Based on some pitfalls above, the next section suggests models to assess market risk. The 
models will accommodate the criticisms addressed to regulatory standardised 
methodologies. 
4.3. Models to assess market risk 
In general, the procedure for calculating risk in banking begins with a calculation of the 
market value of the positions and continues with an estimation of the future value of the 
positions as a result of estimation of changes in rates and prices. As defined in the 
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introductory chapter, risk is the probability associated with the value of banks in the 
future. Therefore, to calculate the market risk of banks we need to: (1) calculate the value 
of the current positions (as defined above); and (2) estimate the value of the positions in 
the future (next day, next week, or at some point in the future). This study will adopt this 
procedure to calculate banks' market risks (for further details, see Figure 4.3). 
There are a variety of approaches to calculating market risk. In general, we can 
distinguish two categories: the regulatory approach and alternative approaches. Banks 
normally use both categories. The adoption of the regulatory approach is necessary to 
comply with regulation and the adoption of an alternative approach (i. e. internal models) 
is necessary to manage risk in an optimal way. In fact, the regulatory authorities usually 
allow banks to use alternative methods to calculate minimum capital adequacy 
requirements with respect to market risk under certain guidelines. For these reasons, this 
study will embrace both regulatory and alternative methods. The following sub-section 
discusses VaR, which is as an alternative model for assessing bank risk. 
4.3.1. Definition of VaR 
The VaR approach became more popular for bankers, regulators, consulting firms and 
academicians after the BIS Committee recognised it as one alternative for calculating 
banks' risk for capital adequacy purposes. Taylor (1993) defines VaR as the maximum 
amount that an institution can expect to lose on a given position during a given period or 
potential close-out period with a predefined probability. Chew (1996), Boudoukh (1997) 
and Hendricks (1996) define VaR as an approximation to the profit or loss generated by an 
institution due to changes in the market prices of underlying assets in a certain time 
horizon. Based on this definition, VaR contains the following features: (1) a position of 
underlying assets; (2) an estimate of the price volatility of underlying assets; (3) a time 
horizon or holding period. 
In mathematical form, the risk of a position in a financial instrument is the following: 
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VaRt+1, 
t = 
Vt 6t+tlt 
where, 
VaRt+,, t = risk at time" t" 
Vt = market value of the position at time " t" 
6t+i1t = volatility of risk factors at time " t" for the period "t+ 1" 
(4.3) 
The equation above shows that the value of instruments is linearly related to the change of 
prices or rates. When the price of the underlying asset decreases by 2%, the value of the 
instrument decreases by 2%. However, the value of a financial instrument may not always 
be linear with respect to the change of prices. The best examples of this are options. The 
value of an option depends on the delta and the change of price of the underlying asset. 
Assuming the position is not linear and has a delta of 0.5, when the price decreases by 2%, 
the value of the instrument decreases by 2% x 0.5=1%. Finally, the mathematical form of 
VaR for a non-linear position is the following: 
VaRr+1, r = Vr o7r+11r ((5) (4.4) 
where S is the delta of the option. 
We need to go further to define the estimate of price volatility, the value of underlying 
assets, and the time horizon. Different parameters used in these three areas will produce 
different results. 
We can also distinguish between Daily Earnings at Risk (DEaR) and VaR. DEaR is 
defined as an estimation of losses on a given portfolio that can be expected to be incurred 
over a single day, such as the next 24 hours, with a certain probability. VaR measures 
maximum estimated losses in market value of a given position that can be expected to be 
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incurred until the position can be neutralised or reassessed. If the time horizon is one day 
with a given probability level, then the VaR equals the DEaR. 
Value at risk defines income as the net value of assets (i. e. after marking-to-market) and 
contracts held by a bank. The volatility of price or rate of an asset in the market (i. e. the 
net value of assets) may influence profit and loss. As defined in the previous section, the 
main purpose of VaR is to measure the maximum loss of a given portfolio in a certain time 
horizon at a given probability level. In VaR, we are just concerned with the probability of 
suffering loss. The crucial step in calculating VaR is to measure the loss which is derived 
from income volatility. 
As part of risk management techniques, the banks' managements tend to adjust their 
portfolios based on estimates of the changes of prices and rates. Therefore, risk estimation 
needs to follows two steps: (1) calculate the sensitivity of a portfolio to changes in 
underlying prices or rates; (2) estimate the potential changes in rates or prices. This 
sensitivity estimation is more important when the holding period of the VaR is longer. 
Figure 4.2 shows the procedure for calculating VaR. 
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Figure 4.2. 
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4.3.2. Volatility assessment methodologies 
According to Chew (1996, p. 208) there are three methods to calculate volatility: the 
correlation method (i. e. variance/covariance matrix method), sometimes called the 
parametric method; historical simulation; and Monte Carlo simulation. 
The correlation method calculates the change in the value of positions by combining the 
sensitivity of each asset to price changes, which are estimated by using variance/covariance 
matrices of the various component's volatilities and correlations. This method uses the 
statistical assumption that the volatility (the change) of prices or rates is normally 
distributed. This study will adopt this method as the model is practical, and data is 
available from various data providers. Section 4.3.3 discusses in detail the parametric 
approach. 
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Simons provides a wider dimension of VaR by differentiating between simple historical 
and historical simulation as well as parametric (mean-variance analysis) and Monte Carlo 
simulation (Simons, 1996). The simple historical simulation method calculates the change 
in the value of positions by identifying the lowest returns (for example: 1 %) from the 
range of returns in historical data and then multiplying the identified of the lowest returns 
by the current market value of a portfolio. The period of historical analysis plays a 
critical role in the accuracy of the results. A shorter period may not capture the whole 
variety of movements in prices or rates. The 1% of lowest returns is derived by 
establishing a rank of daily historical returns. The 1% of probability returns means that 
VaR is calculated using a 1% cut-off point from the lowest returns. According to Figure 
4.3, the VaR of the 1% confidence interval is around 1.5%. This method is less 
complicated than the other methods. However, we would need to establish a huge data 
base for all portfolios of risk factors, and maintaining all the data is impractical. The 
problem is that not all the risk factor data is available. For example, a position of a 
forward exchange rate will entail volatility in the forward rate, yield volatility of currency 
1, yield volatility of currency 2 and correlation of yield volatility of currencies 1 and 2. 
Historical simulation calculates VaR by simulating the actual values of risk factors 
(interest rates, prices or exchange rates) in the past into current portfolio composition. By 
comparing the value of current portfolios and the value of portfolios derived from 
historical simulation, we can get the distribution of returns. The VaR can be calculated by 
employing confidence intervals identical to those defined in simple historical simulation. In 
historical simulation, we simulate the past portfolio returns by using the actual value of 
risk factors and the current portfolio composition instead of looking at the volatility of the 
actual portfolio returns. 
The Monte Carlo simulation method calculates the change in the value of positions by 
using a random sample generated by price scenarios. Instead of using the past value of 
risk factors as mentioned in historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation generates 
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models to estimate the risk factors from past portfolio returns by specifying the 
distributions and their parameters (i. e. volatility and correlation). Using these distributions 
and parameters, we can generate thousands of hypothetical scenarios for risk factors and, 
finally, we can determine future prices or rates based on hypothetical scenarios. VaRs can 
be derived from the cumulative distribution of future prices or rates for given confidence 
levels. 
After studying the arguments, it is hard to say if one approach is better than the others 
without considering the specification of the position, the availability of data and 
information technology. 
Figure 4.3. 
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To determine which method is most appropriate, J. P. Morgan (1995, p. 14) focuses on the 
answers to two questions. The first is whether the future price and rate movements are 
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normally distributed. If the future rate and price movements can be described in a 
statistical fashion by using simplifying parameters of a normal distribution, the volatilities 
and correlation method can be used. However, if market movements are not normal (eg. 
for unexpected, sharp changes) the scenario approach will be appropriate. The second is 
whether the value of positions changes linearly with changes in rates and prices. If the 
change in the value is linear, we can use the position's sensitivity to rate and price change 
(parametric). An option is an example of an instrument which contains a non-linear 
relationship between the change in the value and rate or price. As we know, the value of 
an option will be determined by whether the option is in or out of the money, and the 
future implied volatility is used in the pricing formula instead of the price or rate of the 
underlying asset. The scenario simulation, or full valuation approach, is more appropriate 
for non-linear positions. Based on the discussion above, there are two things that we need 
to consider in determining the ideal approach to calculating VaR: the distribution of 
portfolio returns and the linearity of the relationship between the value of the portfolio and 
the changes in rates and prices. 
This study will focus on the parametric approach in calculating VaR because: (1) Most 
likely, the volatility of interest rates and foreign exchange rate returns up to July 1998 will 
follow a normal distribution as the government in Indonesia adopted a managed floating 
exchange rate policy. Additionally, the domestic currency interest rate is relatively stable. 
(2) The valuation of option positions will assume that their value changes linearly with 
changes in rates or prices (i. e. by using the measurement of Greek letters). 
4.3.3. Parametric approach (delta valuation method) 
In order to estimate price changes in the future, we need to characterise market 
movements statistically and derive a measure of estimated future "adverse" movement. 
Then, we apply the adverse movement to positions and compute the estimated resulting 
changes in market value. 
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From a series of daily historical prices or rates, we can identify the historical daily returns. 
Assuming P is the price of a certain asset and "t" is time (daily), the daily price returns 
(DPt) are calculated from the following equation: 
OPt =1n Pt -1n Pt_1 (4.5) 
Based on the normal distribution assumption of the historical daily returns, we can 
estimate the volatility of price by using its mean (m) and spread of the delta prices around 
its mean value or standard deviation (s). 
In a normal distribution, the probability that the volatility lies at a certain value depends on 
the mean (, u ) and the standard deviation (6 ). According to Green (1993, p. 58) and 
Griffiths, et al (1993, p. 48) the probability density function of a normal distribution is 
calculated using the following formula: 
11 
(x) 
2z6 eXp 262 
(x ß)2 
where, ,u= mean and 6= standard 
deviation 
(4.6) 
The probability that an event lies within one standard deviation from the mean is 0.68. 
This statement can be written in the following mathematical form: 
ý+6 I 
(u-6<X<, u+6)= 0.68 
, U_, 7 
2X6 2 
(4.7) 
Additionally, we can also identify that the probability of an event lying within 1.65 6 is 
0.90; 1.96 6 is 0.95 and in 2.57 6 is 0.99. 
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To estimate the future volatility of prices or rates, we can adopt this rule by assuming an 
adverse movement will occur in certain confidence intervals (i. e. 0.90,0.95 or 0.99). 
Assuming the mean of daily returns is 0.120% and the standard deviation is 1.40%, for an 
0.90 confidence interval, the daily return will be in the range of 2.43% [i. e. 0.120% + 
(1.65 x 1.40%)] and -2.19% [i. e. 0.120% - (1.65 x 1.40%)]. For the purpose of value at 
risk, we consider just the case of negative return, or loss. 
Therefore, risk estimation can be derived from the standard deviation12 of the delta prices 
by multiplying the estimate of delta price by the market value of assets. This treatment is 
true for a single portfolio which is sensitive only to price (single risk factor). For a single 
portfolio which is sensitive to price volatility and exchange rate volatility simultaneously, 
we need to consider the possible relationship between volatility of price and the exchange 
rates. For a portfolio of assets, risk estimation requires calculation of the risk relationship 
among portfolio investments (Markowitz, 1952, Sharp, 1970). The coefficient of risk 
relationship is between 0 and 1 and can be either positive or negative. Section 4.3.4.2 
shows the detailed mathematical explanation of this theory. If we recall equation 4.2 from 
Section 4.2.2.4; 
6AB = VQ26A 
2 +b26g +2pAB6A6B (4.8) 
In a matrix notation, the daily diversified risk (DEaR) can be calculated as follows : 
DEaR= V*[C]*VT (4.9) 
where, 
N 
12 Variance (Q2) is calculated from -"(X Covariance (v) between A and B is calculated from N, _, l ti 
Risk correlation between investment in A and B is calculated from 
V 
(X - h" )(ýv Y"a) 
CovAD 
PAD - 
O-A 0B 
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V= [DEaR, 
........ DEaR, N 
]- It is the DEaR vector 
1 PIN 
[C] It is the correlation matrix 
Pth' ... 1 
DEaR, 
VT= --* It is the transposed vector of V 
DEaRN 
The matrix above can be solved using an EXCEL spreadsheet. 
4.3.4. Identification of exposures 
Before calculating the risk of a certain position, we need to identify the exposure of the 
position on a certain day when the risk is calculated. In general, the position consists of 
spot and forward elements. The identification of exposure for a spot position is straight- 
forward: multiply the accounting value of the position by the market value or spot rate. In 
the case of forward positions, we will adopt the theory of economic value which has been 
discussed in the introductory chapter. Based on this theory, the value of the current 
position (economic value) is the net present value of the future cash flows. Technically, the 
process to identify the future cash flows of the positions is called mapping. However, 
there are some factors which influence the present value of forward positions such a 
discount factors, exchange rates, and prices. 
This study will use the volatility of each relevant factor to calculate the present value of 
cash flows. For instance, if there are two cash in-flows of £100 for one and two months 
ahead, the present value is calculated based on the volatility of one-month and two-month 
yields. 
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In general, this study will adopt the valuation theories of financial instruments to calculate 
the current values of positions. Cash flow identification is the first step in risk valuation for 
forward positions. The objective of this process is to identify the risk factors (i. e. volatility 
and correlation) to which the cash flows are sensitive. The next step is to calculate the 
current exposures by discounting the future cash flows with current market rates. In the 
absence of interest rate references, such as LIBOR, SIBOR, etc., the current exposure can 
be derived by discounting future cash flows using a zero coupon rate. The following 
section discusses in detail each step using some examples. 
In general, bank positions which are sensitive to market risks can be classified into four 
broad categories: fixed income (i. e. income is based on interest rate income), foreign 
exchange, equities and commodities. However, only fixed income and foreign exchange 
exposures are relevant for banks in Indonesia 13. The discussion below is thus limited to a 
consideration of fixed income and foreign exchange exposures. 
4.3.4.1. Fixed income exposures 
Earnings from a fixed income position depend on the amount to be paid, the period of 
repayment , and the performance of the payer (i. e. credit quality). In the discussion below, 
we exclude the performance of the payer. Banks normally use one of the following 
methods in order to identify the distribution of cash flows over time: (1) duration map; (3) 
principal map; and (3) cash flow map. 
The duration map approach was invented by Macaulay (1938). This approach calculates 
an exposure by using the weighted average life of coupons and principal payments (for 
further detail see Chapter 5, section 3). The approach recognises the risk exposure 
according to duration. The principal map assumes that the exposure occurs at the 
payment date of the principal. Before the payment occurs, this position only appears in the 
off-balance sheet book. Earnings and risks are expressed by using the accrual basis of 
13 Banks in Indonesia are not allowed to perform transactions in equities or commodities. 
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valuation. When interest rates are volatile, this approach fails to represent the true earnings 
and risks. The cash flow map calculates the exposure based on the future stream of cash 
flows. However, this approach assumes that the expected flows are stable (i. e. no callable 
or puttable bonds). 
To show the difference between the three maps, let us consider the position of a 10-year 
bond issued on 1 January 1994 with £1000 of nominal, 4.75% of half-yearly coupons, 
11.44% of accrual yield to maturity and a market price of £900. From the above 
information, we can rewrite: 
C=£47.5 (i. e. 4.75% x£1,000) , 
F=£1000, Po=£900, R=11.44% per year or 5.72% per 
half year and N=20 (half-year periods), 
where C is coupon, F is future value, Po is current market value, R= yield (return) per year, 
N= the period. 
Duration can be calculated as follows: 
Cý 
D=- 
(1+R)N+i -1(1+R)-RN 
Rz(1+R)N 
Po 
+ 
FxN 
(1+R)' 
I (1 + 0.0572)21 -1(1 + 0.05721- (0 0572 * 20) 47.5 ---. -- --, ý--- --, 
0.05722 (1.0572)20 
900 
= 12.68 semi - annual periods, or 6.34 years 
(4.10) 
+ 
1,000 * 20 
1 (1.0572 )20 
This method identifies that the exposure occurs in 6.34 years' time. The cash flow map 
identifies the exposure according to the future cash flows over time to expiration. Based 
on the above example, cash flows consist of £47.5 each half-year up to 91/2 years and 
£1,047.5 at the maturity date. The principal map recognises the exposure only at the 
maturity date. Figure 4.4 shows the difference in risk exposure under the three approaches. 
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Figure 4.4. A 
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Figure 4.4. C 
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The cash flow approach provides the most accurate measure of risk (J. P. Morgan, 1994, 
pp. 106-110). The risk of a related position is calculated by multiplying the market value of 
the position by the prices' or rates' volatilities and correlations. 
4.3.4.2. Exposures arising from foreign exchange positions 
To re-value foreign exchange positions, all positions must be calculated in the base 
currency (Indonesian Rupiah or IDR). This section will discuss how to construct spot and 
forward foreign exchange positions. The coverage of foreign exchange positions includes 
all foreign exchange positions (i. e. both in the banking and trading books). A spot foreign 
exchange position is converted into IDR by using the spot rate on the day when the risk is 
calculated. 
Forward foreign exchange positions cover all positions in forward agreements which 
exchange a certain amount of one currency for another at a future date. To calculate the 
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market value of the position, we ignore the transaction cost and risk premia. Holdings of 
purchased forward foreign exchange contracts represent long positions in the purchased 
currency and short positions in other currencies; in other words, lending a purchased 
currency and borrowing another currency. For example, purchasing a one year currency 
forward of 10 million US$/IDR means borrowing IDRs and lending US$ in one year's 
time. To map the position, we need to know the IDR equivalent of USD 10 million on the 
maturity date using the forward rate. A forward rate is a term used to describe the market 
expectation about what the spot rate will be at the maturity date. One of the 
methodologies to estimate the forward rate is interest rate parity. This approach suggests 
that the forward rate depends on the interest rates of the two currencies and the spot 
exchange rate (Klopfenstein, 1993, p. 120). In mathematical form, the forward rate can 
be shown by the following equation: 
Fo 
J 
reign 1 
{ 
(1+rT, r J 
T, t = 
St 
Domestic l (I+lT, t J 
(4.11) 
where, 
fT, t = the 
forward rate observed at time t, which locks in a spot rate at some future 
time T 
St = the spot rate observed at time t 
rT °'Q7g" = the foreign interest rate, observed at time t, for the time interval T-t 
rD°"`es"° = the domestic interest rate, observed at time t, for the time interval T-t r, r 
To provide more detail concerning the forward rate, we can use the example below. Let us 
assume that the following information is given: 
(The following information is the basic data for buying USD 100,000 forward ) 
a. The spot rate of USD/IDR : 2,500 with price volatility of 0.975% 
b. USD yield per year : 6.0% with daily yield volatility ofl. 25% 
c. IDR yield per year : 10,0% with daily yield volatility of 2.5% 
d. Maturity :1 year 
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e. Nominal 
£ Risk correlation 
USD 100,000 
see the following table (4.1) 
Table 4.1. 
Risk Correlation Matrix 
USD/IDR USD 1 year IDR 1 year 
USD/IDR 1 0.0025 0.0050 
USD 1 year 0.0025 1 0.10 
IDR 1 year 0.0050 0.10 1 
Using the above information, mapping can be performed by using the following 
procedure: 
a. Calculating the present value of the future cash inflow of USD 100,000 
Based on the spot rates, the one-year yield of the two currencies, and the maturity, 
we can calculate the 1 year forward rate of USD/IDR = 
2500 
(1+0.06*1) 
(1+0.1*1) = 
2.623.76 
b. Calculating the future IDR position 
IDR= 100,000 x 2623.76 =262,376,000 
c. Calculating price volatility 
Price volatility of 1 USD : 
= Volatility of USD yield * Present value of interest on 1 USD received next year 
= Volatility of USD yield * USD yield*{term/(1+USD yield * term)} 
= 1.25% x 0.06 x1=0.0708% (1.06 * 1) 
Price volatility of IDR is calculated by using the same formula: 
1 
= 2.5 %x0.1 x (1.1 * 1) = 
0.2273% 
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d. Identifying the positions 
Risk in this transaction consists of four risk factors: the forward USD/IDR exchange 
rate, the USD yield volatility, the IDR yield volatility and correlations between these 
three. Each of the risks is associated with an exposure. The following table (4.2) shows 
the exposures of the risk factors: 
Table 4.2. 
Mapping of a Forward Foreign Exchange Position 
Risk Position Present value (current Price 
exposure) volatili 
USD/1IDR 1 (262,376,000)* 262,376,000x(1/1.1) 0.975% 
year = 238,523,636 
forward 
USD 1 year 100,000 100,000x(1/1.06) 0.0708% 
= 94,339 
IDR 1 year (262,376,000)* 262,376,000x(1/1.1) 0.2273% 
= 238,523,636 
Note: *) Short position 
e. Calculating risk 
Risk of each risk factor is the product of price volatility and the current exposure. 
Based on the example above, the risk of each risk factor and diversified risk is as set 
out in the following table (4.3): 
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Table 4.3 
Risk of a Forward Foreign Exchange Position 
Position Calculation Risk 
USD/IDR 
1 year forward 
(-238,523,636)*(0.975/100) 2,325,605.45 
USD 1 year 94,339*(0.0708/100)*2623.76 175,246.21 
IDR 1 year (-238,523,636)*(0.2273/100) 542,164.22 
DEaR 3,043,015.88 
Diversified risk 2,327,179.39 
Ignoring the risk correlation, the risk of the positions is IDR 3,043,015.881`. By 
employing risk correlations, the diversified risk is IDR 2,327,179.39. The following 
discussion concerns the theory of risk in portfolios of positions. 
4.3.4.3. Portfolio risk 
The variance of a portfolio is defined as the expected value of the squared deviations 
of the returns for the portfolio from its mean expected return. Example: rl = is the 
return for asset 1, r2 = is the return for asset 2, rp = is the return of the portfolio, wl is 
the investment in asset 1 and w2 is the investment in asset 2. 
[[w, r +wr]- [w, E(r) +w E(r )]]z (4.12> 
Grouping terms for the individual securities and factoring out the weights yields: 
14 The risk exposure is calculated by summing the risks arising from the risk factors, whatever the sign (i. e. 
negative or positive). 
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2 
a; {w1 [r - E(1ý)]} + 
{w2 [r E(i ) ]}) I 
Multiplying out, we obtain: 
6p = w; [r, -E(r, )]2 + wZ[n -E(rZ)] 
Z +2w, wZ[r; -E(r, )][rz -E(rZ)] 
where, 
[r, 
- E(r, )] = the standard deviation of expected returns on investment in asset 1 or ai 
[r2 
-E(r2 )] = the standard deviation of expected returns on investment in asset 2 or a 
[r1 
- E(r, ) 
][r2 
- E(r2)1= the covariance between expected returns on investments in 
assets 1 and 2 or Cov(r, r2 ). 
We can therefore express the equation above in the following form: 
62 = wý o +wzaz +2w1w2Cov(r,, r2) (4.13) 
We can measure the strength of covariance between two returns by using the correlation 
coefficient 
(p12): 
Cov(r, r2 ) 
Pý, z = --> 
COv(rr)=1ý12 "6,6z 6162 
Finally, the portfolio variance for a two asset model, can therefore be restated as 
follows: 
Up =W; 612 +Wz6? +2W1Wzp12616z (4.14) 
The variance of a three-security portfolio is: 
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6P =(wi61x+w2U2 +2Wlwxp1. x61 ýx)+\wiUlx. 
Wýa6ý +2w1w, p1., c1ý, 
)+ 
Wz 6x + Wx 6z 2233 . 
2'wxw, pz, 6x6, 
We can simplify into the following equation: 
33 
2 
6P=I I W2 6.2 +W262j+2pv(7; 6. W, W) i=1 j=1 (4.15) 
From the exercise above, we obtain evidence that the result for diversified risk is lower 
than the result of the sum of individual risks (by assuming that risk correlation is +1). See 
section 4.2.2.4 for detail. 
4.3.5. Problems with VaR 
VaR models can provide a tool for management to control risk. With the VaR models, 
management can proxy the maximum of expected losses in a certain time horizon by 
employing a certain probability. The resulting VaR can be used to judge how to reallocate 
assets in a portfolio to achieve the desired risk level. However, the VaR may produce 
biased results and lead the management to make wrong decisions if several assumptions 
are not valid. 
According to Chew (1996, pp. 216-19) and Hopper (1996), the VaR methodology 
contains some pitfalls which create bias in risk estimation. First, the normality assumption 
in the parametric approach may create a bias in the risk estimate as the true distribution is 
not normal. Additionally the choice of confidence level is arbitrary. 
Boudoukh (1997) argues that worst case scenarios provide precise measures in all cases 
and are more prudent. The distribution of returns may exhibit skewness (i. e. right or left) 
or kurtosis. The reason why the normality assumption is often used in quantitative analysis 
in finance is that the normal distribution has lots of useful statistical properties that make 
solving problems easy. Second, the VaR models exclude credit risk in their calculation, 
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especially for OTC derivatives. The true value of VaR will be higher if we incorporate 
credit risk into the calculation models. Third, the VaR assumes that all instruments can be 
settled at current market price. This assumption is not valid for illiquid assets which need 
to be sold at a discount. In this condition, the VaR provides biased information 
concerning the risk to portfolios. Fourth, the parametric approach employs volatilities and 
correlations which are derived from historical records. In other words, the VaR assumes 
that future returns will follow what happened in the past. If there is an extreme negative 
return, the VaR will fail to capture the event. 
However, Zangari (1997) argues that we can capture event risk by employing a mixture of 
models, data and intuition, and using a stress test to test whether the model can capture 
event risk. Payant (1997) reported that the VaR method is still unclear concerning how 
risk is estimated, what risk factors and correlation should be included and how to validate 
the volatility and correlation estimate. 
To account for these deficiencies, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
introduced minimum qualitative and quantitative standards (see Appendix 4.8) for banks 
which intend to use internal models (BIS, 1996). Notwithstanding its weaknesses, VaR is 
the best risk management tool currently available to the banking industry and most 
multinational banks adopt VaR for internal risk management purposes. 
4.4. The pre-commitment approach 
Recognition of internal models in the BIS capital adequacy proposal (BIS 1996) is 
intended to measure banks' trading risks more accurately than if the BIS standardised 
methodologies were used. The use of internal models to calculate regulatory capital 
requirements thus addresses some of the pitfalls of the standardised methodologies of the 
BIS approach. 
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Internal models generally assess risks of trading positions using the estimates on a 
probability distribution of returns. Regulatory authorities use the risks to determine the 
probability of suffering losses and hence to determine the minimum capital adequacy 
requirements. Section 4.3 discusses internal models in more detail. 
The Basle proposal (BIS, 1996) sets restriction on the statistical assumptions and sample 
period used for parameter estimation and the proportion of loss estimation that should be 
covered by capital. However, banks are free to set models to estimate the loss 
distributions. 
The adoption of internal models in regulatory capital can provide consistent risk 
assessment between banks and regulatory authorities. The consistency doesn't exist in 
some banks if regulatory capital is assessed using standardised methodologies because 
these banks have implemented internal models for risk management purposes. Kupiec and 
O'Brien (1995a) argue that an internal model is consistent with the regulatory concerns if 
the model satisfies the following requirements: (1) the accuracy of measurement of the 
internal model in measuring bank's risk exposures can be achieved over a holding period 
which is addressed by regulators; (2) the bank's model can be verified by regulatory 
authorities to ensure that the estimation accuracy of risks exists. 
Using the parameters above, this discussion will examine whether the two condition exist 
in practice. Regulatory authorities suggest using 10 day holding periods (BIS 1996). The 
volatility of risk factors in trading are mostly in one day volatility - some of the instruments 
can even be broken down into intra-day volatility. Using the scaling method, which is 
called the "square root of T" (Smithson and Minton, 1996a; 1996b; and J. P. Morgan, 
1996), the 10 day volatility (VV=10) can be calculated from the one day volatility (Vr_i ) 
using the following approach: 
T, t=10 = 10 *l 
t_1 (4.16) 
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Scaling one day volatility into a longer period (e. g. 10 days) to set capital requirements to 
addressed regulatory concerns will reduce the accuracy of the models, especially for highly 
volatile risk factors (Christoffersen, et al, 1998). 
Under the recognition of internal models, each bank will use its own model to estimate the 
volatility of risk factors. The verification by the regulatory authorities of internal models 
needs a benchmark to allow the former to conclude whether an internal model is providing 
under- or over-estimates. However, to determine which model should be used as a 
benchmark should ideally be accomplished by comparing all available models in the 
banking industry, with the most accurate model being considered as the benchmark. 
However, if the benchmark model is believed the most accurate one, it is not necessary to 
allow banks to use their internal models; the benchmark model could be adopted as the 
universal model for all banks. 
Given these difficulties, the pre-commitment approach (PCA) to seting minimum capital 
adequacy over a given time horizon may give a better solution (Kupiec and O'Brien, 
1995c). The approach allows banks to pre-commit to ensuring that their losses do not 
exceed the limits which they have committed themselves to. Penalties will be applied if the 
losses break the pre-committed level. 
Kupiec and O'Brien (1995c) suggest one way to calculate penalties, based on the per 
dollar of excess loss, using the following equation: 
1+r 
F(-C* ) 
(4.17) 
where, 
P= the dollar penalty for each dollar loss in excess of the committed capital 
r" = the bank's weighted average cost of capital 
C*= the capital commitment chosen by the banks 
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F(-C*) = the cumulative probability that the commitment is breached 
This approach assumes that the average cost of capital is constant over time. 
To follow up this suggestion, the US Federal Reserve Board requested public comment on 
the PCA for setting market risk capital requirements. Most of the responses suggested the 
continued development of PCA, and the New York Clearing House organised a pilot study 
of PCA. The participating institutions responded that the PCA is, indeed, appropriate as an 
alternative to the internal model approach for determining the capital adequacy of trading 
activities, and that further steps should be taken to refine and ultimately implement the 
PCA (Considine, 1998). 
In contrast, Gumerlock (1996) argues that the PCA doesn't protect against a "go-for- 
broke strategy", such as that adopted at Barings (Clifford, 1995). After the PCA has been 
approved, the only monitoring from regulatory authorities concerns whether the 
accumulation of losses breaks the pre-committed capital. If the accumulated losses exceed 
the level of pre-committed capital, banks will pay penalties. However, regulatory 
authorities have no right to force banks to reduce their exposures when the banks' 
accumulated losses are approaching the level of the pre-committed capital. Banks have the 
right to carry on trading regardless of the size of the exposure since the accumulative 
losses are still within the level of pre-committed capital. 
A policy of Stop-loss is definitely required in an event such as the stock market crash of 
1987. However, Kupiec and O'Brien (1996) argue that most "go-for-broke strategies" 
are not part of company strategy, but very much related to fraud. Internal controls can 
play a major role in this regard. Further, they mention that neither the PCA nor the internal 
model approach can protect an institution against the breakdown of its internal controls. 
The debate concerning the PCA very much depends on the capability of banks' 
management to set up accurate internal models for risk assessment and the capability of 
banks' internal controls to prevent excessive trading positions. If both conditions are 
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considered as satisfactory from a regulatory authority point of view, PCA may be 
favoured over the internal models approach. The problem, however, is how capable are 
regulatory authorities in assessing the accuracy of the internal models and the capability of 
internal controls in banks to prevent fraud. 
PCA is less applicable for banks which are operated and located in developing countries 
because banks in those countries mostly have weak (or even no) risk assessment systems, 
including internal control systems. Implementation of PCA in developing countries may 
thus create moral hazard for banks, inducing them to adopt "go-for-broke" strategies. 
However, the PCA may encourage banks to develop risk management units to control 
their risks. This study, however, believes that the PCA is appropriate only for banks which 
adopt sophisticated risk management models. 
4.5. Conclusions 
The Basle Accord of 1988 focuses on credit risk only. The Accord does not take into 
account other risks which affect banks' profit volatility (i. e. price risk, interest rate risk, 
foreign exchange risk, and operational risk). Furthermore, there are also some deficiencies 
in the approach adopted towards the measurement of bank risk. This suggests that the 
methodology adopted to assess bank risk for capital adequacy purposes requires further 
examination. 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that there are many approaches available for 
calculating market risk. The BIS proposal provides for simple and practical calculations, 
including the use of internal models which have been adopted by most multinational banks. 
From a theoretical point of view, the proposal produces inaccurate measures of risk as a 
result of simplification and false assumptions of exposure and risk factors. Simplification 
of the calculation of exposure, approximations for volatility and exclusion of volatility 
correlations are the main pitfalls of the BIS proposal. 
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Use of VaR models is an alternative to the standardised method. However, VaR also 
contains some weaknesses which may provide biased information concerning bank risk. 
The normality assumption and choice of confidence interval are among the factors which 
may produce biased information about bank risk. By using the normality assumption, VaR 
fails to capture shock events (outliers) in the volatility measure. Furthermore, the results 
vary depending on the probability level which is used in the model. The key issues in VaR 
are two-fold: how to identify risk exposure amd how to estimate the volatility of risk 
factors. The next step in this study contains modelling and empirical work to assess the 
foreign exchange rate risk arising from the foreign exchange positions run by one of the 
banks - the biggest forex player- in Indonesia. 
It is unclear whether the BIS standardised proposal is more accurate and suitable as the 
basis for minimum capital adequacy regulation around the world than VaR. However, the 
BIS' s standardised proposal is more practical and simple. Hence, the BIS proposal can 
be used widely by both modern and traditional banks. But, the standardised proposal will 
produce less accurate measures than those deriving from the use of VaR if sophisticated 
derivatives operations are undertaken. 
One of the alternative methodologies which could be used to assess the adequacy of 
capital for banks is the PCA. However, the PCA is less applicable for banks in Indonesia 
for two main reasons: (1) banks in Indonesia have not yet adopted risk management 
models; (2) banks in Indonesia have less stringent internal control systems in relation to the 
monitoring of exposures and the prevention of fraud. Therefore, this study concludes that 
the introduction of the PCA in Indonesia might induce banks to adopt "go-for-broke". 
strategies 
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Chapter 5 
Literature Review of Financial Instruments and Risk 
Evaluation Methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
Market risk mostly occurs in positions of trading in financial instruments and derivatives. 
This chapter will outline the definitions of several types of financial instruments, including 
pricing methodologies, and apply VaR to assess the risks of holding the positions in those 
instruments. The main purpose of this discussion is to identify the best risk evaluation 
methodology for the financial instruments and derivatives for VaR purposes. This chapter 
will be organised in the following way: Section 5.2 discusses swaps; Section 5.3 discusses 
bonds; Section 5.4 discusses forward rate agreements (FRAs) and futures; Section 5.5 
discusses options; Section 5.6 discusses equities; Section 5.7 concludes the discussion. 
5.2. Swaps 
5.2.1. Basic concept of swaps 
Swap transactions occur as a result of three possible conditions; different expectations for 
price or rate movements, different purposes with regard to the positions of banks (i. e. 
either hedging or market making) and comparative advantages in access to the capital 
markets (Marshal, 1996, p. 3, Tucker, 1994, pp. 489-513). Figure 5.1. shows the basic 
format of an interest rate swap: 
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Bade 
Figure 5.1. 
Basic Format of Interest Rate Swaps 
7.0% annually 
$50 million, 5 years ý 
Counterparty 
LIBOR semi-annually 
Swaps can be exchanged both in markets (i. e. on the organised exchanges) and over-the- 
counter (OTC). The organised markets provide swaps with certain standardised contracts 
which do not always meet the needs of swap users. However, the users can make swap 
contracts with other banks or brokers to include specific terms in the contract. Due to 
these needs, the plain vanilla swaps can be modified by using the appropriate terms to suit 
the specific end user's need. The objective of conducting swaps is two fold: to make 
money and to protect the position from risk (hedge). 
The following sub-sections discuss the evaluation methodology for interest rate swaps and 
currency swaps. The evaluation methodology for commodity swaps and equity swaps is 
similar to that for interest rate swaps and currency swaps. For this reason, this sub- 
section does not discuss commodity and equity swaps. 
5.2.2. Risk evaluation methodology for interest rate swaps 
Marshal (1993, p. 48) suggests that there are many factors which can influence the value of 
swaps; maturity, structure of the swaps, the availability of a counterparty, the number and 
the price of asset substitutions for hedging purposes, creditworthiness of counterparty, 
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demand and supply for credits in general and swaps in particular in countries where 
currencies are involved in the swaps, and the regulatory limitations on the flow of capital 
that can influence the efficiency of the market. 
For the purposes of the discussion in this sub-section, the maturity and the structure of 
swaps are the only factors to be considered in the swap valuation. The discussion ignores 
the other factors suggested by Marshal. 
Based on figure 5.1, we can make a simple calculation to show the role of the reference 
rate in affecting the value of swaps for both counterparties. If the LIBOR semi-annually 
increases to 7.1% per year, the counterparty will lose 0.1% as the interest rate differential 
between 7.0% fixed and LIBOR floating. However, the counterparty may make money 
when LIBOR semi-annually drops to the point below 7.0% p. a. For risk calculation 
purposes, attention is focused on the volatility of LIBOR semi-annually. 
To indicate the role of volatility in interest rate swap valuations, this sub-section considers 
various types of swaps. The following example shows that a swap may also be used to 
transform a funding position in order to reduce cost, under the assumption that the two 
counterparties have different estimates for the movement of interest rates. 
Assume there are two counterparties: A and B (i. e. with different credit ratings) who want 
to transform their funding positions in order to reduce the risks arising from the volatility 
of LIBOR. Because of the different credit ratings, they can access the money market at 
different interest rates. Assume counterparty A (i. e. with an AAA rating) can obtain funds 
from the money market at a fixed interest rate of 7.5% per year and a floating interest rate 
of LIBOR + 30 bps. Counterparty B can obtain funds from the money market only at 
higher interest rates (i. e. 8.2% p. a. fixed rate and LIBOR + 70 bps floating). 
Counterparty A assumes that interest rates will increase in the future and the management 
of company A decides to take 7.5% fixed rate funding. The management of company B 
assumes that the interest rate will drop and management decides to take LIBOR + 70 bps. 
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The two companies may transact a swap to reduce their funding costs. The flow of funds 
in this swap can be mapped as shown by Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 
Flow of Funds in Swaps 
LIBOR 
A 
ý 
B 
f 
7.5% 
Bond 
v 
Loan/FRN 
When the two companies decide to transact a swap, company A will pay a floating rate 
(LIBOR) and receive fixed while company B will pay fixed and receive a floating rate 
(LIBOR). The negotiation occurs between the two parties to decide the fixed rate. In fact, 
there are many scenarios in which to negotiate the price of the swap. Assume that a 7.4 % 
p. a. fixed rate is agreed between the two parties. The benefit of the swaps is shown in 
Table 5.1. 
7.4% 
Libor +70bp 
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Table 5.1 
Benefit of Swap Transactions 
Fixed Net payment of Benefit of Net payment of Benefit of 
company A company A company B company B 
7.5% Libor 0.3%(Libor+30bps 8.2%(7.5%+(Libor+ 8.2%-8.2%= 
- Libor) 70bps-Libor)) 0% 
7.4% Libor+1Obps(7,5% 0.2%(Libor+30bps 8.1%(7.4%+(Libor+ 8.2%-8.1%= 
-7.4% + Libor) )-(Libor+l0bps) 70bps-Libor)) 0.1% 
7.3% Libor+20bps(7.5% 0.1%(Libor+30bps 8.0%(7.3%+(Libor+ 8.2%-8.0%= 
-7.3%+Libor) )-(Libor+20bps) 70bps-Libor) 0.2% 
From the examples above, the volatility of interest rates clearly plays an important role in 
the valuation of interest rate swaps (yields). Based on the liquidity premium theory '', the 
yields of debt instruments are directly related to their price sensitivity to interest rate 
fluctuations (Blake, 1990, p. 47-51). The longer the maturity of the debt instruments, the 
higher the premiums (i. e. higher interest rates) required. However, other factors such as 
the frequency of coupon payments and the credibility of the issuers may also influence the 
yields. There are many varieties of interest rate swaps such as basis swaps, forward 
swaps, amortising swaps, etc. However, these are not discussed in this section. 
5.2.3. Risk evaluation methodology for currency swaps 
A currency swap generally contains three components of cash flow: exchange of initial 
principal at the spot rate when the contract is begun; exchange of interest payments; and 
re-exchange of the principal at the spot rate agreed at the beginning of the contract. In 
15 The liquidity premium theory explains that the shape of the yield curve represents the interest rate risk. 
The longer the maturity, the higher the interest rate is. 
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fact, the basic idea of a currency swap is just an exchange of borrowing between two 
counter-parties. By using currency swaps, users may get benefits from the following 
opportunities: (1) enables investors or borrowers to access a wider market place to get 
lower costs of funds without assuming additional currency risk; (2) provides an 
opportunity to hedge the assets internationally; (3) trading purposes. 
To provide a clear understanding of currency swaps, we can use the following example: 
Counterparty A enters into a fixed/fixed US$/JPY cross currency swap for 3 years. It is 
agreed that interest is paid/received annually at 5% for JPY and 6% for US$. From this 
example, we can illustrate the exchange of payments between the two counter-parties as 
shown by Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3. 
Cash Flows of Currency Swaps 
Yen 10 billion 
Initial exchange of 
principal A S 100 million 
ý 
B 
Interest payments A 
$ 6% 
Yen 5% 
ý 
$ 100 million 
Repayment of principal IA Yen 10 billion 
B 
B 
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Assume that the spot rate of US$/JPY = 100, the cash flow of counter-party A can then be 
shown in the following table: 
Table 5.2. 
Cash Flows of Counterparty A per Currency 
US$ cash flows (in 
US$ million) 
JPY cash flows (in Yen 
billion) 
Spot 100 (10) 
Year 1 (6) 0.5 
Year 2 (6) 0.5 
Year 3 (106) 10.5 
Valuation of swaps positions can be performed by transforming future cash flows into 
present values by using estimates for discount factors and forward exchange rates. 
Assume that the estimates for discount factors are as shown by Table 5.3 and the forward 
exchange rates are derived using the interest rate differential approach (see Chapter 4) 
Table 5.3. 
Assumed Discount Factors and Forward Exchange Rates 
US$ DF Yen DF US$/Yen Forward 
Year 1 100% 100% 97 
Year 2 94% 95% 95.9789*) 
Year 3 88% 90% 94.8444 
Note: 
*) 95.9789 is an estimate of the forward US$/Yen at year 2 by using estimated discount 
factors (DF) of US$ and Yen (i. e. 97 x (94/95)). The same treatment is used for the 
forward US$/Yen at year 3. 
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Based on these estimations for DFs and US$/Yen forward rates, we can calculate the value 
of the swap after the cash flow of year 1 had been paid for by counterparty A, who has 
dollar-based currency, as follows: 
Yen flows (billion): 
Year 2: Present value of Yen flow 0.5 x 95% 
Year 3: Present value of Yen flow 10.5 x 90% 
Dollar equivalent of Yen flows at 97 spot rate 
Dollar flotivs (million): 
Year 2: Present value of dollar flow (6) x 94% 
Year 3: Present value of dollar flow (106) x 88% 
Sivap value at year 1 in US$: (102.32-93.28-5.64) 
= Yen 0.475 billion 
= Yen 9.450 billion 
=US$ 102.32 million 
= US$ (5.64) million 
= US$ (93.28) million 
=US$ 3.4 million 
From the above example, it can be seen that the value of a currency swap depends on the 
volatility of interest rates and forward exchange rates. 
Finally we can conclude that the risk associated with swaps may occur as a result of 
volatility in interest rates, exchange rates or prices of instruments or commodities 
depending on the type of swaps. Sometimes, the risk in swaps depends on the combined 
volatility amongst interest rates, exchange rates and prices of assets or financial 
instruments as a result of the volatility relationship between them. 
5.2.4. Application of VaR to swaps 
Before we begin to measure the risks involved in swaps, we need to know the basic 
information which is required for risk evaluation. The basic information varies depending 
on the type of swaps. To simplify the discussion, we use an example of a plain vanilla 
interest rate swap. The detail of this example is shown in Table 5.4 and detailed discussion 
of the VaR is outlined in Chapter 4. 
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The basic information required of the position is as follows: the nominal of swaps, the 
basis for the fixed leg and the floating leg, the maturity of the swaps, the zero rate curve of 
the floating currency up to the maturity of the swaps, the price volatility of the zero curve 
and the risk correlation of zero rate coupons. We apply zero coupon rates (i. e. normally 
government bonds) as discount factors in calculating present values because the zero 
coupon rates are free from credit risk premiums. The risk calculation of a swap position 
using VaR involves the following procedure: first, calculate the forward yield to estimate 
the floating payment using the zero curve; second, calculate the cash flows of the floating 
leg based on the estimated forward yield; third, calculate the net present value of the 
future cash flows; fourth, calculate the VaR by employing the data for price volatility and 
risk correlation. Table 5.4 shows the detailed calculation. 
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5.3. Bonds 
5.3.1. Basic concept of bonds 
We can recognise many types of bonds such as straight bonds (or plain vanilla bonds), zero 
coupon bonds, convertible bonds, and many other types of bonds. The difference mainly 
depends on the issuers (i. e. government or corporate), the way of paying interest (i. e. zero 
coupon, fixed coupon, index-linked, and income bonds), and the redemption term (i. e. 
callable bond, perpetual bond, convertible bond). In general, a bond is a promise from an 
issuer to bondholders that the issuer will pay amounts of money (nominal and coupons) in 
the future to bond holders. However, income bonds will pay the coupon only when the 
bond issuer earns enough profit. Sometimes, the repayment of nominal (the redemption 
date) is not specified as the redemption date will be decided by the issuer in the future (i. e. 
callable bond) or the bond has no maturity (perpetual bond). In this case, the coupon is 
paid indefinitely. Below we limit the discussion to bonds with a fixed maturity for both 
coupon and zero coupon bonds. 
5.3.2. Risk evaluation methodology for bonds 
The discussion in this part focuses on the risk associated with holding bonds. There are a 
number of factors which may affect the price of bonds in the market. In general, we can 
classify the risk of holding bonds into a specific and a general market risk. Even though 
the risk factors of a general market risk may vary (due to inflation risk, political risk, 
interest rate risk, etc), this sub-section focuses on the general market risk with respect to 
interest rate risk. There are two approaches to measuring interest rate risk for fixed income 
instruments: the duration method and the convexity method. 
5.3.2.1. Duration method 
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The duration method is the most popular method used to approximate the rate of 
sensitivity of bond prices to interest rate changes. The BIS proposal for capital regulation 
with respect to market risk (BIS, 1996) also refers to this approach in order to 
approximate interest rate risk for debt securities. The duration method was invented by 
Macauly (1938). He defines duration as the weighted average maturity of a bond using 
the relative discounted cash flows in each period as weights. In mathematical terms, 
duration can be expressed in the following equation: 
dTtBT 
D= 
Pd 
= 
(1 + rm)` 
+ Pd (1 + rm)T 
where, 
D= duration 
d= annual coupon 
B= par value of bond 
Pd = dirty price of bond (i. e. market price) 
t= time in year to tth cash flow 
T= time in years to maturity 
rin = yield to maturity 
(5.1) 
In qualitative terms, the formula above says that the duration of a bond can be calculated 
from the relative present value of future cash flow to the current price of the bond in 
absolute terms. 
From the equation above, we can also derive the value of a zero coupon bond and a 
perpetual bond. A zero coupon bond will have d=0, therefore: 
BT 
D=- 
Pd (1 + rm)T 
(5.2) 
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The relationship between duration and maturity is shown by Figure 5.4. A and the 
relationship between duration and yield is expressed by Figure 5.4. B. 
Figure 5.4 
Relationship Between Duration and Maturity and Yield 
Figure 5.4. A Figure 5.4. B 
Duration Duration 
Dirty price below par 
I 
Term to maturity Yield 
Figure 5.4. A shows the relationship between duration and term to maturity of different 
types of bonds. In a perpetual bond (i. e. a bond without maturity date), T is indefinite (x) 
and the duration is calculated merely from the current yield (d/Pd) regardless of the term of 
maturity. In other words, the bond is not sensitive to the term of maturity. If the dirty price 
is below the par value, the duration will be higher. Alternatively, if the dirty price is above 
the par value, the duration is lower. Figure 5.4. B shows the relationship between the 
duration and yield. The duration has a negative slope with respect to yield. Normally, 
investors will prefer lower duration as a result of less sensitivity to volatility of interest 
rates. The lower duration implies that there is a low response of the bond value to the 
change of interest rate. In practice, most financial analysts use modified duration (MD) to 
analyse the sensitivity of bond prices to interest rates: 
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AID = -D (1+rm) 
(5.3. ) 
The modified duration can be interpreted as approximating the percentage change in the 
price of a bond resulting from a 1% change of interest rates in the next instant in time. 
Additionally, the relationship between the bond price (Pd) and the yield to maturity can be 
explained by Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5 
Relationship Between Price and Yield to Maturity 
Current 
price 
Price (Pd) 
Current yield 
to maturity 
(1+r, ) 
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Figure 5.5 shows that duration is the slope of the dirty price of the bond with respect to 
the yield to maturity. The changes of the dirty price can be solved using the following 
procedure (Strong, 1993, pp. 52-96; Diacogiannes, 1995, pp. 431-56): 
ruT dB Pd -1 (1+rm)' +(1+rm)T 
Changes in the price of bonds can be derived from the first order derivative: 
AP 
d_tT 
0(1+rm) -dý (1+rm)'+' -B(1+rm)'+1 
multiplying both sides by (1 + rm) / Pd, we obtain the following equation: 
OPd / Pd 
_dTtBT A(1 + rm) / (1 + rm) - Pd (I+ rm)' Pd (1 + rm)T - 
-D 
* 
0(1+rm) 
PDP d-- (1+rm) 
Pd 
Note: * is the sign of multiplication 
(5.4) 
Based on the above model, interest rates and time play important roles in bond valuations. 
However, the model excludes credit risk in the valuation. In the case of coupon bonds, 
credit risk is one of the most important determinants in valuation. 
5.3.2.2. Convexity method 
Sometimes, analysing a bond's price using modified duration is not enough because the 
yield change is not constant. Assume we have already calculated modified duration from 
certain changes of yield. However, the modified duration will be inaccurate when there is 
continuous movement of yield. Therefore, we need to adjust the modified duration which 
has been calculated by employing the second order derivative of the sensitivity of price 
changes against the change of yield (Yawitz, 1989; Sulivan and Kiggins, 1989). The 
objective of the application of the second order derivative is to improve the accuracy of 
the measurement of the bond's price sensitivity given modified duration. 
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By employing the Taylor expansion series, the second order of differential with respect to 
rm of equation 5.4 can be calculated in the following equation ( Ostaszewski, 1993, 
pp. 384-410): 
SP AP 1 OP 10P 
Pdd Pd Orm 
(Arm) + 
2Pd ArmZ 
(Arm)2 
-1Lý7(Orm) +C (Orm)z 
where, 
MD = modified duration 
C= convexity 
(5.5) 
Duration and convexity of a bond with maturity at T and c oupon (d) paid at t can be 
solved in the following equation: 
TdB 
Pd - 
Et 
(1 + r) t+ (1 + r)T 
ýE 
d *(1+r)-t]+[B(1+r)-T] 
t-I 
-t*d*(1+r)-(t+1)]+[-T*B(1+r)-(T+1)I OPm 
IT 
A2Pd 
Arm 2 
T- -(t+1)*-t*d(1+r)-(t+2)I +[-(T+1)*-T*B(1+r)-(T+2) 
1 
To give a clearer overview of the convexity, we will use a portfolio consisting of. a £100 
two-year bond that pays 5% coupon semi-annually, a £103 dirty price and an 8% yield to 
maturity. The price and cash flow pattern will be: 
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Pd =5* (1.04)-I +5* (1.04)-2 +5* (1.04) -3 +5* (1.04)-4 + 100 * (1.04)-4 = 103.6299 
Apd 
=-1*5*(1.04)-2 -2*5* (1.04)-3 -3*5* (1.04)-4 -4*5* (1.04)-5 -4* 100 * (1.04)-5 Arm 
= 371.55 
371.54 
Duration = 103 = 
3.6 semi - annually or 1.8 yearly 
z Pd 
=2* 5(1.04)-3 +6* 5(1.04) -4 + 12 * 5(1.04) -5 + 20 *5* (1.04)-6 + 20 * 100 * (1.04)-6 
=1743.510 
Given that the price of the bond is 103.6299, convexity is (1/2) x (1743.510/103.6229)= 
8.4122. 
This result is the convexity of the bond during two years. To quote the convexity on a 
yearly basis, we can divide the convexity for two years by the square of the frequency of 
bond payment per year. In this case, the payment is twice per year. The convexity per year 
is 8.4122/(22)= 2.1031. 
5.3.3. Application of VaR to bonds 
Duration and convexity measure the sensitivity of a bond's price to yield changes. This 
implies that the duration and convexity are concerned only with interest rate risk. 
However, the risk of investment in bonds is not only interest rate risk, but also foreign 
exchange risk when the bond is denominated in foreign currency. Therefore, the duration 
and convexity are unable to cover foreign exchange risk arising from exchange rate 
volatility. A VaR model can provide a more comprehensive measurement of risk. The 
detail for the VaR calculation for a bond position is shown in Table 5.5. This sub-section 
excludes discussion of procedures showing how to apply VaR to bond positions because 
the technique is similar to that demonstrated for swaps. Detailed discussion of the VaR is 
outlined in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.5 
Value at Risk for Bonds 
ý5 April 1995 's Basic data US $ ( US 100,000 
Maturity Apr-00 
Coupon per year 10.0% 
2. Risk factors: 
2.1. US$ yield volatility for 1 year, 2 years respectively up to 5 years 
2.2. Risk correlation among the yields 
3. Cash flow exposures 
Year Cash flow Cum-cf Term US Yield PV Cum-PV MD *) 
25-Apr-96 10000 10000 1 7.0555 9,341 9,341 (0.873) 
25-Apr-97 10000 20000 2 7.2836 8,688 18,029 (1.287) 
25-Apr-98 10000 30000 3 7.4017 8,072 26,101 (1.689) 
25-Apr-99 10000 40000 4 7.5428 7,476 33,577 (2.076) 
25-Apr-00 110000 150000 5 7.6344 76,144 109,71 (3.628) 
4. Data volatility and correlation 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Yield Vol. 3.16 2.104 1.735 1.63 1.503 
Current yield 7.038 7.275 7.391 7.536 7.628 
Price volatility 0.208 0.267 0.315 0.378 0.415 
Correlation Matrix 
1 year 1 0.881 0.809 0.782 0.737 
2 years 0.881 1 0.985 0.955 0.916 
3 years 0.809 0.985 1 0.983 0.952 
4 years 0.782 0.955 0.983 1 0.991 
5 years 0.737 
5. VaR 
0.916 0.952 0.991 1 
Year PV Price Vol VaR Horizontal Vertex 
1 9,341 0.208 19.41 19.411 23.221 25.421 28.42 315.98 
2 8,688 0.267 23.22 
3 8,072 0.315 25.42 
4 7,476 0.378 28.42 
5 76,144 0.415 315.98 
VaR 412.25 
DEaR 78.24 
* MD = modified duration 
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5.4. Forward rate agreements (FRAs) and futures 
5.4.1. Basic concept of FRAs and futures 
The FRA contract is designed to meet the needs of both parties in terms of size, maturity 
and currency. This contract is less marketable because the design of the contract is 
suitable just for the specific needs of the two companies. This instrument is not traded in 
regulated markets. Therefore, credit risk in forward contracts is the most significant 
component of risk (see Blake, 1990, pp. 158-9; Kolb, 1997, pp. 1-25). 
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between futures and forward contracts. The main 
difference is that futures contracts can only be traded in regulated markets while forward 
rate agreements are designed to suit only the two counterparties (see Tucker, 1994, pp. 
399-441; Shapiro, 1991, pp. 113-6). Therefore, the futures contract has specific 
characteristics. The detail of the differences between futures and FRAs is shown in Table 
5.6. In general, there are three types of futures contracts: (1) stock index futures; (2) 
interest futures; and (3) currency futures. The objective of doing these transactions is to 
speculate in the price of instruments (making money), arbitrage or hedge certain positions. 
Futures instruments include interest rate futures contracts, such as futures contracts in 90 
day eurodollar time deposits, 30 day US Federal Funds, 90 day US Treasury bills, 
Eurosterling time deposits, bonds 20 year US Treasury Bonds, 10 year US Treasury notes 
and other government bonds. 
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Table 5.6 
Differences Between Futures and FRAs 
Futures FRAs 
1 Transaction is conducted through regulated 1 Transaction is conducted according to the 
market. agreement between two parties. 
2 Terms of conditions in the contract are 2 Terms of conditions in the contract are 
standardised. designed to meet specific needs of the 
parties. 
3 Credit risk is negligible since the regulated 3 Credit risk is important to price. 
market is responsible for the settlement and 
imposes daily loss margin. 
4 Daily mark-to-market approach is more 4 Current value is difficult to identify since 
appropriate to evaluate the positions. there is no active market for the specific 
design of FRAs. 
5.4.2. Risk evaluation methodology for FRAs and Futures 
The value of forward and futures contracts will be zero on the date of the beginning of the 
contracts. At the expiration date, the value of the contracts equals the difference between 
the contract price and the spot price at the expiration date. When the spot price at the 
expiration date is lower than the contract price, the buyer loses and the seller benefits. 
Further calculation is required when we evaluate the value of the contract prior to 
expiration. Tucker (1994, p. 431) suggests that the price of a forward or futures contract 
at the time to expiration is the difference between the spot price at the date of valuation 
and the present value of the forward or future contract over the remaining time to the 
expiration. Assume that the forward or future price on the contract is £ 1000, the current 
spot price is £900, the zero coupon yield is 10% per year, and the remaining time to 
expiration is 5 years. The current value of the forward or futures contract is: 
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1000 
s (1+O. 1) 
= 620.92 
The current value of the contract is £900-£620.92= £279.08 From this example, we can 
identify that the value of the contract depends on the spot price and the volatility of the 
yield over the time to expiration. 
5.4.3. Application of VaR to FRAs and futures 
To evaluate the risk of FRAs and futures in VaR models, we will adopt the cash flow 
approach for fixed incomes and foreign exchange positions as defined in section 2. The 
following outline is the procedure for calculating risk in FRAs and futures: (1) identify the 
risk factors of the fixed income position (i. e. price and foreign exchange); (2) identify the 
cash flow exposure of each risk factor (i. e. if the position contains forward exchange, the 
foreign exchange forward can be calculated by using the current spot rate and yield); (3) 
calculate the present value of all cash flow exposures; (4) employ the volatility of risk 
factors and correlations in order to obtain the VaR. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show examples of 
how to apply VaR to forward contracts. Detailed discussion of the VaR is outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
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5.5. Options 
5.5.1. Basic concept of options 
In an option contract, a company may want to sell assets to hedge against adverse 
movements in the prices of the underlying assets. The party can hedge the position of the 
underlying asset by buying a put option. If the price in the market drops below the price 
shown on the option contract, the company will exercise the put option. This condition is 
called the option buyer being "in the money". In this case, one party (the buyer or 
owner) buys a put option (to sell assets) and another party (the writer) writes a put option 
to buy assets. The decision on whether the options will be exercised lies in the hands of 
the buyers of the options. In another example, a party may want to buy assets to hedge 
again adverse movement in the price of the underlying assets. If the price of the asset in the 
market is more expensive than the price on the contract, the party will exercise the option. 
In this case, one party (the buyer or owner) buys a call option (to buy assets) and another 
party (the writer) writes a call option to sell assets. The decision on whether the option 
will be exercised lies in the hands of the buyers of the options. 
The value of an option may be "in the money", " at the money" or "out of the money". 
From the option buyers' point of view, a put option is in the money when the strike price 
is above the sum of the market price plus premium and a call option is in the money when 
the strike price is below the sum of the market price plus premium. From the buyers' point 
of view, a call option is at the money when the strike price is the same as the sum of the 
market price plus premium, and out of the money when the strike price is below the sum of 
the market price plus premium. From the call buyer's point of view, a call option will be 
out of the money when the strike price is above the sum of the market price plus premium. 
Figure 5.7 shows the four kinds of options using graphs and Figure 5.8 shows the value of 
a call option. 
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Profit 
Call buyer(buying asset) 
Figure 5.6. 
Type of Options 
Profrt, Call writer (selling asset) 
Premium 
Strike price Underlying price 
Limited loss (premium) 
Unlimited profit 
Break-eve 
Profit Pitt buyer (selling asset) 
6 
I 
Lo 
Profit 
Strike price Underlying price 0 
Break-eY 
Premium 
Limited loss (premium) 
Los Unlimited profit Los 
Limited profit (premium) 
Unlimited losses 
-P 
Put writer (buying asset) 
Strike price 
Break-even 
Limited profit (premium) 
Unlimited losses 
Premium 
Underlying price 
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Figure 5.7. 
The Value of a Call Option from Buyer's Point of View 
Profit 
1,000,000 - 
500,000 - 
0- 
-500,000 -ý ýII 
-1,000,000 - 
At the money 
272.29 
Out of the money 
110, Z, 
bo, ý 
0 
281.25 (275 + 6.25) 
TT 
267 271 275 279 283 
T 
SPIO0 at option Expiration 
5.5.2. Risk evaluation methodology for options 
There are many approaches available for valuing options. The most common approaches 
are: put-call parity relationship; Black-Scholes model; binomial tree; and the sensitivity 
analysis using Greek letters. The discussion below focuses on the option valuation using 
the above models and concludes by suggesting which is the best approach to be used in 
empirical studies. 
5.5.2.1 Put-call parity relationship 
The put-call parity relationship model was designed just to price European options (i. e. 
options which can be exercised only on the maturity date and on which no dividend 
V-26 
Chapter 5- Literature Review of Financial Instruments and Risk Evaluation Methodology 
payment is made). This approach suggests that the value of an European put option should 
be equal to the combined value of a call option on one share of the same stock with the 
same strike price and time to expiration, a short position of one share of underlying stock, 
and a riskiess investment of an amount equal to the present value of the strike price (Cox, 
1985, p. 42). As a mathematical expression, we can show this in the following equation: 
P=C+Kexp-'`-S 
where, 
P= current market price of a European put option to sell one share 
C= current market value of a European call option to buy one share 
r= riskless interest rate covering the life of the option 
t= time to expiration of the put (and call) option 
K= strike price for the put (and call) option 
S= current market price of the underlying stock 
(5.6) 
The above equation can be modified into the following equation to calculate the value of a 
call option: 
C= P+ S- K exp -rt (5.7) 
Deviation of market price from this relationship creates opportunities for market 
participants to make profit from a zero risk investment through arbitrage under the 
assumption that there are no transaction costs, margins or taxes. For example, when call 
prices are too high relative to put prices, market participants can perform the following 
transactions: (1) selling a call option; (2) buying a put option of the same underlying 
instrument with the same strike price and time to expiration; (3) estimating the present 
value of the strike price using a risk-free interest rate as a discount factor and the period of 
time to expiration "t" (Kexp-") ; (4) buying underlying assets. 
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On the maturity date, the borrowing fund will be replaced by the funds which are obtained 
from put settlement if the price in the market lies below the strike price. Written call 
options will not be exercised by the buyers as a result of a lower market price compared to 
the strike price. It means the arbitrageur can benefit from the difference between the 
premium received from selling call options and premium paid for buying put options. 
Alternatively, the arbitrageur can create profit when the put price is too high relative to the 
call price by buying calls, selling put, borrowing the amount of Keep-", and buying 
underlying assets. 
Table 5.9 below shows the cash flows of options transactions which generate zero net 
cash flows and where the arbitrager will receive zero profit if the premium received from 
selling a call option equals the amount paid for buying options. 
Table 5.9 
Cash Flows of Options 
At expiration date 
Current 
cash flow ,5 
<_K s)K 
Write call c 0 K- S' 
Buy put -P K- S' 0 
Buy stock -S s' S. 
Borrow Kexp-" -K -K 
Net 0 0 0 
Note: S* is the market price at the maturity date 
The put-call parity relationship approach can also be applied in future options. In the case 
of stock options, initial investment is required to buy or sell a stock. In the futures options, 
investment is not necessary to construct a portfolio. Therefore, there is no borrowing of 
funds in futures option portfolios. The put-call parity relationship equation for futures 
options can be shown in the following formula: 
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Pf =Cf +K-F 
where, 
P! = market price of put future 
Cf= market price of call future 
K= Strike price 
F= Future price 
(5.8) 
The call parity relationship valuation model is an appropriate tool for determining the price 
of options, especially for arbitragers who intend to make profit from the different 
premiums between put and call options. However, this model is less applicable for 
institutions which hold the option positions for hedging purposes. Additionally, the model 
is unable to provide information concerning the risk of option positions - instead it 
suggests that the values of option positions change linearly with the changes in the prices 
of put or call options and the prices of the underlying assets. 
5.5.2.2. Black-Scholes model 
This model was developed by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in 1973 (Black-Scholes, 
1973). The model was originally designed for European options on non-dividend-paying 
stocks. Now, the model has been used for other options such as futures options, foreign 
exchange options, and debt security options, as well as for American options. 
According to Black-Scholes, the value of a call option on a risk-free portfolio which 
consists of a long call option and a short position in the underlying stock can be shown in 
the following equation: 
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C=SN(d, )-Kexp-" N(d2) 
d 
ln(S / K) +rt +0.5a-2t 
, 6VC 
d2 =d, -6J 
(5.9) 
where, 
C= the value of call option 
S= market price of underlying asset 
Kexp_r` 
= present value of the strike price discounted by using the risk-free interest rate 
r= risk-free interest rate 
t= time to expiration 
ln(. ) = natural logarithm 
N(. ) = the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardised normal 
variable 
6= the annual volatility of stock returns or standard deviation of stock returns. 
The model is applicable given the following conditions: (1) the underlying asset cannot pay 
discrete dividends or accrue interest payments; (2) the option being valued is a European 
option (i. e. it cannot be exercised before the expiration date); (3) the risk-free interest rate 
is constant over the life of the option; (3) the underlying asset returns are normally 
distributed with constant mean and standard deviation; (4) all asset markets are perfectly 
efficient, with continuous trading and zero transaction costs and no taxes; (5) the short 
selling of securities with full use of proceeds is permitted. 
The Black-Scholes model can be applied in risk-free portfolios which consist of futures 
options and underlying futures contracts (Gemmill, 1993, pp. 180-200). Unlike in stock 
options, this position does not require any initial investment and there is no return. Based 
on this condition, Black-Scholes (1976) developed the futures option pricing formula in 
the following equation: 
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Cf =Exp "[FN(d1*)-KN(d2)] 
ln(F / K) 
= 
6fit- 
+O. So-fNFt 
=di - o-f 
ý 
This formula uses the same assumptions as those used for stock options. 
(5.10) 
The Black-Scholes approach is simpler than the binomial approach because the Black- 
Scholes model contains a one-step solution rather than a multi-step solution. Additionally, 
computation in the Black-Scholes model is faster than in the multi-period solution. The 
main criticism of this model is associated with the normality assumption of the distribution 
of the underlying asset returns. If the true distribution of underlying asset returns is 
skewed or exhibits kurtosis, the price estimations of options will be biased. Additionally, 
the Black-Scholes model is applicable only for European options where the exercises 
occur at the maturity dates. 
5.5.2.3. Risk-neutral valuation 
The risk-neutral valuation approach assumes that the composition of a portfolio consists 
of one unit of assets and a short call option. According to Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 
(1979), the return on the portfolio is certain irrespective of the price of the underlying 
assets. As the return is certain, the return must be a risk-free return. This approach 
requires the assumption that the price of underlying assets moves up and down to a certain 
level on the maturity date. To illustrate this condition, we use the following example: (1) a 
portfolio consists of assets worth £100; (2) after time "t" , the assets will 
be worth either 
£110 or £90; (3) the strike price of selling the call (writing call) option is £100; (4) the 
current price of the asset is £ 100. According to Gemmill (1993, p. 51), the portfolio yields 
a risk-free interest return since the number of options equals 1/hedge ratio (see the next 
example). The hedge ratio can be derived from the following equation: 
hSU - (SU - K) = hSD - (SD - K) (5. ll) 
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where, 
h= hedge ratio 
U= market price which goes up to a certain level 
D= market price which goes down to a certain level 
K= exercise price 
S= share price of assets 
The equation above shows that whatever the price moves, the portfolio will give the same 
return. 
To simplify this equation, we will use " cu" for (SU - K) and " cd" for (SD - K) 
Rearranging the equation above we can solve for "h" with the following: 
hSU - cu = hSD - cd 
hSU - hSD = cir - cd 
h= cu - cd 
S(U - D) 
Based on the example above, we can calculate the hedge ratio with the following result: 
(110-100) - (90 -100) 
1(110-90) _ 
10 / 20 - 0.5 
In other words, we have a risk-free portfolio of assets to short calls in the ratio of 1: 2. If 
the portfolio comprises 1 asset and 2 options (i. e. 1/0.5 where 0.5 is the hedge ratio)), it 
will always be worth £90. If the price increases to £110, buying one share and selling one 
call will be worth £ 100 (11104 10) where £ 110 is the price of one share and -£ 10 is the 
value of selling a call (i. e. we sell to the call buyer at strike price, £100, while the market 
price is £110). However, if the number of selling calls is 2, the value of the portfolio will 
be £90 (1110-120). If the price falls, the position will be worth £90 (£90-0) where £90 is 
the price of one share and 0 is the value of selling a call because the buyer will not 
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exercise the option. By buying a number of calls twice the number of unit assets, we will 
be free from adverse movements in the price of underlying assets. 
The following scenario, which consists of 0.5 units, of assets and one call, will generate the 
same result regardless of the price. If the price rises, the value of the option equals 45 
[i. e. ( 0.5*110)-10]. Alternatively, if the price falls, the value of the option equals 45 
[i. e. (0.5*95)-0]. 
As we discussed in the previous section, this hedge position will pay the risk-free rate of 
interest charged on borrowing funds to buy an asset. Therefore, we can construct the 
relationship between gross pay-off (i. e. the amount of money which is received from the 
investment in the portfolio) and the risk-free rate of interest with the following equation: 
1+r- gross pay - off 
investment 
(5.12) 
By using the example above, the gross pay-off is 45 and the investment is the current price 
of the asset minus the call premium [(0.5 * 100)-c]. With a certain risk-free rate of interest, 
we can calculate the value of a call option: 
45 
1+0.05 = 0.5(l 00) -c 
45 = 1.05(50 - c) 
45 = 52.5 -1.05c 
1.05c = 52.5 - 45 
1.05c = 7.5 
c=7.15 
This approach demonstrates its ability to value the position of an option by assuming that 
the institution's main strategy is to avoid risk. 
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5.5.2.4. The binomial tree 
The binomial option pricing model calculates the value of options by assuming that the 
prices of assets move in a multiplicative binomial process over discrete periods. It means 
that " S" moves up to " u" and down to " d" by a specific amount in the next period. The 
value of " u" at to equals 1 and the value of the asset at ti will either be " uS" or" dS" 
where " u" )1 and O(d(l (Cox et al, 1979). If we choose "u" as a symbol of the multiplier 
by which that the price moves up, the downward price multiplier will be 
1. This rule is 
it 
necessary to ensure that the return of holding certain assets is symmetric 16. Detailed 
illustration of the value of the portfolio at a period of t1 is shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Value of Options Using the Binomial Approach 
Period of to Up/down Period of ti 
(up) 
Period of 
tj (down) 
Probabi 
lity 
Underlying asset (S) Up "us" - ° P° 
Down -  (i - P) 
C (option) Up Cu=MX(O, 
Down - 
Cd = Max(O, 
dS - K) 
(I - P) 
The call option buyer will let the option be un-exercised when the market price of the 
underlying asset gives no benefit for the buyer (i. e. the option is "out of the money") and 
16 Example: the price movements are 100,110 and 100, the percentage of movement at the end of period 1 
is 10/100=10% and at the end of period 2 is -10/110=-9.909%. The absolute movement is 10 units of 
price. However, the movement in percentage is different as a result of the different denominators (i. e. 10°o 
and -9.909', 0). To get symmetric results, we can use In110/100=0.0953 and In 100/110=-0.0953. From this 
example, we can also state that if the price rises to uS (100x1.1) and falls to S/u (100/1.1), then the returns 
will be In uS/S and In (S/u/S) or logl/u. 
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will exercise the option when the market price is higher than the exercise price. Therefore, 
there are two conditions of the option's value: either 0 or (us - K) . 
To employ this model, 
we need to know the probability that the price of the underlying asset moves up or down 
at period ti. We can indicate the probability by using the following formula (Cox and 
Rubenstein, 1985, pp. 169-74): 
exp-" -d p= , or u-d 
it - exp-" 1-p= 
u-d 
(5.13) 
Additionally, we can also calculate "u" by employing the expected volatility (a-) or 
u= e°. Normally the volatility is expressed on a yearly basis. To calculate a- in intended 
time, we can multiply yearly a by square root of "t" or u= e°'t . 
For example: monthly 
volatility equals u= e' 112. To get the value of an option at period to, we can use the 
present value of C and Cd by employing the risk-free discount rate: 
C=[ pCu + (1- p)Cd 
]-n (5.14) 
To illustrate the application of this model, we employ a position of a call option. An 
American call option on a zero-yielding asset with current asset price (S) =100; strike 
price (K)=100; risk-free rate of interest r =10%; volatility (6)=20%; T=1/4 (3 months). 
Assume we calculate the binomial pricing model using a two-step tree, the possible asset 
prices at months 1 and 2 can be expressed in the following calculation: 
u= ý, 
r, - 101 -0 9454 0 0646 °` "` =1.0577; d= 1/ u=0.9454; p= =57.52% 
u-d0.1123 
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Cu = max[0, (105.77 - 100)] 
= 5.77 
Cd = max[0, (94.54 - 100)] 
=0 
C=0.5752 *5.77 +(1 - 0.5752) *0)1* 
_ [3.3189] * 0.9918 
= 3.2917 
I 
0.1 
1+12 
Figure 5.8. shows the various possible prices of one unit of asset in the first and second 
period. 
Figure 5.8 
Two-step Tree of Binomial Valuation 
100 1100 
ýý 89.38 
Figure 5.9 shows the possible values of the underlying asset in periods 1 and 2 with the 
assumption that the price in period 2 also follows the same binomial process. The possible 
price at the end of period one is either 105.77 (us) or 94.54 (dS) . 
In a multi-period 
binomial model, (us) and (dS) probably go up or down with the same probability as those 
in period 1. The "us" may go up to "uus" or down to "udS"and "dS" may go up to 
105.771 
111.87 
ii 
94.54 
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"udS" or down to "ddS" . 
The value of an option can be represented in the following figure 
(Figure 5.9): 
Figure 5.9 
Framework of Option Valuations Using the Binomial Tree 
Cuu = Max{0, (uuS - K)} 
Mar(O, (uS-K)) 
Cud = Max{0, (udS - K)} 
,= 
M¢r{0, (dS - K)) 
Cdd = Max(O, (ddS-K)} 
In the second year, we have three alternatives for the value of C. The value of C in period 
2 can be solved by using the following procedure: 
Cu = 
[PC.. +1 (1- P)Cua ý 
1.. 
2. 
C, 
= 
i -tr 
[pCdu + (1- p)Cddl 
-U 1. -- 
3. C = 
itr 
[pCu+(1-p)Cdý 
1+r 
Replacing C. and Cd in equation 3, we can solve for C: 
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c= 
[P(PCuu 
+ (1- P)Cdu 
ý+ [(1- 
P)(PCdu + (1- P)Cdd )ý 
(1 +r) (1 +r) 
(1+r) 
[P2Cuu 
+P(1-P)Cud +P(1-P)Cdu +(1-P)2Cdd, 
r- 
(1+r)2 
[p 2c 
uu + 2p(l - p)Cdu + (1- P)2 Cdd 
ý 
(1+r)2 
We can expand the application of the binomial tree into multiple periods by using the 
same properties. The more periods we employ, the more the model provides alternative 
values of the option. However, this model requires the following assumptions: (1) the 
"u" and "d" multipliers are the same in all periods; (2) there are no transaction costs (in 
other words, hedging can be established for each period between the options); (3) the 
asset has no sunk cost; (4) interest rates are constant; and (5) there is no dividend 
payment. The model also requires too many calculations, particularly for calculation of 
the multi-period tree. 
The binomial tree can be applied to American options since we employ the tree with 
interval periods until the maturity date of the options. However, the binomial tree is 
computationally demanding when the number of tree-steps is high and it is impractical if 
we try to apply it to daily tree-steps. Additionally, this model employs price volatility to 
identify whether the price moves up or down within certain levels. Since the price 
volatility is derived from the procedure by assuming that the distribution of option returns 
is normal, the assumption violates the fact that the true distribution of returns is not always 
normal. 
5.5.2.5. Sensitivity of option premium 
To evaluate the option position, we can also employ sensitivity analysis of the option 
premium to various factors which are used to calculate the premium. As mentioned in the 
V-38 
Chapter 5- Literature Review of Financial Instruments and Risk Evaluation Methodology 
previous section, option prices are influenced by the following factors: price volatility, 
time to expiration, and interest rates. In this sub-section, we will discuss option valuations 
using option premium sensitivity with respect to these factors (i. e. the "Greek letters"). 
Then, the change in value of an option can be derived from the multiplication of the 
sensitivity (i. e. delta, gamma, vega, rho, etc) and the change of the factors for which the 
sensitivity is calculated. For instance, for the change of the value of an option with delta 
0.5 and a change of the price of underlying asset (X - S) , where "X" represents the 
estimated value of the future price of the asset and S represents the current spot price of 
the underlying asset, the value of the option is calculated from : 0.5 * (X - S) 
The current value of an option (V) equals the previous value of an option (V0) plus the 
change in the value of the option (dV) or V= Vo + dV . 
The following section will discuss in 
more detail the sensitivity of option premiums. '7 
5.5.2.5.1 Delta (A) 
Delta measures the sensitivity of the call prices to the volatility of the share price. In 
mathematical terms, 
äV 
(5 - äs V0 (5.15) 
where, 
V= the value of the option, S= the value of the underlying instrument (share price), and 
S is the delta, X is the change in the option's value, cS is the change in the price of the 
underlying assets, and Vo is the value of the option in period to. Additionally, 
17 The sources of information concerning the Greek letters in this section is derived from Merton (1990, pp- 
177-278), Gemmil (1993, pp. 72-9), and Strong (1993, pp. 340-60). 
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Rearranging the equation above, we can solve for 6V : 
c"v =ö* C's 
Since we already know the delta and the estimated future price of the underlying asset by 
using price volatility, we can calculate the change in the value of an option (i. e. the risk of 
holding an option). In the Black-Scholes model, the delta is simply the N(dl) and the 
sensitivity of the put price to the share price is N(dl) -1. A delta of 0.6 means that the 
call price will move to 0.6 if the price of the share increases by 1. To establish a fully 
hedged position, a fund manager will buy the number of call options equal to the number 
of shares divided by the delta. If the share position is 60 units, the full hedge position of 
options must be 60/0.6=100 calls. 
5.5.2.5.2. Gamma (r) 
Sometimes the delta fails to measure the option value as a result of linear approximation. 
To get a better approximation of the value of options, we can also use the second order 
derivative of the change of an option's value with respect to the share price (i. e. the 
gamma). The gamma of an option measures the change of an option's delta with respect 
to the underlying asset's price. In mathematical terms, we can express this using the 
following equation: 
2 
r2äs2V0 
TheBlack - Scholes model identifies this gamma as the following term: 
ýa-ýt 
, where 
N' (d, 
2e 
-(0.5dß ) 
(5.16) 
A gamma of 0.10 means that delta will increase by 0.10 when the asset price increases by 
one unit. The put gamma will simply be the negative of the call gamma. 
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5.5.2.5.3. Theta (e) 
Theta is the sensitivity of the option premium to the time to maturity. A theta measures the 
movement of option premium in a particular period. A 10% daily theta of an option to 
maturity means that the option premium will decline by 0.1 between today and tomorrow 
assuming that all other factors remain the same. This condition implies that the value of an 
option is less valuable as the time to expiration decreases. The following equation is the 
mathematical representation of theta: 
_ 
äV Q ät 
The Black-Scholes model identifies theta in the following term: 
2ý 
N'(dl)+Ee-r`rN(d2) 
5.5.2.5.4. Vega (A) 
(5.17) 
Vega measures the change in the option's price with respect to the change in the volatility 
of the price of underlying assets. A vega of 0.3 indicates that a one percentage point 
increase in price volatility produces a 0.3 unit change in option premium. In mathematical 
terms, vega can be expressed as follows: 
av A=- 
a6 
(5.18) 
The Black-Scholes model identifies vega as the following term: 
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A=S. JN' (dl ) 
5.5.2.5.5. Rho (P) 
Rho measures the change in an option's price with respect to a percentage point change in 
the interest rate. In mathematical terms, it is shown by the following equation: 
ov P 
Or 
In the Black-Scholes model, rho can be calculated by the following formula: 
P= tEe -rt N(d2 ) 
5.5.2.5.6. Price sensitivity of all Greek letters 
(5.19) 
Separate calculation of Greek letters is less informative when the factors which influence 
the premium interact simultaneously. The simultaneous calculation of the sensitivity of 
option premium with respect to all Greek letters may provide comprehensive information 
concerning the sensitivity of option premium. The sensitivity of option price to delta, 
gamma, vega, rho and theta can be solved by using the Taylor expansion series (J. P. 
Morgan, 1996). This approach assumes that a linear relationship exists between the price 
of options and the factors for which the sensitivity is calculated. Vlaar (1996) suggests 
that linear approximation is adequate in this sensitivity analysis except in the case of the 
delta. Furthermore, Vlaar also mentions that the second order derivation of each risk 
factor can be ignored since the linear relationship is almost certain and correlation among 
risk factors is insignificant. Finally, we can construct the following equation: 
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V(X, K, r, 6)=Vo(S, K, r, t, 6o)+ - 
IY°(X-S)+2 ýý`ý, 
°(X-. 
S)Z + 
o"V 1 -ý2 Vz oV 1UVz cV 
ý ý0(6-6°)+2 
cýZ 
(6-6°) + 
63- ý°(-r°)+2 c3 "0(r-ro) 
+ 
ci 
1oýV 
+2 
ciZ 
(t-t)z 
va (t - to) 
(5.20) 
where, 
v= value of option 
X= expected price of underlying instruments for time t 
r= riskless rate of interest during the time to maturity of option 
t= time to maturity 
6= standard deviation of returns on the underlying asset 
dV = delta value of option which is calculated from the partial derivatives for V with 
respect to X, r, t, and u. 
S= spot price of underlying instruments 
K= strike price 
5.5.3. Application of VaR to options 
Calculating the risk of options which are not linear instruments can be performed in many 
ways depending on the particular structure of options positions such as whether the 
option is "in the money" , 
"at the money" or "out of the money", and the time to 
expiration. There are many valuation approaches which are available as discussed in this 
section. The most common approaches are the delta valuation method (i. e. parametric 
approach) and the full valuation method. The full valuation method is more appropriate to 
value options which contain non linear relationships between prices and risk factors. 
However, this study will adopt the parametric approach to calculate the value of options 
by considering the sensitivity of option prices with respect to the second order 
approximation of the risk factors. It means we assume that the change in option price is 
linearly related to the price of underlying assets. The main reason for using this approach 
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is that the full valuation method, using the sensitivity of all risk factors, requires too much 
data which is not always available. Additionally, banks in Indonesia are less involved in 
options, particularly the writing of options. 
5.6. Equities 
An equity position is defined as the holding of equities for trading purposes. To calculate 
the VaR for equity positions, we can multiply the current value (mark-to-market) of the 
equity position by the volatility of stock returns. The VaR can be expressed in the 
following equation: 
VaR = Market value of stock * (1)o-R s 
where 
RS =ßSRM+a, +s 
and 
R =the return of the market index 
/' S =a measure of the expected change in RS given a change in R. (beta) 
65 =the expected value of a stock's return (i. e. risk-related firm specific) 
=the random element of the firm's specific return 
(5.21) 
In other words, the return of asset "s" depends on (ßSRM) and components of stock- 
specific (as + es) returns. 
Assume that the stock-specific return can be neutralised by diversifying the portfolio into a 
different number of stocks: the risk of the stock is a function of the stock index. 
Therefore, in mathematical terms: 
6RS - 
ßS 
" 
6R, 
v 
(5.22) 
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Substituting in the VaR equation, we obtain: 
VaRs =Ml'S. ßs. (1)6RM (5.23) 
To estimate the market risk for a multi-index portfolio, the additional process of 
calculating correlation among indices is necessary. Similarly, for stock positions 
denominated in foreign currency, we need to consider foreign exchange risk. 
This study excludes equity positions from empirical study, because banks in Indonesia are 
prohibited from taking equity trading positions. The discussion of equities in this sub- 
section is to provide a comprehensive coverage of the theory of risk evaluation for 
financial instruments. 
5.7. Conclusions 
From what we have discussed in this chapter, we discover that most of the valuation 
theories are unable to accommodate credit risk simultaneously in the calculations. This 
finding supports the case for calculating credit risk separately from market risk. 
To evaluate the value of positions, each evaluation model is designed for a particular 
objective, such as measuring sensitivity with respect to a certain factor, valuing positions 
for hedging purposes or quoting the price for arbitrage purposes. Additionally, the 
valuation model is normally designed for pricing and not for risk evaluation purposes. 
Therefore, the results are less applicable for the measurement of risk. However, we can 
adopt some of these theories within our risk evaluation methodology since there is no 
better approach - hence the use of the delta of options and the Black-Scholes model. 
Finally, this study will employ the VaR approach in an empirical study of how to calculate 
the risk of positions in financial instruments. The examples in this chapter show the basic 
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format of the VaR calculations. However, adjustment may be necessary with respect to 
variations in financial instruments. 
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Chapter 6 
Foreign Exchange Rate Risk Assessment Using 
Alternative Models: Empirical evidence 
6.1. Introduction 
The popularity of modelling to measure risk volatility has increased dramatically in the 
banking and finance industries since the inclusion of market risks (i. e. interest rate, price, 
and foreign exchange risk) in capital adequacy regulations (Hall, 1996; BIS, 1996; Bank of 
England, 1995). Most of the modelling techniques attempt to counter the methodologies 
adopted in those proposals. 
In chapters 4 and 5, we outlined the important role that volatility plays in the assessment of 
the risk of banks' portfolios. J. P. Morgan suggests to use an exponential weighted moving 
average with a 0.94 decay factor in estimating the volatility of returns. However, historical 
data of time series may show different behaviour. In other words, there is no guarantee 
that the exponential decay approach is fit for the time series. 
The difference in the volatility behaviour is driven by the different economic processes and 
the speed of the distribution of news about the asset's fundamental value. If news is spread 
out freely and rapidly through the media, the volatility returns will exhibit a short period 
interval. Considering this argument, the volatility of a particular time series will require a 
different model from others to generate the best estimates with the smallest errors. This 
study will review the various models of forecasting and identify the most appropriate one 
to estimate the IDR's volatility in order to assess foreign exchange risk for Indonesian 
banks. This risk is important for the measurement of the adequacy of capital with respect 
to market risk. 
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To forecast volatility using historical time series, we can use either univariate (time series) 
or multivariate (i. e. causal relationship) models. The causal relationship method gives a 
better fit of future estimation since there is no changing of the behaviour of explanatory 
variables such as a change in economic policy (Lucas, 1976). Due to the difficulties of 
ensuring the stability of government policy, the univariate model is preferable. This chapter 
will begin with discussion of general models for risk assessment and continue with 
discussion on how to treat data and volatility in forecasts. 
In general, univariate forecasting methodologies consist of smoothing, decomposition and 
causality (Makridakis, 1983, pp. 17-54) models. The smoothing method adopts the 
principle that the current forecast is a reflection of the previous forecast and the current 
errors. This method includes equally-weighted moving average (ExWMA) and 
exponentially-weighted moving average (ExWMA). The exponential method has been 
used by J. P. Morgan since 1994 to provide volatility data for its clients (J. P. Morgan, 
1994). The difference between the two depends on the weights. The ExWMA gives 
different weights to each observation while the ExWMA employs the same weights for all 
observations. 
The decomposition method is based on the principle of breaking down a time series into 
each component of seasonality or trend cycle and then predicting the future from each 
component separately. Causality methods forecast the variation of the dependent variable 
based on some explanatory variables. The most widely used of the causality methods 
includes the autoregressive process (AR), autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA), autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), and generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) - see Engle (1991), Bollerslev 
(1986), and Box-Jenkins (1976) for details. This chapter will provide a theoretical 
overview of forecasting using ExWMA (in later discussion, we shall call it EWMA), AR, 
ARIMA, ARCH and GARCH, and conduct an empirical study. The aims of the empirical 
study are to obtain evidence as to whether the J. P. Morgan decay factor (0.94) is valid for 
the volatility of IDR exchange rate returns, and to suggest different models which provide 
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more accurate estimates. Using the foreign exchange positions of an Indonesian bank -a 
major forex player in the market - this study identifies the foreign exchange rate risk of the 
bank as assessed using the BIS standardised methodology, EWMA and GARCH. This 
chapter will proceed in the following way: Section 6.2 outlines the models; Section 6.3 
discusses the data; Section 6.4 shows how to identify the patterns of data; Section 6.5 
reviews the theories of exponential weighted moving average; Section 6.6 provides details 
on the theories of ARIMA and GARCH models, including empirical evidence; Section 6.7 
discusses the empirical results of GARCH models; Section 6.8 discusses the testing of 
GARCH estimates; Section 6.9 assesses foreign exchange risk using volatility and 
correlation; Section 6.10 contains the conclusions of this chapter. 
6.2. Models 
The main objective of this section is to design new models for market risk. The discussion 
below is mainly based on the theories which have been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Adopting the definition in Chapter 4, VaR measures risk over a fixed span of time in which 
positions are assumed to remain fixed. This study adopts a one day time horizon to assess 
the VaR of foreign exchange positions. This time horizon is reasonable for measuring the 
risk of foreign exchange positions, but it is less appropriate for fixed income positions. The 
following equation is the mathematical expression of VaR for a single position: 
Va` `t+l = Vr6r+1 
where, 
VaRt+i = value at risk 
V. = market value of positions at time" t" (risk exposure) 
o-t+i = volatility of risk factors at time "t+ 1" 
(6.1) 
If the model above is employed within the standardised methodology of the BIS 
guidelines, we can derive the following conclusions: 
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"V is marked to market only for the trading book. The proposal doesn't mention how 
to calculate market value for fixed incomes positions or OTC derivatives. 
"6 is determined based on consensus between member countries (i. e. 8% for foreign 
exchange risk). 
" Overall risk equals the summation of the risk of individual positions (i. e. ignoring risk 
correlation). This approach violates portfolio theory (see Sharp, 1970 , pp. 
34-44) 
Detailed criticisms of the standardised method have been discussed in Hall (1994 and 
1995). 
This study suggests expanding the application of VaR to positions in fixed incomes and 
OTC derivatives. The marked-to-market values (v) for fixed incomes and OTC 
derivatives can be derived from the following models: 
1 
Lt = Ct+k 
(I+ l)k 
(6.2) 
where, 
Cr = cash flow at time "t" 
i= yield to maturity (i. e. we assume that the spot rate is the same as the yield of a zero 
coupon bond) 
k= period from the time the risk is assessed (" t ") to "t+k" 
This study also suggests that the volatility of risk factors at time "t+ 1" (o ), such as 
exchange rates, stock prices, interest rates, and commodities, can be estimated using time 
series forecasting techniques. 
Daily value at risk of the "ninstrument at time "t " can be shown in the following 
equation: 
DaR,,; r = I' , n! t +1 
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where, 
"t+ 1" is the day after "t" (i. e. the day when the risk is assessed) 
a,,, +, = n t+1= the 
daily price risk for the instrument "n " 
This study adopts price volatility rather than yield volatility". Assuming that "i" yield in 
currency (r) will be delivered at time "t+k", the price risk (Pk) of one unit of currency 
(r) at yield "i" and for period "t+k" is given by the following equation: 
Pk 
- 1r 
1 
(6.3) Lo +lr)ký 
where, 
Pk = the price of a"k" period zero coupon bond denominated in currency "r" 
i= the spot rate of a zero coupon bond in currency "r" for "k" periods ahead. 
k= the time when the cash flow is received 
The price volatility of a "k" period zero coupon bond can be derived from the following 
equation: 
6pk = (7i Pk 
where, 
6pk = the price volatility of a "k " period zero coupon bond 
6, = the daily yield volatility of a "k " period zero coupon bond in currency "r" 
Diversified daily value at risk (DDaR) can be derived from the following equation: 
(6.4) 
DDaR, _ (DaR)2 *(DaR, )2+2*ppj *DaR*DaRj (6.5) 
where, 
DDaRj = Diversified daily value at risk for instruments "n" and "j" 
18 Price volatility is normally used for fixed income valuations when the price of an instrument is not linearly 
related one to one to the yield. 
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DaR = Daily value at risk for instrument "n" 
DaR, = Daily value at risk for instrument "i " 
p11j = Risk correlation between risk factors in instruments "n" and "j" 
To assess the risks of non-linear positions (i. e. options), this study will employ the second 
order of a Taylor series expansion around the spot rates. Assuming that the price of an 
option depends on several risk factors, such as the strike price (K), the spot price of the 
underlying instrument (P ), time to maturity (t ), the risk-less interest rates (r ), and the 
volatility of the price of the underlying instrument (a), the value of options can be 
calculated in the following equation: 
lJv cr, Iý 
, b(6 ýý 
(6.6) TZP Kt, r, ý=v(Pgt, r, o) b (K P) 2ý (x-P)? +........ z &»1 
where, 
V= estimated value of option 
Vo = value of options at time " to " 
The DaR of options depends on the volatility of the risk factors which can be estimated 
using forecasting techniques. Diversified risk in options can be solved by employing the 
correlation of underlying factors (i. e. P, K, t, r, 6 ). Normally we call these the "Greek 
letters". 
6.3. Data 
This study employs daily spot exchange rate returns of 18 IDR exchange rates which are 
going to be used to assess foreign exchange risk for a sample bank. The time series of 
exchange rate returns consists of data from 2 January 1996 to 30 May 1997 or 350 
observations. The length of the time series is considered long enough, particularly for 
EWMA. The length of the data series will not affect the results too much since the model 
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gives high weights to recent observations. The weights will die exponentially to zero as the 
observations move back to the older observations. In GARCH models, a longer time series 
will provide better results when these models can capture the long patterns of the time 
series. One of the purposes of this study is to show that GARCH models can provide 
more accurate IDR volatility returns than the standardised method and EWMA. 
Exchange rate returns in this study are derived from the following formula: 
rr = (LnRr+i - LnRr) x 100% (6.7) 
where rr is an exchange rate return at time "t" and R, is the exchange rate at time "r". 
The exchange rate data is derived from the quote prices of Bank Negara Indonesia (a 
commercial bank). The ownership of this bank is split between government and private 
owners (i. e. public shareholders). Therefore, we believe that the exchange rate policy of 
this bank is likely to be independent from involvement of the owners. The exchange rate 
and exchange rate returns are shown in the following graphs: 
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As the last graph shows, the IDR is a managed float against the USD as the trend line 
increases at the same sequence. It is in line with the government's announcement that 
Indonesia adopts a managed float for its foreign exchange rate policy. 
To assess foreign exchange risk, this study will employ the net foreign exchange positions 
of a state bank in Indonesia. However, regulations in Indonesia do not allow the name of 
the bank to be revealed. The foreign exchange exposure of the bank is a consolidated 
position on 30 May 1997. The internal management of the sample bank has employed 
several guidelines to ensure that the foreign exchange trading exposure is within a level at 
which the management of the bank thinks the bank is secure. These restrictions include the 
setting of a maximum overnight open position of foreign exchange trading of US$7,500 
for each dealing room. However, most forex dealers square their positions at the end of 
the day. Therefore, the forex position from the banking book dominates the consolidated 
position. The positions in foreign exchange will be used to assess foreign exchange risk 
using the standardised method and GARCH. The foreign exchange position of the sample 
bank and the methodology for calculating the capital requirement using the standardised 
method are given in Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1 
Foreign Exchange Risk Using the BIS Standardised Method 
Currency Long Short Net Position Short position 
USD 8,373,301,640 (7,729,693,080) 643,608,560 
ATS 87,546,688 (86,309,830) 1,236,858 
AUD 7,400,184 (1,292,568) 6,107,616 
BEF 1,573,909 (1,574,397) (488) 
BND 23,934 0 23,934 
CAD 132,759 (467,312) (334,553) 
CHF 12,582,382 (11,050,178) 1,532,204 
DEM 116,792,616 (110,369,697) 6,422,919 
DKK 425,981 0 425,981 
FFR 9,164,324 (7,365,047) 1,799,277 
GBP 82,776,884 (47,889,937) 34,886,948 
HKD (8,442,627) (578,444) (9,021,071) 
ITL 180,971,516 (103,088,543) 77,882,972 
JPY 11,618,610,327 (7,828,188,561) 3,790,421,766 
MYR 18,692,184 (33,689,118) (14,996,934) 
NLG 3,047,112 (1,827,246) 1,219,866 
NZD 324,997 (4,439) 320,558 
SEK 241,521 (1,302) 240,219 
Sum 4,566,129,678 (24,353,046) 
Foreign ex change risk 8% from 365,290,374 
6.4. Identification of the patterns of data 
Forecasting in mean-variance analysis requires certain conditions to get the best results. 
The most important requirement is the stationarity of the data. Data is stationary when the 
process of generating this data is in equilibrium around a constant value and the variances 
around the mean remain constant over time. A non-stationary process of time series 
occurs when trend or seasonal effects, or combinations of them, generate the process of 
the series. Some modelling techniques assume that means and variances are constant over 
time. If a time series is generated from a non-stationary process, this process is redundant 
with the assumption of constant means and variances. Therefore, the mean-variance 
approach will not give the best results. The EWMA will be more appropriate for non- 
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stationary time series. However, the mean variance analysis may produce better estimates 
since the model considers the heteroscedastic variances. The following discussion covers 
the theories of stationarity and whitenoise tests. 
6.4.1 Sample autocorrelation function (ACF) 
In time series data, the probability of an observation falling by a certain value is assumed to 
be drawn from a random process (i. e. the series was generated by a stochastic process). 
However, the stochastic process of time series data may follow a certain pattern such as 
horizontal, seasonal, cyclical, trend, or combinations of these patterns. 
An autocorrelation function (ACF), which measures the relationship between two 
observations within a time series, is the standard method to examine the patterns of data. If 
the ACFs are significantly different from zero, the data is not random (non-stationary). In 
other words, past values may influence current values in the time series. If the process of 
the data is non-stationary (i. e. the data is time variant), the estimation of the future with 
fixed coefficients of parameters is misleading (Pindyck, 1991, p. 444). Another indication 
of a stationary process is when the ACF drops to zero immediately or exponentially (see 
Enders, 1995, p. 85). If a time series is not generated from a stationary process, it will be 
necessary to transform the series into a stationary generated process before we employ 
these series in models. 
The ACF at lag "k ", (we normally use symbol pk ), can be derived from the relative value 
of covariance between two observations over the product of the two standard deviations. 
To keep it simple, the discussion below begins with the correlation in a bivariate time 
series model even though the application to univariate time series is the same. In 
mathematical terms we can express the correlation of the bivariate time series data (X and 
Y) in the following equation: 
VI-13 
Chapter 6- Foreign Exchange Rate Risk Assessment Using Alternative Models: Empirical evidence 
CovxY 
rx. y Sxsy 
where, 
Covxy = 
1n 
n-l 
(X'-X)(Y-Y) and 
1" 
sx =, (X= _Xýz n1 ; =1 
Sy I 
n 
(Y 
; _ý 
where, 
Cov, y = covariance between series X and series Y 
Sx = standard deviation of series X 
Sy = standard deviation of series Y 
(6.8) 
The autocorrelation in univariate time series data is the correlation between an 
observation at time "t" and an observation at time "t-k", we can call it an 
autocorrelation with lag "k ". Given a time series (X1, X2, ......... 
X,, ), the autocorrelation 
at lag "k " can be expressed in the following equation: 
n 
Autocorrelation (lag k) = pk = -I, 
where, 
n-k t=k+l 
k=1,2,3,....., 
ý(Xt 
-X)(Xt-k - 
n 1ý In 
(6.9) t=k+1 
ýXr-X) 2 II, IýcXt -Xýz \V t=k+1 /\Y t=k / 
If the series are identified as invariant with respect to time (i. e. stationary), these series will 
satisfy the following conditions 
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(1) The series have a constant mean or the mean is invariant of time. 
(2) The series have a constant variance. This condition implies that the variances will be 
the same whatever the "n" which is calculated in the following: y, (X, - X)2 = 62 
(3) The covariance (yk = (XX - X)(XI_k - X) } is always the same for the same "k ". 
Finally, we can rearrange equation in point 3 into the following: 
Yk =E (xt - x)(xt_k - X) 
t=k+1 
n 
1 (Xt - 
X)(Xt-k - X) t=k+1 
Pk =- n E (Xt - X)2 
r=i 
where 
n 
I (XI -, Y)2 = Yo r=1 
Therefore, 
Yk 
pk = 
yo 
6.4.2. Test of a whitenoise process 
(6.10) 
Assuming the series is y1, y2, y3 .............. y. and the autoregressive process 
is given by the 
following equation yt = ayt_1 + c, the series is generated from a whitenoise process if 
-1 < a1 <1 (Enders, 1995, p. 215). Another indication of the whitenoise process is when 
the ACF drops to zero in the first of several lags. To test whether the pk is significantly 
different from zero, we assume that y, is independent ofy, _1 
(or a= 0) and o' is white 
noise; then the autocorrelation of po =1 and pk =0 for k>0. By using a sample, we can 
test whether pk =0 fork >0 (Bartlett, 1946). According to Bartlett, sample 
autocorrelation coefficients are approximately normally distributed with zero mean and 
variance 1/n. 
Given the time series data of daily exchange rate returns for the USD/IDR from 2 January 
1996 to 30 May 1997 (i. e. T=350), the variance is 1/350 and standard deviation is 
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1 
350 = 
0.053452. Assuming we use a 95% confidence interval in a standard normal 
distribution, any Pk will lie within the following range - 0.104765 < pk s 0.104917 
(1.96*0.053452 = 0.104917). We will accept the hypothesis that the true value of pk is 
zero if the Pk falls inside the interval value. From the correlogram (Table 6.2), we can see 
that the values of Pk for k>1 fall inside the interval; thus we accept the hypothesis that the 
true value of Pk is close to zero for k>1. However, for k=1, the value ofpk falls outside 
the interval. 
The USD/IDR correlogram shows that the ACF drops to zero after the third lag so we 
suspect that the time series of the USD/IDR is whitenoise. The correlogram test for other 
currencies also shows that the ACF drops immediately to zero 19 and all the time series of 
foreign exchange rate returns on IDR may be stationary at the series level. 
This study also tests the significance of ACF using Q Statistics developed by Box and 
Pierce (Box and Pierce, 1970). This method employs the hypothesis that the coefficient of 
ACF equals zero (Ho: pk = 0). 
Consider the following equation: 
m 
Q=nYPk (6.11) 
k=1 
where, 
n= sample size 
m= lag length 
19 For the purposes of this discussion, we use only the USD/IDR series. Modelling for other currencies 
adopts the same methodologies as those used for USD/IDR 
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According to Box and Pierce, the distribution of Q follows the chi-square distribution with 
m degrees of freedom. If the value of Q exceeds the critical Q value from the chi-square 
table at the chosen level of significance, we reject the hypothesis that the values of all 
pk are zero. 
However, this test is more appropriate for large samples. Ljung-Box (1978) claim that 
their model can produce better results than those produced by the use of the Q-statistic. 
Ljung-Box suggest using the following formula: 
LB = n(n+2)T, 
Pk 
x=i n-k 
(6.12) 
Theoretically, the value of LB also follows the chi-square distribution with m degrees of 
freedom. Table 6.2 shows the results of the correlogram, ACF, PACF, Q-statistic 
calculated using Ljung-Box, and Box-Pierce on USDIIDR exchange rate returns. 
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Table 6.2 
Stationary Test of USD/IDR at Original Series Level 
Lags ACF PACF ACF PACF LB BP 
1 ***ý. ***ý. -0.394 -0.394 57.59 57.13 
2 
. 
ý. *ý. 0.012 -0.170 57.65 57.18 
3 
. ý. . 
ý. 0.041 -0.026 58.27 57.80 
4 
. ý. . 
ý. -0.043 -0.040 58.96 58.48 
5 
. 
ý. 
. ý. 
0.000 -0.034 58.96 58.48 
6 
. ý. . ý. -0.001 -0.024 
58.96 58.48 
7 
"I" 
I. 0.037 0.034 59.46 58.98 
8 
. ý. 
ý. -0.027 0.003 59.73 59.25 
9 
. ý. . ý* 0.061 0.067 61.11 60.62 
10 
. 
ý. ý. -0.050 -0.001 62.04 61.54 
11 
. 
ý. *ý. -0.055 -0.082 63.16 62.65 
12 
. ý. . 
ý. 0.037 -0.035 63.67 63.16 
13 
. 
ý. 
. ý. 
0.024 0.027 63.89 63.37 
14 
. ý. . ý. -0.009 0.021 63.92 63.40 
15 
. ý. . ý. 
0.009 0.014 63.95 63.43 
16 
. ý. . ý. 
0.007 0.012 63.96 63.45 
17 
. ý. . ý. 0.001 0.019 63.96 63.45 
18 
. 
ý. 
. ý. -0.010 
0.004 64.00 63.48 
19 
. 
ý. 
. 
ý. -0.046 -0.056 64.79 64.26 
20 
. ý. . 
ý. 0.040 -0.002 65.38 64.85 
Note: LB =Ljung Box Q Statistic 
BP = Box-Pierce Q Statistic 
Single * indicates that the ACF/PACF falls below significant level. 
More than one * indicates that the ACF/PACF falls above significant level. 
This test uses a 5% confidence level. 
6.4.3. Partial autocorrelation function (PACF) 
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Partial autocorrelation is the degree of association between observations Yr and Y_k when 
the effect of other time lags 1,2,3,... up to k -1 are partialled out. This partial 
autocorrelation can also be defined as the last autoregressive coefficient of an 
autoregressive with order k -1 or AR (k -1) model. The purpose of defining the PACF 
is to identify an appropriate ARMA process in forecasting. The following equations show 
how to derive an AR(1), AR(2), AR(3 ), ... 
AR(m - 1), and an AR(m). 
t Y= ýiY-ý +e 
Y= OlY-1 + 02Y-2 + er 
Y_ AY-1 + AY-2 + Y3Y-3 + er 
Y =Ay -1 + 
02yt-2 + 03Y-3+.......... +Om-1Y-(m+1) + et 
Y= OlY-i + 0ZY-2 + 03Y-3+.......... +Om-iY-(m+1) + 0), nY-m + et 
(6.13) 
(6.14) 
(6.15) 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
Theoretically, we can solve the A, 0,03 ................. 
0in_1, cm using these equations. 
However, the computation will be time consuming. To solve 01, we can multiply the 
equation of AR(1) by Y_, and we obtain the following equation: 
Yt. Y-i = AY-, Y-, + Y-ter (6.18) 
Taking the expected value of the equation above, we get the following equation: 
E(YYY-t) = E(, AY-, Y, -1) + E(Y-ler ) 
Since E(YY_, ) = yi, E(Y_, Y_, ) = yo and E(Y_ier) is assumed to be zero, therefore: 
71 = oYO 
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Rearranging the equation above we can solve PACF with order 1 (pl ): 
_1 Ti 
To 0 
Pi =0, 
(6.19) 
The same methodology applies for solving other cbk by employing the following 
procedures: (1) multiplying the equation by Y_k ; (2) taking expected values of the 
equations; (3) dividing the expected values by yo will produce a set of simultaneous 
equations (i. e. Yule-Walker equations) which can be solved for Ok. 
The next concern is how the value of 4 can be used to identify the ARMA model. If the 
value of 0, is significantly different from zero, the time series is identified as an AR(k ) 
process. It is possible that more than one AR (k) is significant. However, if the series was 
generated from the MA process instead of AR, then the PACF will not indicate the order 
of the MA process. A general rule says that the MA process can be identified when the 
PACF do not exhibit a drop to random values after "k" lags but instead decline to zero 
exponentially (see Appendix 6.1 for details. ). The stationary test on the USD/IDR series 
shows that the PACF drops to zero at the third lag. This may indicate that the series is not 
generated from an MA process. 
6.4.4. Unit root test 
Even though we have already examined a sample ACF, there is still an argument that, 
sometimes, a sample ACF (i. e. correlogram) fails to detect stationary process. This 
technique makes it hard to distinguish between unit roots and near unit roots because they 
have the same shape as in ACF. The next step in this discussion is to identify whether a 
series is generated from unit roots and to conclude whether the process of the series is 
stationary. 
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If the ACF drops slowly (not in a multiplicative process), a time series may contain a 
characteristic of a unit root process and a trend stationary process. In the previous section, 
we tested ACF under the null-hypothesis that pk = 0, and the result provides information 
on whether the ACF is significantly different from zero. However, it is unclear whether it 
is a unit root process. In the unit root test, we will employ the hypothesis that the series is 
non-stationary by employing Ho : (p = 1) in the equation 6.20 below. Recall the 
following equation: 
Yr = a1Yt-1 +s 
The unit root test will determine whether the coefficient of a, equals 1. This section will 
discuss the methodology of the unit root test and in this connection we will adopt the 
Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). A time series is probably generated from a 
random walk with drift as the effects of a temporary shock (i. e. this drift is reflected in a 
constant term) and trend. Let us examine the following equation: 
Yr = a+, 8t+pyt_1+st (6.20) 
where, 
yt = the observation at time "t" 
a= the constant term 
Et = the error term at time "t" 
t= the times 
ß= the coefficient of the trend parameter 
Detail on the mathematical background may be found in Appendix 6.2. 
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The equation above suggests that an observation in a time series is a function of a 
constant, time, previous observations and errors. Theoretically, a time series grows 
because of two factors: 
(1) A time series grows as a result of a trend reflected by the coefficient of "t". However, 
this trend effect can be removed by detrending the series (i. e. make coefficient p< 1). 
The most common approach is by adding Ay, to the both sides of the equation. 
(2) The other source of the growth is random walk with a positive drift 
(i. e. a>0, ,8=0, and p =1). 
If this condition exists, detrending will not help and the 
regression will lead to spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974). 
To test whether p =1, we can adopt the Dickey-Fuller distribution estimator of 0. 
This test employs the following procedure: 
(1) Run unrestricted OLS regression of the following equation: 
1, -Y_1 = a+, 6t+(p-1)Y1 +AAY, _1 
(2) Run restricted regression of the following equation: Y=a+. ý0Y1 
(3) Calculate the standard F ratio to test whether the restrictions of ,ß=0, and p=1 hold. 
The F ratio is calculated in the following formula: 
F- 
(N - k)(SSER - SSEUR ) 
g(SSEUR) 
where, 
SSER = the sum square errors of restricted regression 
SSEUR = the sum square errors of unrestricted regression 
N= the number of observations 
k= the number of estimated parameters in the unrestricted regression 
q= the number of parameter restrictions 
A unit root sequence exists when p-I=0 or p=1 and a deterministic trend exists when 
pis significantly different from zero. Using the Dickey-Fuller distribution table, we can 
reject or fail to reject (accept) the hypothesis that 8=0, and p=1. If the critical value 
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on the table with a certain confidence interval is larger than the F ratio, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis. 
This study runs the Dickey-Fuller test for exchange rate returns of IDR and the results are 
shown in Appendix 6.3. Working from these results, we reject the hypothesis that the time 
series of IDR exchange rate returns are generated from a random walk with a 5% 
confidence level. 
6.4.5. Identification results 
This study employs daily data of exchange rate returns on IDR against 18 currencies from 
January 1996 to May 1997. The 18 currencies are selected on the basis of the foreign 
exchange risk exposure of a state bank in Indonesia; we will use its foreign exchange 
positions as samples to assess foreign exchange risk. By employing the techniques 
discussed in the previous sections, the results of Ljung-Box and Box-Pierce stationary 
tests are shown in Appendix 6.4. This table shows that all series are stationary at a 5% 
confidence level. Stationarity at the level of the time series is achieved because the series in 
this study is derived from the log normal of exchange rate returns. Based on the Dickey- 
Fuller test, the results show the rejection of the hypothesis that the time series are 
generated from a random walk (p is significantly different from 1 even at a 1% confidence 
level). The Dickey-Fuller test supports the conclusion in the Ljung Box and Box-Pierce 
tests that these series are stationary at level of the series (see Appendix 6.3). Finally we 
conclude that these series are eligible for use in forecasting. 
6.5. Exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) 
The main discussion in this chapter covers the theories of EWMA and the choice of the 
decay factor by J. P. Morgan. The aim of this section is to examine whether the decay 
factor suggested by J. P. Morgan is valid for IDR exchange rate volatility. 
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6.5.1. Theory of EWMA 
This method was developed for the first time in the late 1950s by operations research 
personnel. The many sources available make it difficult to decide who discovered the 
smoothing methods. Cox (1961) indicates that either Holt (1957) or Brown (1956) used 
the exponential smoothing method for the first time. Muth (1960, p. 299) suggests that 
J. F. Magee (1958) was the first person to use the smoothing techniques. Most of the 
important works which employed exponential smoothing were done in the late 1950s and 
published in the 1960s and the dates of the publications are unreliable in helping to identify 
who first used the exponential-smoothing techniques. Many other authors also used the 
smoothing techniques after the 1960s, for example Holt et al (1960), Winters (1960), 
Brown and Meyer (1961), Nerlove and Wage (1964), Theil and Wage (1964), and J. P. 
Morgan (1995). Most of the previous works only used EWMA in marketing and 
productions. They concluded that the models predict quite well. By estimating tourist 
demand in Hawaii, Geurts (1975) claims that the exponential smoothing model is 
outperformed by the Box-Jenkins (i. e. ARIMA models) approach. The following 
discussion provides the theoretical background to the EWMA. 
In EWMA, the next estimated observation of a time series (Fr+i) is a function of the 
previous forecast (F, ) and the observation (X, ) at time "t " (Brown, 1963; Cox, 1961; 
Winters, 1960). In mathematical terms, we can express this in the following equations: 
Model 1: 
F+llr = aFýt_1 + (1- a)Xý 
where, 
a 
Fr+1 
= the decay factor with a constraint of 0< a <1, 
= the forecast of variance at time "r+1" 
the observation (i. e. sample variance) at time "t " 
(6.21) 
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We can rearrange equation 6.21 by replacing the definition of Fr and substituting for 
(1- a) =p in the following equation: 
F+11r = a(a1-tr-2 +PXr-1)+pXr 
2 = aF-1, r-2 + aPXr-1 + pXr 
= a2 (aF-21r-3 + Pxr-2 )+ aPXr-1 + PXr 
= a3F-2, r-3 +a 
2PXr-2 + aPXr-i + PXt 
Assuming that the initial forecast is the same as the first observation (T =1 +q), we can 
rearrange the forecast equation into the following: 
F-+lit = agPXt-q + aq-1PXt-(q-i) +....... a3PXt-3 + a2PXr-2 + aPXt-i +PXt 
q 
F: +llr = P>, a7 Xr-, i=0 
Additionally, model 2 can be applied: 
Model 2: 
F+jjr = aXt + (1- a)F, t-1 
(6.22) 
The value of a plays an important role in EWMA. If the value of a equals a figure 
which is close to 1 (see equation 6.21), this forecast will adopt a small adjustment for the 
errors in the previous forecast. On the other hand, if the value of a is close to 0, the 
model gives substantial adjustment of the previous errors. Without any rule to decide the 
value of a, we can select the value of a to get the intended results of forecasting. 
Indicators to decide the value of a are required, to ensure that there is no subjective 
treatment in forecasting. This study will employ root mean square errors (RMSE) as an 
indicator to decide the value of a. Using time series data, the best value of a is derived 
from the value which gives the minimum RMSE. This study will adopt a trial and error 
method to chose the RMSE. 
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The next issue for EWMA is to determine the initial value of the forecast (i. e. Fo ). For a 
small T and when a is close to 1, the initial value plays a crucial part in forecasting. 
However, since the time "T" is large enough and the a is close to 0, the initial value of 
the forecast (F0) does not affect the outcome of the forecasts too much. Box-Jenkins 
(1976, pp. 199-200) adopt back-forecasting which can be applied to the exponential 
smoothing method. The method simply inverts the time series data and starts the 
estimation from the most recent series and moves to the oldest one. Because our 
observations are numerous (350 observations), the initial value of forecasting will not 
affect the results too much. Therefore, this study assumes that the F. equals 0. 
To test the results, this study will employ Theil's U Statistic since this method has been 
used widely to measure the accuracy of forecasting (Makridakis, 1983, pp. 43-52 and 
Trigg, 1964 ). In mathematical terms, Theil's U statistic can be shown in the following: 
U= 
I 
where, 
n=1 2 
ý (APE,,, ) 
r=1 
(n -1) 
UD U- 
F+1-x 
1 ---' l'l L' i+1 
X; 
The forecast percentage errors (FPE) represent the forecast relative change 
ADS- _ 
X, +1 - Xi  L'i+1 - X; 
The actual percentage errors (APE) represent the actual relative change 
We can simplify equation 6.23 into the following: 
n-1 (FPE; +, - 
APE, 
+1)2 
1=1 
ýý 
(6.23) 
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U 
n=1 2 
1 
F+1 Xi+1 
I=I 
Xi 
n-1 2 
ý 1Xi+1 - Xi 
i=1 
Xi 
The lower the Theil's U statistic, the better the fit in our forecast. 
6.5.2. Universal optimum decay factor in EWMA 
J. P. Morgan (1996) suggests that the decay factor of 0.94 is valid to forecast the daily 
volatility and correlation for all instruments. A universal decay factor is adopted as a 
practical applications by users. The universal decay factor is derived from a weighted 
average of individual optimal decay factors. The weight represents the individual forecast 
accuracy. The following discussion shows how the universal decay factor is derived. 
Assuming that ) represents the optimal decay factor for instrument i, N(i = 1,2....... 3) 
stands for the number of time series included in forecasting, and z, is the minimum RMSE 
for the time series i. Based on the J. P. Morgan approach, the universal decay factor can 
be derived from the following procedures: 
  calculate the sum of z; using the following equation: 
N 
11 = 
Y, Zi 
i=1 
  define the relative error using the following equation: 
A- Ti 
'-'t N 
ý% 
i=1 
  define the weight using the following equation: 
0-1 
Ye, -1 
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N 
where Y- 0; =1 
i=1 
  the optimal decay factor, I is defined in as the following equation: 
_ 
1Y 
A1 2: oi_Zt 
r=1 
Using 480 time series, J. P. Morgan finds that the optimum decay factor is 0.94, which is 
believed to be valid for all currencies. The decay factor is derived from the series which 
comprises of foreign exchange rates, 5 year swaps, 10-year zero coupon bond prices, 
equity indices, and 1-year money market rates. However, the purpose of the universal 
decay factor is just to simplify the calculation of risk assessment for users. From the 
discussion above, we can conclude that the approach assigns the higher weight for the 
lower RMSE. 
If we apply the methodology on 18 IDR exchange rates, the optimum decay factor is 0.98. 
The decay factor on USD/IDR exchange rate returns contributes significantly to the 
optimum decay factor because the RMSE on USD/IDR exchange rate returns is lower 
than the others. The results provide evidence that the decay factor of 0.94 is not valid for 
IDR exchange rate returns. 
The next sub-section shows the empirical study of forecasting IDR using EWMA. The 
aim of this empirical work is to find whether forecasting using the original decay factor 
yields different results. 
6.5.3. Empirical results of forecasting IDR using EWMA 
By employing RMSE , the 
decay factors (DFs) of IDR exchange rate returns are shown in 
the following Table: 
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Table 6.3 
Decay Factors (a ) of IDR Exchange Rate Returns 
No. Currencies a for model 1: 
[F 
= oFT-1 +(1-a)Xt-i] 
a for model 2: 
[F 
= aX-1 +(1-a)F-1] 
1 ATS 0.989 0.011 
2 AUD 0.967 0.033 
3 BEF 1.000 0.000 
4 BND 0.987 0.013 
5 CAN 0.967 0.033 
6 CHF 0.968 0.032 
7 DEM 0.997 0.003 
8 DKK 0.995 0.005 
9 FFR 0.994 0.006 
10 GBP 0.935 0.065 
11 HKD 0.994 0.006 
12 ITL 0.942 0.058 
13 JPY 0.945 0.055 
14 MYR 0.967 0.033 
15 NLG 0.994 0.006 
16 NZD 0.987 0.013 
17 SEK 0.980 0.020 
18 USD 0.975 0.025 
The coefficients of a are near 0 in model 1 and near to 1 in model 2. These results 
support the findings that the series are whitenoise. Since the time series data is generated 
from a whitenoise process, GARCH will provide more accurate estimates than EWMA. 
Lawrence and Robinson (1995) and West and Cho (1995) also support this finding. 
However, EWMA is more simple, practical and suitable for most users (Longerstaey and 
Zangari, 1995). They argue that EWMA can provide similar volatility with GARCH (1,1). 
However, the empirical results - see Section 6.7 - suggest that this argument is invalid for 
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IDR exchange rate returns. Table 6.4 shows the DDaR of foreign exchange position of the 
sample bank calculated using EWMA with original and J. P. Morgan's decay factors. 
Table 6.4 
DDaR Estimates Using EWMA 
1=IDR 1,000 
Net Position Volatility(%) DaR using Voaltility (%) DaR using a 0.94 
using original original DF usingn a 0.94 DF 
DF DF 
ATS 1,236,857.82 -1.11 (13,773.95) -1.04 (12,903.44) 
AUD 6,107,616.04 -0.85 (52,185.92) -0.61 (37,539.12) 
BEF 488.25 -1.12 (5.49) -0.96 (4.68) 
BND 23,934.40 -0.92 (221.34) -0.83 (197.47) 
CAD 334,552.68 -1.34 (4,477.02) -1.39 (4,641.19) 
CHF 1,532,203.80 -1.37 (20,943.65) -1.21 (18,535.68) 
DEM 6,422,919.14 -1.13 (72,824.09) -0.95 (61,303.30) 
DKK 425,981.25 -1.21 (5,158.97) -1.15 (4,904.38) 
FFR 1,799,277.12 -1.05 (18,831.83) -0.92 (16,534.42) 
GBP 34,886,947.65 -0.94 (327,615.84) -0.88 (308,701.69) 
HKD 9,021,070.80 -0.52 (46,772.53) -0.72 (65,239.71) 
ITL 77,882,972.44 -0.91 (708,784.39) -0.97 (753,722.13) 
JPY 3,790,421,766.15 -1.91 (72,470,620.58) -1.90 (72,126,065.90) 
MYR 14,996,934.42 -0.43 (64,653.94) -0.37 (55,741.74) 
NLG 1,219,865.56 -1.20 (14,618.11) -0.98 (11,966.32) 
NZD 240,219.00 -0.69 (1,658.38) -0.68 (1,625.25) 
SEK 320,557.77 -1.09 (3,496.05) -1.03 (3,315.73) 
USD 643,608,560.00 -0.10 (627,846.30) -0.13 (826,493.34) 
Daily at risk (DaR) (74,454,488.38) (74,309,435.48) 
Diversified daily at risk (DDaR) 72,793,852.50 72,437,750.09 
The results show that the original decay factor yields a higher risk than the J. P. Morgan 
approach (i. e. using a 0.94 decay factor). A plot of actual values and estimates is shown in 
Appendices 6.10 and 6.11. 
The following section discusses estimation models using GARCH, and conducts an 
empirical study to estimate the IDR exchange rate returns. The aim of this empirical study 
is to prove that a decay factor approaching 1 is one piece of evidence that the series is 
whitenoice, and, therefore, that the GARCH model provides more accurate estimates. 
6 
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6 
6.6. Theory of the ARIMA and GARCH models 
This section discusses the theory of univariate time series models as the basis of model 
selection procedures to decide the best models for the empirical work. The previous 
section (i. e. identification of patterns) notes that the mean variance analysis assumes that 
the means and variances are constant over time. This assumption is in line with the true 
process since the time series data is generated from the stationary process. The previous 
chapter discussed the theory and the testing of the stationarity of the data. The next step in 
this section is to discuss the models of mean process (ARIlVIA) and conditional 
heteroscedasticity of variances (GARCH). 
6.6.1 Models of mean processes 
6.6.1.1. Autoregressive (AR) models 
The mean process of time series may follow an autoregressive process with certain orders. 
Assuming that the time series data is y,, y2, y3.............. YT , an autoregressive process with 
order p can be shown in the following equation: 
Yt u+ Ol. vt-i + 02Yr-2 +........... +Op. yP + er 
where, 
u= the constant term 
cb = the jt' autoregressive parameter 
et --the error term at time "t " 
(6.24) 
This model assumes that et is white-noise with variance 6`, and is independent from any 
y. Using backward operators, we can rearrange equation (6.24) above into the following 
equation: 
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. vt - A. vt-1 - 
02Yt-2 - 
............... -Op. vt-p =u+ et 
(1-ýB-02B2- ............. 
OpBp)Yt 
- u+et 
The parameters of an autoregressive process can be solved by employing the Yule-Walker 
equation. If we recall the methodology to identify PACF in section 6.4.3, then using the 
Yule-Walker equation we obtain: 
Pl =01+02A -I- ................ i-OpPp-1 
P2 = OiPi -}- 02 + ............... +OpPp-2 
Pp - 
OlPp-1 +APp-2+ ................... 
+op 
where, 
PI, p2 .............. pp are the theoretical auto correlations 
for lags 1,2,........ p and 
0,02,........... 0. are the parameters of the autoregressive coefficients. Since we know the 
value of p from sample autocorrelation, we can calculate the value of 0 (see Appendix 
6.6). 
6.6.1.2. Moving average (MA) models. 
In an AR process, we assume that that there is no relationship between the disturbance 
terms and the dependent variable. However, some previous studies have found that the 
dependent variable (ye) is not always independent from the disturbance, e. To treat this 
behaviour, we can employ MA models. The MA process with q orders is shown in the 
following equation: 
6 
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Yt = e, + 6, e, _, 
+ 82e, 
_2 
+ 83et_3......... +8 e, -Q 
(6.25) 
The ACF and PACF of disturbance can be applied to test whether the MA process is 
significant (see Appendix 6.1). Appendix 6.7 provides the mathematical background on 
how to solve for the variances and covariances of the MA process, and calculate the 
parameters of the MA process. 
6.6.1.3. Autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models 
It is also possible that a time series is generated from a combination of an AR and MA 
models (Box-Jenkins, 1976). Assuming the time series data is an integrated time series, 
Box-Jenkins identify this model as an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
model. The following discussion contains the mathematical background to this model. 
Assuming the first difference of an integrated time series is yi , y2 ................... yr , the 
ARIMA (p, 1, q) models can be shown in the following equation: 
y, _ O, y, -. 
+ ............. +Oy, _p 
+e, +B, e, -,........ 
+6ýt-4 (6.26) 
The parameters of ARIMA models can be solved using the same approach as those in AR 
and MA processes (see Appendices 6.6,6.7 and 6.8). 
6.6.2. Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) 
Many authors propose different models to estimate the volatility of asset returns. 
Lawrence and Robinson (1995) suggest that the GARCH model is better than EWMA 
because GARCH can remove the autocorrelation of conditional volatility and therefore 
represents a satisfactory model of a data generating process. West and Cho (1995) found 
that EWMA can provide similar results to GARCH for short time horizons. JP Morgan 
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(1994) also found that EWMA with a 0.94 decay factor and GARCH (1,1) can give 
similar results of volatility in GBP/USD returns. 
The accuracy of a model depends on many aspects such as the data, models, and accuracy 
assessment criteria. In other words, a good model does not always give the best estimates 
in all circumstances. To provide a clear picture of the volatility of IDR exchange rate 
returns, this study also employs GARCH in the empirical study. 
The aim of this chapter is to select the best estimation model to calculate the volatility and 
correlation of IDR exchange rate returns. The results of the exchange rate volatility will be 
employed to assess the foreign exchange risk of a sample bank in Indonesia. 
In forecasting, we normally assume that the variance of the disturbance term (62) is 
constant over time "t ". However, the actual volatility of a time series is not always 
constant. Engle (1982) introduced a forecasting method allowing the variances to vary 
over time. This model is called Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH). 
These models have been widely used in economics and finance (see Engle , 
1987; Engle, 
1991; French, 1987; Nelson, 1990). 
Based on the identification process, we may conclude that time series were generated from 
a particular process such as AR or a combination of AR and MA (i. e. ARMA). It is also 
possible when the series is integrated either at the level of the series or after the first 
difference. To simplify the discussion below, we assume that the mean process is 
ARMA(1,1). To forecast foreign exchange rate return " y" at time "t" using 
ARMA(1,1), we can use the following equation: 
vr = aly, -, + £r + Act-, 
where, 
yt = the exchange rate return at time "t " 
(6.27) 
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a1= the slope 
c, = the residual 
f3= the coefficient of an MA process 
Appendix 6.8 shows the mathematical derivation for solving the parameters. 
To forecast the variance at time "t+1" (c;,, ) we can employ the following method: 
Var (yt+l I yt )= Et [(. l't+l - Act-1 - alyt )2 ý 
2 
= Et ýt+l 
(6.28) 
The ARMA process assumes that the variance is constant over time. In mathematical 
terms: 
Erst 1 =Ets? =Etst1 =........ Erst p =62 
However, many researchers involved in forecasting financial time series (e. g. stock prices, 
inflation rates, foreign exchange rates, interest rates, etc. ) have observed that the forecast 
errors vary over time. 
If we assume that the variance is conditional on the past variances, or the variance is not 
constant, then: 
et' = ao + a, Etz, + az 't2-2 +...... .... . +ag 
Et-g + vt 
where, vt is a white-noise process (i. e. zero mean, vtvt (o )=1 and vtvt_1 = 0) 
(6.29) 
Engle (1982) employs the multiplication form of conditional heteroscedasticity with order 
1 as shown in the following: 
6 
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sr = vt 
ýao 
+ a1,1 
where, 
yr is white noise process. 
(6.30) 
Other constraints are required for equation 6.30, such as ao and al being constant, 
ao >0 and 0< al < 1, and vt Et_1 =0 in order to maintain the stability of the 
autoregressive process. 
Since the unconditional autoregressive models assume that Evt = 0, the unconditional 
mean of ct will be zero. The white noise process of vt implies that vtvt_1 = 0. From this 
assumption, we can also draw the conclusion that E6tet-1 =0 since i#0. 
The discussion below tries to examine the unconditional variance of st . 
From equation 
6.30, we can derive the EE? as shown in the following equation: 
Eý = E[vý(ao +aisý1)] 
= Evr E(ao + alEr ,) 
If we now recall the assumptions of the white noise process of vt that v, v, (6v) =1 and of 
unconditional variance when Esr = Es? 1= Esr 2=......... = Esr we see that 
unconditional variance can be solved in the following equations: 
Est = Eaa + Eaisý i 
Est - Eaisi i= Eao 
Est (1-ai)=Eao 
E` 
2= ao 
(1-al) 
the 
(6.31) 
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Finally we can conclude that equation 6.30 (i. e. mathematical expression of conditional 
heteroscedasticity disturbances) yields the same result as the unconditional autoregressive 
process of st since we employ the properties of constant variance, zero mean, and all 
auto-covariances are zero. However, this is not the case for conditional autoregressive 
process of variance, 
where, 
Es? # Es? 1 #- Est 2 ......... ý 
Es? , and 6r =1 
Finally the conditional variance can be derived from the following equation: 
E(sr I=a. + a1st 1, 
where, 
E(sr i1 er-2 , et-3 .... 
)= ao + al Et 2, 
(6.32) 
Since the [st ] follows a conditional heteroscedastic process, the [yj ] will be in the 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) as well. Finally, we conclude that 
the ARCH model can reflect the volatility of the time series [y, ]. 
To simplify the discussion above, we used the ARCH(l) as an example. However, the 
ARCH of a variance process may follow aq order which can be shown in the following 
equation: 
R 
22 
6ý = vt (ao + a1Et2-1) 
i=1 
9 
2 
sr = ti 
/a0 
+ al sr 
i=1 
(6.33) 
(6.34) 
The equation above is the same as a model of a time-varying parameter with MA(q). 
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Bollerslev (1986) expands Engle's work by considering an AR process in the 
heteroscedasticity of variances called generalised autoregressive heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH). In mathematical form, GARCH can be shown in the following equation: 
22 
6r = Vt 
4P 
22 
a0 i Lriýt + Ni6t-1 
i=1 i=1 
(6.35) 
where, 
q 
The MA (q) process of residuals is a; st ;= alE, 
2_1 + a28r 2+........ +agEt q ; =1 
P 
The AR(p) process of variances is ß 6ý i =ßl61 +, ßZ62 +.......... +ßP 6r P i=1 
9P 
since vý =1 and 6z= ao +j ai s? 1+Lß, 6r 1 
i=1 i=1 
When the variances (o z) are heteroscedastic, we can replace the symbol 07t 2 with ht (i. e. 
heteroscedasticity). 
To test time variance in variances, this study employs the LM test on the ARMA(1,1) 
variances. The mathematical background to this test is given in Appendix 6.9. This 
method has been used widely by authors to test the autocorrelation of variances (see 
Breusch and Pagan, 1978,1980; Godfrey, 1978; and Engle, 1982). Additionally we can 
also adopt the Ljung-Box q-statistics on the residuals of mean process to test the ARCH 
process (see the discussion in paragraph 6.4.1). 
6.6.3. Model selection procedures in GARCH 
To select the GARCH models is not straightforward. This study adopts the following 
procedure -. (1) identify the patterns of data (i. e. stationarity and trend); (2) transform the 
non-stationary data time series into a stationary process if necessary; (3) identify the mean 
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processes (AR, MA and ARMA); (4) test the ARCH process; (5) test the GARCH 
process. Steps 1 and 2 have been discussed in section 6.4 in this chapter. The following 
section will discuss the identification of AR, ARMA, ARCH and GARCH processes. 
To identify the AR process, we can use the PACF of the series. The high PACF score in 
certain lags, which are measured by the q-statistic of Box-Pierce or Ljung-Box, indicates 
the presence of the AR process. Based on the certain lags which have significant scores, 
we can employ those significant lags as parameters (i. e. AR) in regression. However, this 
method needs an iterative process to choose the true AR process until the process achieves 
efficient estimates. Some model selection indicators can be employed, such as AIC and 
SBC (see Appendix 6.1). R2 is less appropriate for this purpose because the R2 will 
increase when more parameters are included in the regression. The correlogram of ACF 
and PACF provides an initial guess of the ARMA process. The detail of these guidelines is 
in Appendix 6.1. 
The next step is to identify the MA process. The AR process will produce residuals which 
are the difference between the actual series and the forecasts. Based on these residuals, we 
regress the time series (ye) on residuals (et ). To obtain the initial guess for the lags of the 
MA process (ei) in this regression, we can use the ACF and PACF correlogram of 
residuals. The method to derive the correlogram on residuals is similar to that in the 
original series. Since we have identified the MA process, this MA with lag "q" will be 
incorporated into the AR models . 
To select the best ARMA models, we employ several 
rules of statistical properties such as AIC and SBC. Additionally, this study also considers 
the parsimony principle as suggested by Box-Jenkins (1976). This principle suggests that 
the models will produce a better fit with the data if no additional unnecessary parameters 
(i. e. insignificant parameters) are added. To ensure that the model is parsimonious, the t- 
statistic must be greater than 1.96 (i. e. the coefficient must be statistically different from 
zero at a 5% confidence level). Finally, the efficient estimate of the ARMA process can be 
achieved by employing the least-squares estimation procedure. 
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The next step is to identify the ARCH process. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is the 
most widely used to detect the ARCH process on mean residuals. Engle (1982) adopts this 
test by employing the following steps: 
1. Use OLS to estimate the most appropriate AR(n) model: 
YI = ao + alyt-1 + a2Yt-2 +......... .. +anyt-n + £t 
2. Obtain the squares of the fitted errors 612. Regress these squared residuals on a 
constant and on the "q" lagged values (6t = ao + alEt2 1+ a2et-2 +........... +agSt-q) . 
If there is no ARCH or GARCH effect, the estimated values of al , a2 , .... , ar_q will 
be 
zero. Hence, this regression will have little explanatory power so the coefficient of 
determination (i. e., the usual R2-statistic) will be quite low. With a sample of T residuals 
and under the null hypothesis of no ARCH errors, the large TR2 (i. e. over the xq 
distribution) provides evidence for the rejection of this hypothesis. 
The next step is to identify the GARCH process. Actually, the GARCH process is similar 
to the AR process in ARIMA models. To obtain an initial guess of the GARCH process, 
we can use the same approach as that used in the AR process by regressing the estimates 
of ARCH on the ARCH residuals with certain lags. The significant coefficients of lagged 
residuals is the preliminary identification of the GARCH process, and can be included in 
the models. Using AIC and SBC, we can identify the efficient parameters of the GARCH 
models. 
6.7. Empirical results 
Based on the procedures which have been discussed in section 6.6, we find that 11 series 
have zero means and 7 series have non-zero means. The series with zero mean indicate 
that the series are white noise and support the conclusion that these series are generated 
from stationary processes. All series are generated from ARCH processes while only 6 
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series are generated from GARCH processes. Details of the models are provided in the 
following table: 
Table 6.5 
Means and Heteroscedasticity Process of Variance Models 
No. Currency Mean Process Conditional Variance 
1 ATS Y, =O+E, h, =0.21+0.1762, 
2 AUD y, =0+6, h, = 0.14 + 0.13611 
3 BEF y, =0+6, h, = 0.10+0.046? +0.65a2, 
4 BND Y, =0+6, h, =0.13+0.28x;, 
5 CAD y, =0+x, h, =0.31+0.26x11 
6 CHF y, = 0+x, h, = 0.35+0.14x1, 
7 DEM y, =0+E, h, = 0.28+0.21x1, 
8 DKK y, = 0+x, h, = 0.21+0.15e1, 
9 FFR y, = -0.57y, -, 
+ 6, h, = 0.06 + 0.13x1, + 0.7 
10 GBP y, =0+6, h, = 0.06+0.14611+0.596, 
11 HKD y, = 0.02 + x, h, = 0.03 + 0.24x11 
12 ITL y, = -0.14y, + et h, = 0.02 + 0.11611 + 0.84x11 
13 JPY y, =0+6, h, = 0.11+ 0.2662 + 0.4161 1 
14 MYR y, =0.03-0.16yr_1+e, h, =0.03+0.58E, 
15 NLG y, =-0.23y, _, 
+0.11622 +x, h, = 0.25+0.547, 
16 NZD y= -0.18Ya_, +x h, = 0.01 + 0.11x1 ,+0.85o , 
17 SEK y, =0+6, h, = 0.23+0.15E, 
18 USD y, = 0.02 -0.34y, _, 
+x, h, = 0.00+0.23x7 1 
Using those models, we estimate the IDR risk of returns for the next day (i. e. 2 June 
1997) by employing one tail of a 5% confidence level with the assumption that the IDR 
exchange rate returns are normally distributed from their means. In mathematical terms, 
the estimates are calculated from the following equation: 
y= yr + 1.966, (6.36) 
6 
The estimates on 2 June 1997 are given in the following table: 
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Table 6.6 
IDR Exchange Rate Returns: Estimates on 2 June 1997 
Curr. Variances Standard 
deviation 
Conditional 
Mean 
Estimates 
ATS 0.32 0.56 0.00 -1.11 
AUD 0.16 0.39 0.00 -0.77 
BEF 0.28 0.53 0.00 -1.04 
BND 0.14 0.37 0.00 -0.72 
CAD 0.31 0.56 0.00 -1.09 
CHF 0.51 0.72 0.00 -1.40 
DEM 0.36 0.60 0.00 -1.18 
DKK 0.29 0.54 0.00 -1.05 
FRF 0.29 0.54 -0.29 -1.35 
GBP 0.18 0.42 0.00 -0.82 
HKD 0.51 0.71 0.02 -1.38 
ITL 0.28 0.53 0.09 -0.95 
JPY 0.22 0.47 0.00 -0.91 
MYR 0.03 0.18 0.03 -0.32 
NLG 0.46 0.68 0.14 -1.18 
NZD 0.18 0.43 0.13 -0.71 
SEK 0.24 0.49 0.00 -0.96 
USD 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.04 
All estimates of negative exchange rate returns are less than 8% which is the figure 
suggested by the Banking Supervisory Committee (BIS) within the standardised method. 
Plots of the actual value and estimates using GARCH models are provided in the following 
graphs: 
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Chapter 6- Foreign Exchange Rate Risk Assessment Using Alternative Models: Empirical evidence 
6.8. Testing of GARCH estimates 
To examine the power of these models, we can compare the fraction of days when the 
actual volatility is higher than the GARCH estimate and the choice of confidence level in 
estimation. This error test examines the lower bound of estimates because the purpose of 
the estimates is simply to cover negative losses. Based upon this error test, the best 
achievement of GARCH models occurs in HKD, when this model fails to cover only 3 
losses out of 350 observations (i. e. 0.86% errors), and the worst result occurs in DEM 
when 13 losses are uncovered by estimates (i. e. 3.71% errors). These errors are very close 
to the one tail confidence level of 2.5%. Appendix 6.12 shows the details of the error 
estimates for all currencies. However, there is an argument that this method attempts to 
compare risks from a static portfolio (i. e. exposure is assumed to be fixed for a certain 
time horizon) in this model and dynamic revenues in actual profit and loss. The GARCH 
model is more appropriate for a shorter time horizon (i. e. daily) when the portfolio doesn't 
change too much. Based on the error estimates, the GARCH model produces the average 
percentage errors shown in Table 6.7. Based on this table, GARCH yields lower errors 
than EWMA. 
Additionally, this section will employ Kupiec's error tests to examine the accuracy of the 
GARCH estimates (Kupiec, 1995b). Initially, this method tests the accuracy of estimates 
according to time until first failure (TUFF). Assume t is the time until first failure and T is 
a random variable which represents the number of days until the first failure. Let p be the 
probability of a failure on any given day. The probability of observing the first failure on 
day t is given by the following: 
Prob (T = t) = p(1- p)`-' (6.37) 
Kupiec suggests that T has a geometric distribution with an expected value 1p. For 
example, if p is 0.02, the average time until the first failure is 1/ 0.02 = 50 . 
This method 
6 
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will test whether the actual number of days until the first failure (T) is statistically 
different from the null hypothesis. Kupiec adopts the Neyman-Person lemma to construct 
a log likelihood ratio (LR) test. Given p= p" (i. e. the null hypothesis), a value of 
T (assuming T= N) and p *, the LR test can be solved using the following equation: 
LR(N, p*)= -2log[p* (l - pµ )N-' 
]+ 21og 
N NI C1 J`1 1 
N-1 
(6.38) 
Under the null hypothesis, the value of LR(N, p*) has a chi-squared distribution with one 
degree of freedom. GARCH estimates in this study were calculated using a one tailed test 
with a 0.025 confidence level. Therefore, we employ p* = 0.025 in this TUFF test. The 
results show that all currencies accept the null hypothesis (i. e. p= p` -> 1/ 0.025 = 40 ). 
In other words, the true time until first failure is not different from 40 days. See Table 6.8 
for more details. However, these results may accept a false hypothesis when the actual 
time until first failure is not 40 days. Kupiec classifies these errors as Type II error rates 
and he suggests testing with Kupiec Table 2 (see Appendix 6.21). The probability of 
accepting a false null hypothesis for each currency is shown in Appendix 6.17. 
Additionally, Kupiec suggests using the total number of failures to test the accuracy of the 
estimates, especially when the test cannot reject the null hypothesis. Assume that the total 
number of observations is T, total number of failures is N, and the probability of a failure 
on any one of the independent trials isp. Kupiec suggests that the probability of observing 
N failures in a sample size of T follows a binomial process as shown in the following 
equation: 
Binomial [T, N) = (1- p)T-N pn (6.39) 
Using the same procedure as the TUFF test, the LR test statistic of the null hypothesis that 
p= p* can be shown in the following equation: 
6 
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LR = -21og[(1- p*)T-T'(p')] +21og 
(T)]T-N( T) 
ý NJ `N) j 
N 
3 (6.40) 
where p* is the probability of a failure under the null hypothesis. Under this test, the 
proportion of failures has a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. Using 
p* = 0.025 (i. e. the number of failure is 8.750), all currencies accept the null hypothesis 
that the number of actual failures is not statistically different from the null hypothesis with 
a 5% confidence level - see Appendix 6.20 for details. Additionally, this study makes a 
simulation using alternative values for p*. The results show that the larger the difference 
of p* from 0.025, the more the test results in rejection. Finally, we can be confident that 
the GARCH models used in this study provide estimates with a level of accuracy of 
97.5%. 
ý 
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6 
Table 6.7 
Error Estimates (in percentage of observation) 
GARCH EWMA (DF=individual) EWMA 
(DF=0.94) 
Currencies Number of % Number of % Number of % 
Obs. Obs. Obs. 
ATS 8 2.29 9 2.57 14 4.00 
AUD 12 3.43 11 3.14 12 3.43 
BEF 10 2.86 12 3.43 14 4.00 
BND 5 1.43 7 2.00 4 1.14 
CAD 7 2.00 10 2.86 7 2.00 
CHF 8 2.29 14 4.00 12 3.43 
DEM 13 3.71 12 3.43 11 3.14 
DKK 11 3.14 10 2.86 12 3.43 
FFR 11 3.14 9 2.57 13 3.71 
GBP 9 2.57 12 3.43 12 3.43 
HKD 3 0.86 12 3.43 12 3.43 
ITL 10 2.86 10 2.86 11 3.14 
JPY 8 2.29 12 3.43 12 3.43 
MYR 8 2.29 18 5.14 12 3.43 
NLG 11 3.14 9 2.57 8 2.29 
NZD 12 3.43 12 3.43 11 3.14 
SEK 10 2.86 10 2.86 10 2.86 
USD 6 1.71 13 3.71 26 7.43 
Sum 162 46.29 202 57.71 213 60.86 
Average 9 2.57 11.22 3.21 11.83 3.38 
Note: *) 8/350x100 
DF = Decav factor 
However, to estimate the GARCH models needs some expertise which is not always 
available in banks, even in banking supervision units in central banks. Moreover, 
forecasting in GARCH models is more complicated and requires experience as well as 
technical skill, such as the sharpness of intuition to observe the patterns of data and the 
skill to generate efficient models. Therefore, there is no guarantee that two experts in 
forecasting will produce the same models for GARCH even if they employ the same data. 
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Regulatory authorities must be aware of the weaknesses of GARCH models. The adoption 
of GARCH for internal models in banks will require thorough examination before banks 
are allowed to employ GARCH for capital adequacy purposes. 
6.9. Foreign exchange risk assessment using GARCH 
volatility and correlation 
This section will employ the estimates of IDR (negative) returns in foreign exchange 
exposure of a sample bank in Indonesia to assess its foreign exchange risk and compare the 
results to those calculated using the standardised method of the BIS proposals. This 
section also assesses the difference between the daily risk (DaR) and daily diversified risk 
(DDaR) in foreign exchange portfolio positions. According to risk diversification theory 
(see Chapter 4 for details), the volatility of one currency may affect the volatility of other 
currencies. The risk which considers the volatility correlation with other currencies is 
called DDaR in this study. 
Volatility correlation is derived from the following formula: 
4i't 
pý, t = h; t * 
Chj't (6.41) 
where, 
py t= the volatility correlation of the variances on IDR exchange returns 
in currency i and 
currency j at time t 
h,,., = the covariance of the IDR exchange rate returns in currency i and currency j at time 
t 
The correlation matrices of variances is given in Appendix 6.14. 
The results of risk assessment using one tail of a 5% confidence level are given in the 
following table: 
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Table 6.8 
Foreign Exchange Risk of a Sample Bank 
1=IDR 1,000 
Currencies Net Position GARCH 
estimates 
DaR using 
GARCH 
ATS 1,236,858 -1.106 (13,675) 
AUD 6,107,616 -0.773 (47,233) 
BEF 488 -1.045 (5) 
BND 23,934 -0.723 (173) 
CAD 334,553 -1.095 (3,662) 
CHF 1,532,204 -1.404 (21,505) 
DEM 6,422,919 -1.175 (75,499) 
DKK 425,981 -1.050 (4,475) 
FFR 1,799,277 -1.346 (24,214) 
GBP 34,886,948 -0.823 (287,086) 
HKD 9,021,071 -1.381 (124,592) 
ITL 77,882,972 -0.950 (740,132) 
JPY 3,790,421,766 -0.913 (34,608,476) 
MYR 14,996,934 -0.323 (48,367) 
NLG 1,219,866 -1.184 (14,446) 
NZD 240,219 -0.705 (1,695) 
SEK 320,558 -0.963 (3,087) 
USD 643,608,560 -0.039 (249,649) 
Daily at Risk (DaR) (36,267,970) 
Diversified Daily at Risk (DDaR) (34,958,455) 
The results show that the GARCH models suggest lower capital requirements are required 
than suggested by either the standardised method or EWMA[i. e. the standardised method 
requires IDR 365,290,374 thousand (see Table 6.1), EWMA with original decay factors 
requires IDR 72,793,852 thousand, EWMA with a 0.94 decay factor requires IDR 
72,437,750 thousand (see Table 6.3), while GARCH only requires IDR 34,958,455 
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thousand]. To cover shock events, the BIS proposal (1996) requires banks which use 
internal models to multiply the results by a certain multiplication factor (not less than 3). 
Assuming we use a multiplication factor of 3, the GARCH results show that required 
capital should still be far below that suggested by the standardised method - see the 
calculation below. 
Table 6.9 
Comparison of Risk Using GARCH and the BIS Standardised Method 
Models Risk After The difference from the 
multiplying by standardised method 
3 
GARCH 34,958,455 104,875,365 365,290,374-104,875,365 
=260,415,009 
BIS 365,290,374 
Finally, we can thus conclude that the GARCH models suggest a lower capital requirement 
than that applicable under the standardised methodology. This finding is consistent with 
the results of the empirical study by Jackson et al (1997). He found that the actual losses 
are lower than the results generated by multiplying daily risk by 2.5. 
6.10. Conclusions 
The decay factors of IDR exchange rates for EWMA vary. This finding contradicts the 
assertion of JP. Morgan that the 0.94 decay factor is universal, even for interest rate risk 
(J. P. Morgan, 1995,1996). Adoption of a universal decay factor will thus be misleading 
for risk assessment. However, Longerstaey and Zangari (1995) argue that Fisk-metrics' 
methodology is the best way of resolving the dispute between theory and practice. 
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The results of the GARCH estimates are different from those of EWMA. This finding 
therefore contradicts the suggestion that EWMA estimates are similar to GARCH (1,1). 
Additionally, it has been shown the GARCH models can provide a lower error of estimates 
than EWMA (see Table 6.7). 
The 8% risk weighting for all currencies in the BIS standardised methodology is higher 
than suggested by the GARCH estimates. This finding thus provides evidence that the 
standardised methodology is misleading as a guideline for assessing exchange rate risk. 
This finding also provides information for the Indonesian government (i. e. the central bank 
of Indonesia) on how to select the appropriate multiplication factors to capture shock 
events. Adoption of a multiplication factor of 3 (as required in the BIS proposal of 1996) 
still gives much lower results than the standardised method since the highest estimated 
negative returns are only 1.40% (for CHF) in GARCH. 
The GARCH approach however may result in different estimates being provided by each 
forecaster. In an extreme case, two econometricians may produce different estimates for 
the same data. This constraint leads to the adoption of different GARCH processes in 
banks, and demands a detailed verification of each model before a central bank allows the 
models to be used within risk assessment for capital adequacy purposes. 
The regulatory authorities should be aware of the arbitrary results in the GARCH models. 
Stahl (1997) reported that internal models may face errors because modelling normally 
simplifies the real world, using approximations in the calculation and testing the models 
using samples which represent the population. One of the possible solutions to this issue is 
to examine thoroughly the internal models of each bank before granting approval for its 
usage. This treatment, however, may cause heated debate between banks and the 
authorities and will be time consuming. The regulatory authorities may thus decide to 
adopt the same GARCH process for all time series data for banks which are interested in 
using GARCH models in forecasting volatility under certain requirements. This approach 
will be fair to all banks. 
6 
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The pre-commitment approach may also be applicable (Federal Reserve Board, 1995)20. 
However, this method is less prudent when the banks set the pre-commitment level of 
capital far below that required by true level of risk; then the capital regulation is unable to 
prevent moral hazard. Additionally, no single model can guarantee that there will be no 
suffering from unusual financial market stress situations (Gumerlock, 1996). If a penalty 
applies, the figure will be significant. Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a) suggest comparing the 
internal model with a benchmark measure of risk exposure as an alternative to verifying an 
internal model. However, there is no regulatory benchmark model available as a basis for 
comparison. To select a benchmark, we would need to examine all the models used by 
banks. This study thus concludes that the pre-commitment approach is irrelevant for 
Indonesia, especially given the poor state of development of internal risk management- 
processes. 
To decide which models are best depends on what criteria are employed. From the 
accuracy point of view, the GARCH approach is much better than both the BIS 
standardised method and EWMA. However, this model needs frequent adjustment to fit 
with new data, more complicated and is time consuming due to the need to add new data 
to ensure that the pattern of the process (mean and variance processes) remains fixed 
(Jacquier, Poison, and Rossi, 1994). As soon as we suspect a pattern change, we need to 
rerun the models by incorporating new data to identify the new mean and variance 
processes. 
20 The pre-commitment approach allows a bank to set in advance its own capital requirement, with penalties 
imposed if it suffers cumulative losses larger than its committed capital at any point during the reporting 
period. 
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Conclusions 
After the bank reform of 1988, the regulatory authorities in Indonesia relied heavily on 
minimum capital requirements to curb excessive risk taking by banks by adopting the Basle 
Accord of 1988. However, this minimum capital regulation failed to prevent bank failure - 
witness the many banks that failed in Indonesia after 1989- because the regulation considered 
only credit risk. Additionally, the methodology for assessing credit risk in the Basle Accord of 
1988 is flawed. Moreover, in general, the credit risks of borrowers in Indonesia are higher 
than those in the BIS's member countries. For these reasons, a re-evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the then current capital adequacy regulation was in order. 
Many types of risk may affect the economic value of capital, such as credit risk, market risk 
(i. e. interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk, price risk for equities and commodities), 
operational risk and other risks. The empirical work conducted in this thesis concerning the 
determinants of problem banks in Indonesia finds that banks in Indonesia are sensitive mainly 
to credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. It also finds that foreign 
exchange rate risk is insignificant for problem banks (when grouped together) in Indonesia. 
However, this finding does not mean that no Indonesian bank has faced problems because of 
foreign exchange rate risk. Because so few banks suffered from foreign exchange rate risk, the 
parameter which represents this risk is not significant. However, if we observe individual cases 
of bank failure, we find that some banks, such as Bank Duta in 1990 and Bank Exim in 1997, 
encountered severe financial difficulties because of huge losses in foreign exchange trading. It 
is thus clear that some banks failed because of foreign exchange rate risk, although the number 
is very low compared to the number of banks which failed because of other risks. Therefore, 
further examination of foreign exchange risk exposure was in order. 
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The insignificance of the foreign exchange rate risk parameter is consistent with the fact that 
most failed banks were unauthorised in foreign exchange transactions. Even though the 
number of authorised foreign exchange banks is low, they account for a large portion of 
market share. Seven state banks (all foreign exchange banks) control 40% of the market in 
credit while foreign exchange banks in general account for around 70% of the market in credit 
(Bank Indonesia, 1995). Therefore, the failure of a foreign exchange bank will affect the 
banking system in Indonesia significantly. This study thus concludes that the inclusion of 
market risk (predominantly foreign exchange rate risk) in capital adequacy assessment in 
Indonesia is necessary. 
The models in Chapter 3 can also be used as an "early warning system" by banking 
supervisors as they allow for the early identification of potentially problematic banks. 
However, due to the current banking crisis in Indonesia, these models require adjustment 
using new financial data because the financial ratios after the crisis may produce different 
coefficients of parameters. Using error I type and error II type tests, the model 2 in Chapter 3 
can estimate problem banks with only 12.38% total errors. This figure is better than that 
achieved by most researchers, including Espahbodi (1991) who produced 16.89% errors. The 
errors in this study mostly occur during the transition period when banks are re-classified from 
non-problem to problem or from problem to non-problem. This is possibly because the 
regulatory authority needs time to classify banks as problems although the financial reports in 
the previous quarter had already shown that the banks were in trouble. 
The empirical study in Chapter 3 employed data of call reports and supervisory information in 
Bank Indonesia. The data and information are available only for banking supervision purposes. 
Therefore, the use of the data in the model will yield reliable results for an early warning 
system in banking supervision.. 
VII-2 
Chapter 7- Conclusions 
The simulation of these GARCH volatilities into the foreign exchange positions of a bank in 
Indonesia shows that the inclusion of foreign exchange rate risk in capital adequacy 
assessment makes the bank's capital ratio break the trigger of the minimum requirement. 
However, the inclusion of market risk within capital adequacy regulations requires thorough 
study of the methodology of risk assessment and of the requirements appropriate for banks 
interested in using internal models. The adoption of internal models may create the following 
problems: (1) inequality in the standards used for the verification of internal models will 
discourage convergence in capital adequacy regulation; (2) a relaxed approach to the 
supervisory recognition of internal models or the adoption of the pre-commitment approach 
(PCA) may induce banks to set capital requirements as low as possible and to ignore the true 
risks. This may render the minimum capital adequacy regulation ineffective. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Pseudo-R2 
Aldrich & Nelson (1984, pp. 55-7) 
Pseudo R2= 
C 
(N+c) 
where, 
c= the chi-square statistic for overall fit (log likelihood ratio) which can be derived from 
the following equation: 
c= 
-2 (1m - 
1o ) 
N= the total sample size 
lm the log likelihood value of the model 
1,, = the log likelihood value if all slope coefficients are restricted to zero 
McFadden (1973, p. 121 
l 
Pseudo R2=1- 
Z 
0 
McKelvey and Zavoina (1975, pp. 103-20) - 
N 
y(Y# 
-Yý)2 
Pseudo R2= Fass N ExSS+N62 ý(Y' 
-YR)2 +N62 
where, 
N 
N 
, =i 
I 
r=1 
= x;, 8 (ie. evaluated at maximum likelihood) 
ExSS = the explained sum of square 
6= the standard deviation of disturbance under the normal distribution assumption. 
In a logit model this standard deviation is 1.814 (variance=3.29). 
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Appendix 4.1 
Derivation of Capital Base Under the BIS Proposals 
I. Components of capital 
Tier 1 (primary capital): 
1. Ordinary paid-up share capital/common stock 
2. Disclosed reserves 
Tier 2 (Supplementary capital): 
1. Undisclosed reserves 
2. Asset revaluation reserves 
3. General provisions/general loan loss reserves 
4. Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
5. Subordinated term debt 
II. Limitations 
The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 elements will be eligible for inclusion in the capital base, subject to the 
following limits: 
1. The total of Tier 2 elements will be limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of the total of Tier 1 
elements (i. e. at least 50 per cent of the capital base must comprise Tier 1 elements) 
2. Subordinated term debt will be limited to a maximum of 50 per cent of Tier 1 elements (i. e. 25 per 
cent of the capital base). 
3. Where general provisions/general loan loss reserves include amounts reflecting lower valuations of 
assets or latent but unidentified losses present in the balance sheet, the amount of such provisions or 
reserves will be limited to a maximum of 1.25 percentage points, or exceptionally and temporarily 
up to 2.0 percentage points, of risk assets'. 
4. Asset revaluation reserves which take the form of latent gains on unrealised securities (see below) 
will be subject to a discount of 55 per cent. 
III. Adjustment made to the capital base for calculation of the risk asset 
ratio 
Deduction from Tier 1: goodwill 
Deduction from total capital 
1. Investment in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary companies (NB. The presumption is 
that the framework would be applied on a consolidated basis to banking groups) 
2. Investment in the capital of other banks and financial institutions (at the discretion of national 
authorities). 
' This limit would only apply in the event that no agreement is reached on a consistent basis for 
including unencumbered provisions or reserves in capital. 
Appendices 
Appendix 4.2 
Risk Weights by Category of On-balance-sheet Assets Under the BIS 
Proposals 
0% (1) Cash 
(2) Balances at and claims on domestic central banks 
(3) Securities issued by domestic central governments) 
(4) Loans and other assets fully collateralised by cash or domestic central 
government securities or fully guaranteed by domestic central 
governmentS2 
0 or 20% (1) Claims on IBRD and regional development banks (at national 
discretion) (EC countries would treat EC institutions consistently) 
20% (1) Claims on domestic and foreign banks with an original maturity of 
under one year 
(2) Claims on domestic banks with an original maturity of one year and 
over and loans guaranteed by domestic banks 
(3) Claims on foreign central governments in local currency financed by 
local currency liabilities 
(4) Cash items in process of collection 
20% or 50% (5) Claims on the domestic public sector, excluding central government 
(at national discretion) and loans guaranteed by such institutions 
50% (6) Loans to owner-occupiers for residential house purchase fully 
secured by mortgage 
100% (7) Claims on the private sector 
(8) Cross-border claims on foreign banks with an original maturity of 
one year and over 
(9) Claims on foreign central governments (unless 20 per cent) 
(10) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
(11) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
(12) Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated 
investment participations in other companies) 
(13) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from 
capital) 
All other assets 
1 The information stated below is derived from "Handbook of Banking Regulation and Supervision" by Maximilian 
JB. Hall, London: Woodhead-Faulkner, 1993, p. 36 
2 National supervisors have the discretion to prescribe non-zero weights (e. g. 10 per cent or 20 per cent) if they 
attempt to take account of the investment risk on securities issued by their domestic central governments. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
CREDIT CONVERSION FACTORS FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS 
UNDER THE BIS PROPOSALS' 
Instruments Credit 
conversion 
factors 
1. Direct credit substitutes, e. g. general guarantees of indebtness (including standby 100% 
letters of credit serving as financial guarantees for loans and securities) and 
acceptances (including endorsements with the character of acceptances) 
2. Certain transaction-related contingent items (e. g. performance bonds, bid bonds, 50% 
warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular transactions) 
3. Short-term, self-liquidating, trade-related contingencies (such as documentary 20% 
credits collateralised by the underlying shipments) 
4. Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with resource2, where the credit 100% 
risk remains with the bank 
5. Forward purchases, forward forward deposits and partly paid shares and securities, 100% 
which represent commitments with certain drawdown 
6 Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities 50% 
7 Other commitments (e. g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) with an 50% 
original maturity exceeding one year 
8 Similar commitments with an original maturity of less than one year, or which can 0% 
be cancelled at any time 
9 Foreign exchange and interest rate related items Treated 
separately 
NB. Member countries will have some limited discretion to allocate particular instruments into items 1 
to 8 above according to the characteristics of the instruments in the national market. 
1 The information given above is derived from "Handbook of Banking Regulation and Supervision" by 
Maximilian JB. Hall, London: Woodhead-Faulkner, 1993. 
2 These items are to be weighted according to the type of asset and not according to the type of 
counterparty with whom the transaction has been entered into. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.7 
Treatment for Debt and Equity Options 
(Under the BIS Proposals) 
Cash position Option 
position 
Treatment 
Long Long put Position risk would be the market value of 
the underlying security multiplied by the 
sum of specific and general market risk 
charges for the underlying less the 
amount the option is in the money (if any) 
Long Long call same as above 
Short Long call same as above 
Short Long put same as above 
None Long call or put 1. The market value of the underlying 
security multiplied by the sum of 
specific and general market risk 
charges for underlying 
2. The market value of the option 
Source : Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Amendment to The Capital Accord to Incorporate 
Market Risks", January 1996. 
Appendices 
Appendix 4.8 
Qualitative and Quantitative Standards 
(Under the BIS Proposals)2 
Qualitative standards 
1. The bank should have an independent risk control unit that is responsible for the design and 
implementation of the bank's risk management system. 
2. The unit should conduct a regular back-testing program, i. e. an ex-post comparison of the risk measure 
generated by the model against actual daily changes in portfolio value over longer periods of time, as 
well as hypothetical changes. 
3. Board of directors and senior management should be actively involved in the risk control process and 
must regard risk control as an essential aspect of the business to which significant resources need to be 
devoted. 
4. The bank's internal risk measurement model must be closely integrated into the day-to-day risk 
management process of the bank. Its output should accordingly be an integral part of the planning, 
monitoring and controlling of the bank's market risk profile. 
5. The risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with internal trading and exposure limits. 
In this regard, trading limits should be related to the bank's risk management model in a manner that is 
consistent over time. 
6. A routine and rigorous program of stress testing should be in place as a supplement to the risk analysis 
based on the day-to-day output of the bank's risk measurement model. 
7. Banks should have a routine in place for ensuring compliance with a documented set of internal 
policies, control and procedures concerning the operation of the risk measurement system. 
8. An independent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out regularly in the bank's 
own internal auditing process. 
Quantitative Standards 
1. Value-at-risk must be computed on a daily basis. 
2. In calculating the value-at-risk, a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval is to be used. 
3. In calculating value-at-risk, an instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10 day movement in prices is 
to be used, ie. the minimum "holding period" will be 10 trading days. 
4. The choice of historical observation period (sample period) for calculating value-at-risk must be a 
minimum length of one year. 
5. Banks should update their data sets no less frequently than once every three months and should also 
reassess them whenever market prices are subject to material changes. 
6. No particular type of model is prescribed. So long as each model used captures all the material risks 
run by the bank, banks will be free to use models based on such as variance-covariance matrices, 
historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation. 
7. Banks will have discretion to recognise empirical correlations within broad risk categories (e. g. interest 
rates, exchange rates, equity prices and commodity prices, including related options volatilities in each 
risk factor category). 
8. Banks' models must accurately capture the unique risks associated with options within each of the 
broad risk categories. The following criteria apply to the measurement of options risk: 
a. Bank's models must capture the non-linear price characteristics of option positions 
b. Banks are expected to ultimately move towards the application of a full 10 day price shock to 
options positions or positions that display option-like characteristics 
C. Each bank's risk measurement system must have a set of risk factors that captures the volatilities 
of the rates and prices underlying option positions, i. e. vega risk. 
9. Each bank must meet, on a daily basis, a capital requirement expressed as the higher of the following 
2 Source : Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Amendment to The Capital Accord to Incorporate Market 
Risks", January 1996. 
Appendices 
alternatives: 
a. Its previous day's value-at-risk number measured according to the parameters specified in this 
section, or 
b. An average of the daily value-at-risk measures on each of the preceding 60 business days, 
multiplied by a multiplication factor 
10. The multiplication factor will be set by individual supervisory authorities on the basis of their assessment 
of the quality of the bank's risk management system, subject to an absolute minimum of 3. 
11. Banks using models will be subject to a separate capital charge to cover the specific risk of interest rate 
related instruments and equity securities as defined in the standardised approach to the extent that this 
risk is not incorporated into their model. 
IX-10 
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Appendix 6.1 
Identification Guidelines and Model Selection Criteria 
1. Identification: 
Process ACF PACF 
White-noise All pk =0 All 
Oq 
=0 
AR(l): a, >0 Direct exponential decay pk = a, 0, =p; Oq =O for k2 
AR(1): a, <0 Oscillating decay: pk = a, 0, =p; Oq =O for q2 
AR(p) Decays toward zero. Coefficients may 
oscillate 
Spikes through lag p. All 
Oq = Ofor q>p 
MA(1): Q>0 Positive spike at lag 1. pk =0 fork 2 Oscillating decay: 0, >0 
MA(1): Q<o Negative spike at lag 1. pk =0 fork 2 Decay: 01 <0 
ARMA(1,1) 
a, >0 
Exponential decay beginning at lag 1. 
Sign 
, o, = sign(a, +ß) 
Oscillating decay beginning at lag 1. 
01 = pl 
ARMA (1,1) 
a, <0 
Oscillating decay beginning at lag 1. 
sign 
(oq) 
= sign (0, ) 
Exponential decay beginning at lag 1. 
0, =p and sign (0q) = sign (0, ) 
ARMA (p, q) Decay (either direct or oscillatory) 
beginning at lag 
Decay (either direct or oscillatory) 
beginning at lag p 
Sources: Walter Enders (1995, p. 85) 
Note: 
a= coefficient of AR process 
fi = coefficient of MA process 
Pk = autocorrelation function for k>1 
Oq = partial autocorrelation function for q>1 
2. Model Selection Criteria 
The most widely used of model selection criteria to achieve parsimonious model are Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Scwhartz Bayesion Criterion (SBC). These methods are derived from the following 
formula (Enders, p. 88): 
AIC= Tln(SSE)+2n 
SBC =T ln(SSE) +n In(T) 
where, 
n =number of parameters estimated (ie. p+q+ constant term) 
T =number of usable observations [ie. total number of original observations - (p +q+ constant term)] 
SSF. = sum square errors 
6 
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Appendix 6.2 
Mathematical Background of Dickey-Fuller Test 
To test whether al = 1, we employ the following equation: 
yr = alyr-1 + et 
Subtracting yt_1 from both sides to get the delta yr : 
Ayr = a1Yr-1 Yr-i + Er 
_ (al - 1)Yr-1 + -ct 
However, we can add the deterministic elements which are an intercept (a0) and a drift 
term (ß): 
oyt+, 6t ct 
Assuming that (a, - 1) = p, the hypothesis in this test (Ho) is p=0 
Appendices 
Appendix 6.3 
Dickey-Fuller Test at Level of the Series 
No. Variable ADF- DATS(-1) D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- C Trend 
..................... 
TEST.................................... )................... ý).................. 3)).............. 4)). 
........... ............................ 1. ATS (8.64) 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
t-Statistic 
Prob. 
(1.05) 
0.12 
(8.64) 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.98 
0.03 
0.09 
0.35 
0.73 
0.02 
0.08 
0.28 
0.78 
0.03 
0.05 
0.57 
0.57 
(0.02) 
0.05 
0.29) 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.40) 
0.69 
2. AUD (8.71) 
Coefficient (1.03) 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.09 (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.00 
t-Statistic (8.71) 0.69 0.23 0.06 0.75 2.13 (2.02) 
Prob. - 0.49 0.82 0.95 0.45 0.03 0.04 
3. BEF (8.56) 
Coefficient (1.05) (0.02) 0.02 (0.00) 0.03 (0.03) (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 
t-Statistic (8.56) (0.20) 0.18 (0.06) 0.50 (0.46) (0.27) 
Prob. - 0.84 0.86 0.95 0.62 0.65 0.79 
4. BND (11.20) 
Coefficient (2.28) 0.69 0.34 0.12 0.01 0.06 (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 
t-Statistic (11.20) 3.87 2.42 1.26 0.25 1.25 (0.44) 
Prob. - 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.80 0.21 0.66 
5. CAD (11.52) 
Coefficient (2.32) 0.73 0.39 0.19 0.07 0.04 (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.00 
t-Statistic (11.52) 4.14 2.74 1.90 1.33 0.55 (0.03) 
Prob. --0.01 0.06 0.19 0.59 0.98 
6. CHF (8.14) 
Coefficient (1.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) 0.00 
Std. Error 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.00 
t-Statistic (8.14) (0.71) (0.69) (0.69) (0.42) (0.70) 0.07 
Prob. - 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.67 0.48 0.94 
7. DKK (8.69) 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
t-Statistic 
Prob. 
(1.05) (0.02) 
0.12 0.11 
(8.69) (0.19) 
0.85 
0.04 
0.09 
0.40 
0.69 
0.05 
0.08 
0.64 
0.52 
0.05 
0.05 
0.85 
0.40 
(0.01) (0.00) 
0.05 0.00 
(0.27) (0.37) 
0.79 0.71 
Appendices 
Appendix 6.3 (continued) 
No. Variable ADF- DATS(-1) D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- C Trend 
D. -"----............................. 
))................. 
................. 
3). )................. 4). )....................................................... 
LM .................... 
TEST 
8. (8.88) B. DEM 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
t-Statistic 
Prob. 
(1.20) 
0.14 
(8.88) 
9. FFR (8.55) 
Coefficient (1.06) 
Std. Error 0.12 
t-Statistic (8.55) 
Prob. - 
10. GBP (8.55) 
Coefficient (1.01) 
Std. Error 0.12 
t-Statistic (8.55) 
Prob. 
11, DHK (9.88) 
Coefficient (1.96) 
Std. Error 0.20 
t-Statistic (9.88) 
Prob. - 
12. ITL (9.66) 
Coefficient (1.70) 
Std. Error 0.18 
t-Statistic (9.66) 
Prob. 
13. JPY (7.60) 
Coefficient (0.86) 
Std. Error 0.11 
t-Statistic (7.60) 
Prob. - 
14. MYR (9.24) 
Coefficient (1.23) 
Std. Error 0.13 
t-Statistic (9.24) 
Prob. 
15. NLG (8.79) 
Coefficient (1.31) 
Std. Error 0.15 
t-Statistic (8.79) 
Prob. 
0.05 (0.04) 0.03 0.05 (0.02) (0.00) 
0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.00 
0.38 (0.34) 0.42 1.04 (0.30) (0.36) 
0.70 0.74 0.67 0.30 0.76 0.72 
(0.04) (0.01) 0.02 0.06 (0.01) (0.00) 
0.11 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 
(0.37) (0.15) 0.25 1.12 (0.18) (0.34) 
0.71 0.88 0.80 0.26 0.86 0.74 
(0.06) (0.01) 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.00 
0.11 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 
(0.53) (0.07) 0.87 0.99 0.19 0.64 
0.60 0.94 0.39 0.32 0.85 0.53 
0.48 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.00 
0.17 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.00 
2.75 1.63 0.86 0.56 0.75 1.09 
0.01 0.10 0.39 0.58 0.45 0.28 
0.31 0.12 0.00 (0.12) 0.10 (0.00) 
0.15 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.00 
2.07 0.97 0.03 (2.28) 1.23 (1.40) 
0.04 0.33 0.97 0.02 0.22 0.16 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 0.00 
0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.00 
(1.40) (1.36) (0.82) (0.61) (0.69) 0.73 
0.16 0.17 0.41 0.54 0.49 0.46 
0.10 0.10 0.07 (0.02) 0.05 (0.00) 
0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 
0.84 0.96 0.84 (0.32) 1.91 (0.98) 
0.40 0.34 0.40 0.75 0.06 0.33 
0.03 
0.13 
0.23 
0.82 
IX-14 
0.01 (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) 
0.11 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.00 
0.12 (0.57) (0.76) (0.29) (0.39) 
0.90 0.57 0.45 0.77 0.70 
Trend 
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Appendix 6.3 (continued) 
No. Variable ADF- DATS(-1) D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- D(DATS(- C Trend 
TEST 
..................................... 
1. ).................. ).................. 3ý).................. 4ý).......................... 
16. NZD (10.30) 
Coefficient (1.62) 0.35 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.12 (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00 
t-Statistic (10.30) 2.57 1.87 1.33 1.07 2.23 (1.65) 
Prob. - 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.29 0.03 010 
0.35 
0.14 
2.57 
0.01 
0.21 
0.11 
1.87 
0.06 
0.11 
0.09 
1.33 
0.19 
0.06 
0.05 
1.07 
0.29 
0.12 
0.06 
2.23 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(1.65) 
0.10 
17. SEK (7.77) 
Coefficient (0.90) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 0.01 0.02 (0.00) 
Std. Error 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.00 
t-Statistic (7.77) (1.24) (0.96) (1.18) 0.20 0.28 (0.77) 
Prob. - 0.21 0.34 0.24 0.84 0.78 0.44 
18. USD (10.01) 
Coefficient (1.81) 0.34 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Std. Error 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.00 
t-Statistic (10.01) 2.13 1.12 1.00 0.67 7.74 0.09 
Prob. - 0.03 0.26 0.32 0.50 - 0.93 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
1% Critical Value* -3.9872 
5% Critical Value -3.4239 
10% Critical Value -3.1346 
(1.62) 
0.16 
(10.30) 
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Appendices 
Appendix 6.6 
Solving Parameters of Autoregressive (AR) Process 
AR(1) process. 
Based on the Yule-Walker equation, the ACF at lag 1 is as follows: 
Assuming the empirical of ACF of p, = A, the parameter of AR(1) equals A 
AR(2) process. 
Based on the Yule-Walker equation, the ACF at lag 2 is as follows: 
P, = 01 + 02PI 
Pz=AiJ? +4 
Replacing p, by A, and P2 byA2 we can solve for A and 
A, =0+ 0ZA, 
A2 =0, 
A, +Y2 
Rearranging these equations, we obtain the following equations: 
0, =A1-g52A1 
=A, (1-02) 
02 = A2 - OA, 
Inserting equation no. 1 into no. 2 and solving for 
0z = Az -Ai(I-4)Ai 
= A2 - (A, + A, 4 )A, 
= Az - A; + Ai 02 
¢§-A, 24 =Az - A, z 
zz 4(1-A, )=AZ-A, 
A- Az -A, 
2 
4: 
Y2 1-A 
Inserting equation no. 2 into no. 1 and solving for q: 
01 = A1(1-A2 -q51A1) 
z 
ýfj= 
A, - A, AZ -01A 1 
Y'1 
+ OA12 = A, - 
A, AZ 
q51(1+A12) = A1(1-A2) 
A, (1-Az) 
01 = (1+A) 
Parameters of the higher order of AR process can be solved using the same approach. 
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Appendix 6.7 
Mathematical Explanation of Moving Average (MA) Process 
The MA process with order q can be written as: 
Yt = e, + 9, et-I + 
O2et_2 + 93et-3......... +Gget-9 (1) 
The covariance and ACF of the MA process can be derived from the multiplication of 
equation (1) by yr_k to get the following equation: 
Yt-k 
t= 
(e, + Bet-1 + 92et-2 + 83e1-3+ 
............. 
+8 et lJ, 
-k 
= 
(e, 
+6, e, --1 +e2et_2 +9et_3+.... 
+eget-q)(et_k +81et-k-1 +92et-k-2 +83e_k-3+.... +Be } 
q t-k-g 
Taking expected values for both sides, we get: 
Yk = E[(et + Stet-t + eet_2 + 93et_3+ ............. 
+8get-q)(et-k + Bet_k-1 + 02e, 
-k-2 
+ 83Et_k_3+........ +8qe 
rk =E(eet-k +getel_k-, +getet-k-2+..... +Bete, -k-q+............ 
+q6et_, et_k. +........ qet-, et_k_, +.... +9et_, et_k_2+.. +qet-qet-k-q) 
For covariance with lag 0 (k = 0), the yo will be the following: 
Yo = E(e, e, ) +8ee, -, 
+ 8z e, et_z +...... 8 e, e, -q 
+..... +912 e, _, 
+....... +9 et_2 +. ... +6z e q t-q 
Since the E(eter_; ) = Ofor i# 0and E(eer_1) = 62 for i=0, therefore: 
_2222222 +022 YO - 6e +816e +826e +836e+ ............. +Bg6e 
YO =0+812+82+42+........ +82)62 
For covariance with lag 1 (k = 1), we obtain the following results: 
YI E(Ber_, e, _, 
+ 828, et_2et_2 + e3p"2et_Set_3............... +GgGq_legeq ) 
=9162 +916,62 +03836. ........... 89_, 072 
=ffl +0201 +0, e...... .. e0g_1)6e 
Yk 7 lek + 
81 ek+1 + 
................. 
+09eg_k l6e 
(2) 
(3) 
From equation (2) and (3), we can calculate the ACF of the MA process 
Appendices 
Yk 
(ek + e18k+1 + e2 ek+2 +. 
..... . 
+8 
_k 
6ýJ6e 
- 
v- 
- Pk 
/0 (1 + 
e12 
+ 92 + .............. +e9 
)6e 
MA (1), MA(2) and MA(3) processes can be shown in the following equations: 
MA(1): 
MA(2): 
81 
Pk=(l+e, 2) 
p1= 
eZ 
MA(3): 
Pz -I+012 
+022 
81 + 81e2 + e2e3 
p'-1+8,2+ez 
+8; 
01 +010 
2 61(1+9z) 
1+812 +02 1+812 +6z 
0, +0,0, Pz - 1+elz +82 +e2 
e3 
P3 -1 +e, Z +e2 +e3 
The value of Pk in the MA(q) process will be zero for k>q 
Appendices 
Appendix 6.8 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) Models 
The equation of the models can be written: 
yt 1J t-1 
+ 
............. 
+ 
pJ r-p 
+ et 
ler_I 
+...... +(Jet-9 
To derive the ACF of the ARMA (p, q) models : 
Multiply both sides of the equation above by yr_k , to get the 
following: 
Y, 
t-k 
= 
Ol 
r-1J r-k 
+ etJ 
r-k 
+ el e, 
-1J , -k 
+.......... +G et-qy, 
-k 
Taking the expected value 
ýýojj 
of the equation above, we get the following: 
Yk = E(Olyr-lyt-k +........ +Y'pyt-pyt-k + ery, k+ 
elet-lyt-k ........... +89et-9yr-k ) 
If k>q, the term E(etyt_k) =0 and if k<q, the past errors and the yr_k will be 
correlated and the autocovariance will be affected by the moving average. 
The variance and autocovariance of ARMA(l, 1) can be shown in the following equation: 
yt = Y'lyt-1 
+ er + 
elet-1 
Multiplying both sides by Yt_k we get the following equation: 
YtYt-k = 
Ol 
t-IJ t-k 
+ e, YI-k + elet-1J 
t-k 
Taking the expected value of the equation above, we get the following equation: 
EYt-kYt = E(Oly, -ky, -1 
+Y, 
-ke, 
+ O'1Yt-ke, 
-1 
) 
If k=0, the equation above will be the following: 
EY, Y, = E(91YY, -, 
+ y, e, + ey, e, 
-1) 
ro = 
01r1 + E[(O1y, 
-, 
+ e, + Ole, -1)et 
]+ 91E[(01y, 
-1 
+ e, + Oe, 
-, 
)e, 
-1 
0,71 + EO1yt-let + et + EOlet_, e, + 0, E(oy, -, et-, + etet_1 + 
01e, -let-1) 
Since this model assumes that covariance ye_1e, = Oandye, = o, therefore: 
r0 =1 ul +O+6e +0+0+0+01260 
= 
07, + 6e + 01'(7 
2 
If k=1, the covariance can be derived in the following way: 
EY, y, 
ý-1 
= E(O1Y, -, 
y, 
-, 
+ y, 
-let 
+ O1y, 
-, 
e, 
-1) 
r1 = 
7'1)/0 
+ E[(Y'1y, 
-2 
+ e, 
-, 
+ 01et-2 )e, ]+ 01E[(Y'1Yt-2 + et_1 + 0e, -, )e, _, )et-1 
Appendices 
OýYo + Eo, y, -2 e, 
+ e, -, e, 
+ EB, er_2e, + 9, E(O, yt-2e, 
_, 
+ e, -, e, _, 
+ 9, et_2et_, ) 
This model assumes that yr_ke, = 0, et_ket = 0, etel = (7. 
Y, =0,7, +O+O+O+O+O+B16e +0 
= 02 
110 
+ e'6e 
To solve for the autocovariance (p1 ), we need to rearrange the yo and 
following equations: 
Recall: yo = 011 + 6e + 
0126¢ 
Substitute y, into yo we obtain the following equation: 
Yo = ý1 (o, Yo + et6e )+ 6e + 
etZ6e 
YO -Y 12 /0+ 
01 el6e + 6e + e12 6e 
r0 -ý 1Z 
r0 ='7e + 
elZ 6e + `Yl 
e61 e 
r 0(1- 
`YIZ 
)= 6Q + e12 6e +ol el 6e 
v- 10 (1-Y'1') 
Recall: Y, = 0170 +0 , 6' 
V- !l (1 
- Y'12 
) 
0e + ý1ý 6e + ý1816e 
O1 
l6e 
+ elz 6e + 
Y'1816e /+ 
e16e 
Yl 
_ 
Y'16 
+ 
Y'1 
812 
(6e 
+ýjY%]2 e16¢ + e] 6e 
\ý-Y'I2) 
G+ 
0,0. )Y' 
1+(0, e, + 1)8, 
(1-011) 
z 6e 
into the 
ý(1+Oý eAO, +8, ) 6, Yý _ (1-011) 
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Appendix 6.9 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
Engle (1982) proposes the use of the Lagrange multiplier test for disturbances using the 
following steps: 
1. Use OLS to estimate the most appropriate AR(n) model: 
Y, = as + ay, -, 
+ a2Y, -2+........... 
+any, + e, 
2. Obtain the squares of the fitted errors e; . 
Regress these squared residuals on a 
constant and on the "q" lagged values (et = a0 + a, eý ,+ az e. _2 
............ +aq eJ 9) 
If there are no ARCH or GARCH effects, the estimated values of a, , a2 , ...., a, _q will 
be zero. Hence, this regression will have little explanatory power so the coefficient of 
determination (i. e. the usual R2-statistic) will be quite low. With a sample of T residuals, 
under the null hypothesis of no ARCH errors, the test TR2 converges to a 
x9 distribution. If TR2 is sufficiently large, rejection of the null hypothesis that 
a, , a2 , ...., a, -, 
jointly equal to zero is equivalent to rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH errors. On the other hand, if TR2 is sufficiently low, it is possible to conclude that 
there are no ARCH effects. 
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Appendix 6.13 
Test GARCH Residuals 
No. Currencies Theil's U score Mean Square Errors 
1 ATS 0.00 2.33 
2 AUD 89.70 0.09 
3 BEF 1.73 0.35 
4 BND 1.31 3.31 
5 CAD 4.15 8.09 
6 CHF 1,945.51 4.63 
7 DEM 0.90 2.96 
8 DKK 0.21 2.22 
9 FFR 0.36 0.64 
10 GBP 0.00 2.16 
11 HKD 0.00 1.92 
12 ITL 0.00 11.34 
13 JPY 1.74 3.41 
14 MYR 0.00 0.72 
15 NLG 0.17 2.07 
16 NZD 0.00 4.16 
17 SEK 2.75 1.94 
18 USD 0.00 0.00 
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Appendices 
Table I 
Critical values for the TUFF test 
Appendix 6.21 
Kupiec's Table 
Null Hypothesis probability 
p* 
Non-rejection region for t 0.05 Type 
I error 
Non-rejection for t 0.10 Type I 
error 
0.005 11<t<879 21<t<729 
0.010 6<t<439 10<t<364 
0.015 4<t<292 7<t<242 
0.020 3<t<219 5<t<182 
0.025 2<t<175 4<t<145 
0.030 2<t<146 3<t<121 
0.035 2<t<125 3<t<103 
0.040 1<t<109 3<t<90 
0.045 I <t<97 2<t<80 
0.050 t<87 2<t<72 
Table 2 
Selected Type II error rates for the TUFF (0.05) test 
Null hypothesis probability Alternative hypothesis 
p*=0.010 
p*=0.010 
p*=0.010 
p*=0.010 
p*=0.010 
p*=0.025 
p*=0.025 
p*=0.025 
p=0.015 
p=0.020 
p=0.030 
p=0.040 
p=0.050 
p=0.030 
p=0.040 
p=0.050 
Type II error rate 
0.898 
0.868 
0.808 
0.751 
0.698 
0.908 
0.884 
0.857 
Table 4 
Maximum sample size (T) for which the null hypothesis p=p* is rejected by PF (0.05) test 
Number of 
failures 
p*=0.01 p*=0.02 p*=0.03 p*=0.04 p*=0.05 
N=1 6 3 - - - 
N=2 34 17 11 9 - 
N=3 75 38 26 19 16 
N=4 125 63 42 32 26 
N=5 180 91 61 46 37 
N=6 240 121 81 61 49 
N=7 302 152 102 77 62 
N=8 367 184 124 93 75 
N=9 434 218 146 110 88 
N=10 503 253 169 127 102 
Notes: 
1. t is the number of observations until the first failure is recorded. 
2. The type II error rate is the probability of accepting the false null hypothesis using a 5% confidence 
level TUFF test when the specific alternative hypothesis is true. 
3. Example for Table 4: if two failures are observed in a sample size which employs 34 observations or 
less, the null hypothesis p*=0.01 can be rejected at the 5% confidence level. 
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List of Currencies 
Symbol Currencies 
ATS Austrian schilling 
AUD Australian dollar 
BEF Belgian franc 
BND Brunai Darussalam dollar 
CAD Canadian dollar 
CHF Swiss franc 
DEM Deutsche mark 
DKK Danish krone 
FFR French franc 
GBP Great Britain Pound Sterling 
HKD Hon Kong dollar 
IDR Indonesian rupiah 
ITL Italian lira 
JPY Japanese yen 
MYR 
_ 
Malaysian rin it 
NLG Dutch guilder 
NZD New Zealand dollar 
SEK Swedish krona 
USD U. S dollar 
